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Abstract
My dissertation aims at understanding the environmental and behavioral determinants of road traffic accidents in
a developing country, India. To do so, a panel database on Indian states over a period going from 1996 to 2006 has
been built. A household survey among drivers and passengers of motorbikes has been also implemented in Delhi
in 2011, this to overcome the absence of individual data on road habits.
Chapter 1 is a macroeconomic study on the Indian subcontinent. The results found suggest that India should
invest more particularly in road infrastructures, in the strict implementation of road rules and in education pro-
grams on road related risks. Given that 70% of motorized vehicles are two-wheelers in India, I decided to focus
the rest of my analysis on this subgroup. Chapter 2 provides a presentation of the survey. I study in Chapter 3 the
adequate measurement of risk aversion in the context of a developing country. I explore the impact of questions
and interviewers on the elicited individuals’ preferences towards risk. In Chapter 4, a theoretical model on the
influence of risk aversion on prevention activities is first adapted to the road safety context. When looking at the
data, we found that more risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet while there is no significant effect on
choice of speed. As for passengers, they seem to adapt their helmet use to their environment and in particular to
their driver’s skills. In Chapter 5, I show that previous experiences of road crash and police stop impact subjective
expectations. Fear of injuries lead to a greater use of helmet on long distance journeys, while police threat rather
determines the helmet use on short trips.
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Résumé
Ma thèse a pour objectif de mieux cerner les facteurs environnementaux et comportementaux des accidents de
la route dans un pays en développement, l’Inde. Dans ce but, une base de données de panel couvrant les états
indiens sur une période allant de 1996 à 2006 a été construite. Une enquête ménage parmi les conducteurs et
passagers de deux roues a aussi été mise en place à Delhi en 2011, ceci pour surmonter l’absence de données in-
dividuelles sur les habitudes en matière de sécurité routière.
Le Chapitre 1 est une étude macroéconomique sur le sous continent indien. Les résultats suggèrent que l’Inde de-
vrait investir plus particulièrement dans les infrastructures routières; dans la mise en application stricte du code de
la route ainsi que dans des programmes de prévention routière. Etant donné que 70% des véhicules motorisés sont
des deux roues en Inde, j’ai décidé de concentrer le reste de mon analyse sur ce sous groupe. Le Chapitre 2 présente
l’enquête. J’étudie dans le Chapitre 3 l’adéquation des outils de mesure de l’aversion au risque dans le contexte
d’un pays en voie de développement. J’explore l’influence des questions et des enquêteurs sur les préférences
individuelles pour le risque élicitées. Dans le Chapitre 4, un modèle théorique sur l’influence de l’aversion au
risque sur les activités de prévention est tout d’abord adapté au contexte de la sécurité routière. L’examen des
données montre que plus un conducteur est averse au risque plus il est enclin à porter le casque; aucun effet sig-
nificatif n’est obtenu sur la vitesse. Quant aux passagers, ces derniers semblent adapter l’utilisation du casque à
leur environnement et en particulier aux compétences de leurs conducteurs. Dans le Chapitre 5, je montre que
les expériences passées d’accidents de la route ou d’arrestations policières impactent les anticipations subjectives.
La crainte d’être blessé accroît le port du casque pour les trajets longs, tandis que la menace policière influe sur
l’utilisation du casque sur de plus courtes distances.
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Samenvatting
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om meer inzicht te krijgen in de determinanten van verkeersongelukken in een
ontwikkelingsland, in dit geval India. Daarbij is gekeken naar omgevings-, institutionele en gedragsfactoren. Op
basis van rijke en oorspronkelijke datasets wordt beoogd om nieuw licht te werpen op dit onderwerp en bij te dra-
gen aan het debat over verkeersveiligheidsprogramma’s in ontwikkelingslanden.
Het eerste hoofdstuk beschrijft een macro-economisch onderzoek op het Indiase subcontinent. Op grond van
de analyse van verschillen in verkeerssterfte tussen Indiase deelstaten en door de tijd heen kan geconcludeerd
worden dat India meer zou moeten investeren in het wegennet, de strikte implementatie van verkeersregels en
voorlichtingsprogramma’s over verkeersgerelateerde risico’s. Aangezien 70% van de gemotoriseerde voertuigen in
India tweewielers zijn, en ruim de helft van de verkeersslachtoffers in dit land hoofdletsel oploopt, is het onderzoek
gericht op motorrijders. Omdat er geen individuele gegevens over verkeersgedrag voorhanden waren, is er in 2011
een enquête gehouden onder motorrijders in Delhi. In hoofdstuk 2 volgt een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de
steekproef en vragenlijst. Voordat in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 wordt ingegaan op de invloed van individuele voorkeuren en
opvattingen op het gebied van veilig gedrag in het verkeer, wordt in hoofdstuk 3 beschreven hoe risico-aversie in
de context van een ontwikkelingsland gemeten moet worden. Hoofdstuk 4 begint met een theoretisch model van
de invloed van risico-attitudes op zelfbescherming en het nemen van voorzorgsmaatregelen, toegesneden op de
verkeersveiligheidscontext. Daarna worden de resultaten van het empirisch onderzoek beschreven. Het blijkt dat
motorrijders die hoger scoren op risico-aversie vaker een helm dragen, maar dat risico-voorkeuren geen significant
effect hebben op hoe hard iemand rijdt, zoals de theorie voorspelt. Bovendien lijken een lage snelheid en het
dragen van een helm substituten te zijn. Passagiers lijken hun keuze om een helm te dragen af te stemmen op hun
omgeving en in het bijzonder op de rijvaardigheid van de bestuurder. Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 5 ingegaan
op het effect van verwachtingen over letsel en verkeersboetes op het dragen van een helm. Het is interessant
dat de angst voor letsel het dragen van een helm bij lange-afstandsritten bevordert, terwijl de dreiging van een
bekeuring vooral bepalend is voor het dragen van een helm op korte trajecten. Op grond van de resultaten wordt
aanbevolen om de verkeersboetes te verhogen en tegelijkertijd de verkeersregels strikter te handhaven, en ook om
in informatiecampagnes meer de nadruk te leggen op het nut van het dragen van een helm op korte motorritten
dicht bij huis.
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The World Health organization (WHO) estimates that road traffic crashes cause over 1.24 million deaths and
probably more than 25 million severe injuries per year (WHO; 2013). Globally, road traffic injuries are already today
among the three major causes of death for the age group 5 to 44 years (WHO; 2013). Moreover, the WHO’s Global
Status Report in Road Safety states that over 80% of the world’s road fatalities occur in middle income countries,
although these countries only account for about 52% of the world’s registered vehicles (WHO; 2013).1 Over the next
15 years, unless immediate action is taken, the WHO anticipates that the number of people dying annually in road
traffic crashes may rise to 2.4 million. The increase will probably entirely occur in low and middle income countries
where road traffic injuries would become one of the major causes of death. Given these numbers, tackling this
problem has to become no less of a policy priority as compared with diseases such as diarrhea, malaria, HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis.
In the last four decades, industrialized countries have been able to achieve significant reductions in road mor-
tality. For instance, in the case of France, the reversal of the trend was observed already in 1972. The attention of
policymakers to this issue was reflected in the creation of a National Delegate for Road Safety position. In 1973,
mandatory seat belt and speed limit laws were implemented. Still in 2002, road safety was President Chirac’s top
priority. New road-related laws led to the setting of speed cameras, the automatic process of traffic offences and
the creation of a probationary license, which led to a 32.5% cut in road mortality in only four years’ time (2001-
2004). Overall, road mortality decreased by 83%, from 18,000 in 1972 to around 3,000 fatalities nowadays. This
reduction was made possible by a constant and strong political will, tackling all dimensions of the problem: from
enforcement of traffic rules to the quality of road and health infrastructures.
High and middle-low income countries experience today very different situations with respect to road traffic
mortality. Contrary to developed countries, the number of road fatalities has risen substantially in many develop-
ing regions. While the number of road traffic deaths decreased in 42 (out of 49) high-income countries between
2007 and 2010, only 41 (out of 100) middle-income states and 5 (out of 33) low-income ones have a similar record
(WHO; 2013).2 Road traffic injuries entail major economic problems, in particular because they primarily affect
the economically active population, as does HIV/AIDS. Moreover, providing medical services to those injured im-
1India belongs to the middle-income country group.
2These statistics correspond to a categorization of countries according to the World Bank Atlas method (WHO; 2013) the middle income
group corresponds to countries with a GNI per capita between US$ 1,006 and US$ 12,275.
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plies a high burden on national health systems and budgets. Hence, not surprisingly, the WHO estimates global
losses due to road traffic accidents to be close to 518 billion USD and likely to cost governments between 1% and
3% of their GDP (Ansari et al.; 2000; Jacobs et al.; 2000; WHO; 2009).3 In many developing countries this is obvi-
ously more than the total amount that these countries receive in terms of development assistance. Cross-country
studies (Kopits and Cropper; 2005; Bishai et al.; 2006) suggest that at very low levels of income, road traffic fatalities
per population increase with income up to a certain threshold and then fall. This inverted u-shaped relation be-
tween the income and number of road casualties can be explained by the fact that growth and development come
first with an increase in road mortality caused by a raise in the number of motorized vehicles. Subsequently, once
a certain level of wealth has been reached, the country is able, in particular, to invest in road and health infrastruc-
tures, to launch awareness campaigns or to enforce traffic rules. Unfortunately, most developing countries are still
far away from this stage. Nevertheless, adequate and cost effective actions must be found without delay in order
to reverse or at least bend down the observed trend in road mortality in these regions.
0.1 What are the possible levers to reduce road mortality?
The improvement of the quality of road infrastructures plays a key role in the reduction of the frequency and the
severity of road traffic accidents. While metropolitan cities are widening in many developing countries, leading
to an increasing need of mobility within but also between cities, huge financial resources and time are required
to build a safe and comprehensive road network. In many cases, governments’ financial shortcomings explain
why potholes and unpaved roads are still very common in many regions of the world. Rapid access to health care
following a road crash is also crucial to limit the consequences of injuries. In the case of India, the slowness of
ambulatory services worsens the road accident problem. According to Hsiao et al. (2013), 58% of all road injury
deaths in this country occur on the scene of the collision, either immediately or while waiting for the emergency
ambulance to come.
Another lever to reduce road mortality is to prevent individuals from adopting risky behaviors while traveling.
In recent years, more and more low- and middle-income countries have started implementing and enforcing road-
related legislation to reduce speeding and drink-driving, and increase the use of motorcycle helmets, seat-belts and
child restraints. The case of Cambodia is a good example of the efforts some governments are putting to reduce
road mortality by changing habits of road users. Indeed, this country passed a law in 2009 requiring motorcycle
drivers to wear a helmet. One year later, it increased the police capacity to enforce the law. Finally in 2012, it
implemented an awareness campaign, in order to make individuals realize the financial and health-related risks
they face when traveling without a helmet. Unfortunately, the low enforcement of traffic rules and the widespread
petty corruption in many developing countries (WHO; 2013) often impede the success of road safety legislative
measures.
3Ansari et al. (2000) report for instance that in Saudi Arabia the impact of road traffic crashes on the health budget is dramatic: at any time,
one third of beds in public hospitals would be occupied by road crash victims.
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Attitudes adopted by road users may also depend on their perception of road risks and their awareness regard-
ing road injuries. Despite the fact that helmet use is an individual choice, the adoption of head protection may be
influenced by social norms, or be the result of a family decision. Let’s take the case of a motorcyclist. His or her
expectations regarding the financial and health consequences of infringing the helmet mandatory law, as well as
of being involved in a road crash if not using a head protection are likely to impact his or her traveling behavior.
Considering the cost of a helmet, a household may decide to buy only one such device and subsequently choose
which member of the household will benefit from this protection. This choice may depend on age, gender or on
the income each household member brings home. Finally, behaviors adopted by other motorcyclists belonging
to the same household, the same neighborhood or the same community may also influence individual’s conduct,
regardless of his or her risk preferences and beliefs.
The environmental, institutional and behavioral dimensions I just presented are all likely to impact road mor-
tality. In this PhD dissertation, I study these different factors and their respective impact on road mortality, taking
the case of India. Road traffic accidents represent in this country up to 3% of the GDP (Mohan; 2001). Since the
end of the 1980’s, the strong urban growth, combined with an accelerated motorization, has led to an important
increase in the number of road deaths. Fatalities and injured people constitute there a major public health issue,
yet largely neglected. India has seen its road mortality situation worsen over the years: the number of road deaths
has more than doubled in twenty years’ time going from 56,000 fatalities in 1992 to close to 137,000 in 2013 (figures
from the National Crime Record Bureau), corresponding to 10% of all road victims worldwide. In 1950, the num-
ber of vehicles was close to zero in India. In fifty years, this figure reached more than 70 million, among which 50
million are motorbikes. I have thus chosen to concentrate my doctoral dissertation on this subcontinent and in
particular focus my research on road safety behaviors adopted by motorcyclists.
0.2 An overview of the thesis
My dissertation aims at understanding the environmental, institutional and behavioral determinants of road traffic
accidents in a developing country, India. Thanks to rich and original datasets, this thesis aspires to contribute to
the growing debate on road safety programs in developing countries. Figure 0.1 presents the articulation of the
different chapters, and figure 0.2 reports the different research questions which I tackle in this dissertation.
0.2.1 Environmental and institutional determinants of road mortality
The first chapter of the thesis is a macroeconomic study on the Indian subcontinent. It explores the determinants
of road mortality in India. Besides income, the analysis takes into account, as potential explanatory factors, the
socio demographic structure of the population, the level of motorization, the traffic mix, the road and health in-
frastructures as well as the traffic rules enforcement intensity. An original panel dataset built based on information
coming from diverse sources and covering 25 Indian states has been used. When analyzing the road mortality dif-
0.2. AN OVERVIEWOF THE THESIS 15
ferential across Indian states and over time, I find that the rise in the motorization level, the urbanization rate, as
well as the share of pedestrians and motorcyclists among the road users are the main factors associated with road
mortality in India. Among vulnerable road users, women are particularly at risk. Furthermore, the more money
the government spends per police officer, the lower the level of mortality is. These findings suggest that India
should invest more in road infrastructures, in the strict implementation of road rules and in education programs
on road-related risks.
0.2.2 Data collection and measurement issues
Road traffic crashes result from a complex and multidimensional phenomena. The conduct adopted by road users
when traveling is one of the key factors often put forward as one of the main cause of the number of fatalities. Many
public policies have tried to affect individuals’ actions by focusing either on repression (speed cameras, fines for
infringing road rules) or prevention (information campaigns, education programs emphasizing road dangers).
Given that in India 70% of motorized vehicles are two-wheelers and that more than half of the road casualties
sustain head traumas, I decided to focus my analysis on this particular subgroup. In order to overcome the absence
of individual data on road habits, a household survey among motorcyclists in Delhi has been implemented in 2011.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed presentation of the sample and questionnaire. Before investigating the influence
of individuals’ preferences and beliefs on safe conducts in Chapters 4 and 5, I study in Chapter 3 the adequate
measurement of risk aversion in the context of a developing country. Besides the measurement of individual’s
preferences toward risk per se, I consider the implementation issues and in particular the influence of interviewers.
0.2.3 Individual determinants of road safety behaviors
In the two last Chapters of the dissertation, I investigate the respective roles of risk preferences and subjective
expectations on helmet use. In Chapter 4, a theoretical model on the influence of risk attitudes on self-protection
and self-insurance activities is first adapted to the road safety context. When turning to the empirical analysis,
we find that more risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet while there is no significant effect of risk
preferences on choice of speed, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, low speed and helmet use appear to be
substitutes. As for passengers, they seem to adapt their helmet use to their environment and in particular to the
driver’s skills. Subsequently, the formation of injury and fine expectations and their impact on helmet adoption
are studied in Chapter 5. Knowing someone who experienced a road crash or having been sanctioned by the traffic
police modify motorcyclists’ subjective expectations. Interestingly, fear of injuries lead to a greater use of helmet
on long distance journeys, while police threat rather determines the helmet use on short distance trips. Based on
these findings, I advocate for the simultaneous raise of fines prices and enforcement of road rules as well as for
information campaigns with a focus on the utility of wearing a helmet also for motorbike trips nearby users’ home.
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Chapter 1
Determinants of Road Traffic Crash
Fatalities across Indian States
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Abstract
Objective: This paper explores the determinants of road traffic crash fatalities in India. In addition to income, the
analysis considers the socio-demographic population structure, motorization levels, road and health infrastruc-
ture and road rule enforcement as potential factors.
Methods: An original panel data set covering 25 Indian states is analyzed using multivariate regression analysis.
Time and state fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity across states and time.
Results: Rising motorization, urbanization and the accompanying increase in the share of vulnerable road users,
i.e. pedestrians and two-wheelers, are the major drivers of road traffic crash fatalities in India. Among vulnerable
road users, women form a particularly high risk group. Higher expenditure per police officer is associated with a
lower fatality rate.
Conclusion: The results suggest that India should focus, in particular, on road infrastructure investments that al-
low the separation of vulnerable from other road users, on improved road rule enforcement and should pay special
attention to vulnerable female road users.
JEL classification: I18, O18, R41.
Keywords: Transportation, traffic safety, vulnerable road users, road rule enforcement, urbanization, India.
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1.1 Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, annually, road traffic crashes cause over 1.2 million deaths
and more than 25 million severe injuries worldwide (WHO, 2009). In 2020, road traffic injuries are expected to
reach third in the ranking of the global burden of disease (Lopez et al.; 2006). Over 90% of the world’s fatalities
occur in low and middle income countries, putting road traffic fatalities on par with malaria deaths (WHO; 2009).
Given that these fatalities are concentrated in the economically active population, reducing the number of road
traffic injuries and fatalities could confer large welfare gains to households.
So far, the literature that has examined the causes of road traffic accidents has either focused on the cross-
country variation in fatality rates and on the role of aggregate income as one of the major drivers of this variation
or relied on small-scale case studies. Cross-country studies that rely on a single year of data (see e.g. Wintemute;
1985; Jacobs and Cuttings; 1986; Söderlund and Zwi; 1995; Van Beeck et al.; 2000) almost all suggest that at very
low levels of income, road traffic fatalities per population increase with income up to a certain threshold and
then fall again. More recent studies that rely on panel data and thus can control for all time-invariant country-
specific characteristics confirm this inverted u-shaped relationship (Kopits and Cropper; 2005, 2008; Bishai et al.;
2006). Moreover these studies have successfully worked out the mediating factors between income and road traffic
accident fatalities at different stages of development. Other studies solely focus, as we will do, on the variation
across space and time within a single country (Noland; 2003; La Torre et al.; 2007; Traynor; 2008). This may avoid
potential problems of parameter heterogeneity, a problem that often arises in cross-country studies. Nevertheless,
these latter studies typically focus on richer and highly motorized countries. In this paper we focus on India.
India is an important case as it has one of the highest per capita traffic fatality levels in the world (WHO; 2009).
More than 133,000 people died on Indian roads in 2010. Significant differences across states exist, but on average,
according to police records, about 85% of all fatalities are men, mainly between the ages of 30 and 59, and more
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than 40% are vulnerable road users, i.e. pedestrians or two-wheelers (Mohan; 2009). According to the police, the
share of female victims is relatively higher among vulnerable road users than among non-vulnerable ones. Unlike
China, fatalities continue to increase. The social costs have been evaluated at 3.2% of GDP, a loss that inhibits
economic and social development (Mohan; 2001).
Virtually no low income and less-motorized country has been successful in reducing the number of road traffic
crash fatalities and injuries in the recent past. Traffic patterns in these countries are much more complex than
those in high-income countries (Mohan; 2002), an issue we will take into account in our analysis. The reasons for
this greater complexity are: (i) a large proportion of income-poor road users; (ii) a high proportion of vulnerable
road users sharing the road with motorized vehicles; (iii) high population density in urban areas; (iv) a low en-
forcement of road traffic rules and regulations; and (v) severe limitations on public resources available for roads
and other infrastructure. The latter aspect is illustrated in Table 1.1 which shows that Germany, for instance, com-
pared to India had a much higher income level at comparable rates of motorization.
Table 1.1: Same motorization level, different income
Year Motor vehicles per GDP per capita in
1,000 population 2005 Intl $ PPP
India 2005 73 588
Germany 1960 73 7,092
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2010).
Figure 1.1a shows that in 2006 the number of registered motor vehicles in India was 50 times higher than in
1971. While two-wheelers represented one third of the total number of motorized transport in 1971, today they
represent around 70% of the total. Figure 1.1b shows that there is indeed a strong correlation between fatalities per
population and the number of vehicles per population, confirming the finding by Bishai et al. (2006) and Kopits
and Cropper (2008), that in poor countries the rise of motorization that accompanies income growth is one of the
most important forces in the increase in road accident fatalities per population; fatalities per vehicle decline in fact
over time.
Using a spline model, Garg and Hyder (2006) find for states below US$750 of net domestic product (NDP) that
income is positively correlated with fatalities per population, while for the richest states in the sample the corre-
lation is close to zero and insignificant, i.e. the curve is flat, almost downward sloping, and hence supporting to
some extent the hypothesis of an inverted u-shaped relationship. The authors speculate that increased investment
in road safety measures and public transport as well as stricter enforcement of road traffic rules enable richer states
to reduce road traffic accident mortality. However, none of these hypotheses has been examined empirically. Our
study makes an attempt to close this gap by exploiting variations across time and Indian states to disentangle the
roles of various factors related to the road accident fatality rate in general and by type of road user in particular.
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Figure 1.1: Trends in motorization and road traffic fatalities in India, 1971 - 2006
Source: See Table 1.6.
1.2 Method
1.2.1 Conceptual framework
We focus on four different sets of factors; factors associated with the socio-demographic population structure,
motorization level, road and health infrastructure and institutional quality. In addition we include income that
may play a role in conjunction with these factors.
Among the socio-demographic factors, we explore gender, education, urbanization, population density and
religion, since we assume that these factors influence risk attitude, risk exposure and risk knowledge and via these
channels road traffic accident fatalities. Individual income and employment status can be seen as further inter-
mediate variables through which socio-demographic characteristics act on risk attitude, risk exposure and risk
knowledge. Income and employment determine the frequency of traveling, the means of transport, the availabil-
ity of safety devices and the relative costs of physical and human damage.
Motorization should matter through the number of registered vehicles and the vehicle mix. In poorer countries
the diversity of vehicles sharing the same road leads to high differences in speed between the various road users,
which in turn may increase the number of accidents compared to a country with a more homogenous group of
road users. To account for road infrastructure we include some characteristics of the road network. We also con-
sider health care supply as the quality of trauma and medical care may matter for the chances of accident victim
survival. Moreover, the quality and accessibility of health facilities may also have an indirect impact on the risk
attitude of road users. Regarding the institutional factors, we mainly focus on the enforcement of road traffic rules
and regulations.
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There are good reasons to believe that income affects road traffic fatalities through all four transmission chan-
nels. First, economic development usually leads to increased motorization levels and urbanization. Second, a
higher national income will allow the government to invest more resources in the quality and quantity of road
and health infrastructure. Moreover, resources allocated to the police may also increase with national income. On
the individual level income should matter because, with higher income, road users can also afford more and bet-
ter safety devices such as better-quality vehicles and helmets. Finally, people’s risk attitude and exposure to risky
situations is likely to be affected by income. The greater the number of relevant transmission channels that are
captured by the empirical analysis, the less we expect income to be significant in our analysis.
Figure 1.2 summarizes the conceptual framework graphically. Our framework is closely related to the sys-
tems approach used by the Global Road Safety Forum, an international initiative for global road safety (www.
globalroadsafety.org). The systems approach is inspired by the so-called ‘Haddon Matrix’ which distinguishes
three main factors: human, vehicles and equipment and the environment (including the legal framework) that in-
teract over three time windows – pre-crash, crash, and post-crash – to produce or prevent road traffic accident
fatalities or injuries.1
1.2.2 Data
Our data set covers 21 Indian states and four Union Territories (UTs) over the period 1994 to 2006.2 However,
for some of our analysis we stick to the period 1996 to 2006 and 24 instead of 25 state/UT observations as the
information regarding other variables is incomplete for earlier years and one particular state. The variables have
been drawn from many different sources. The details are given in Table 1.6 (Appendix). The number of road traffic
fatalities per population and its components pedestrian, two-wheeler and four-wheeler fatalities are taken from
the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), i.e. the police. Socio-demographic information is based on census
data.3 However, there is no information available regarding the age structure at the state level. State level income is
measured by the state-specific per capita Net Domestic Product (NDP) using 1993 prices published by the National
Statistics. Road infrastructure, motorization levels and the vehicle mix were obtained from the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways. Information on road infrastructure is unfortunately missing for many states and years.
Information on health care supply, i.e. the number of hospitals and dispensaries, is drawn from the ‘Center for
Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes’ database. We completed this information with the 2001 Census state fact
sheets. However, here again the time period covered is a bit shorter than for most of the other variables. Finally,
data from the NCRB was again used to compute different proxies of road rule enforcement, i.e. expenditure per
police officer, the number of police officers per population and the number of cases under investigation per police
officer. We assume that traffic police expenditures are proportional to total police expenditures.
1This distinction of factors related to humans, vehicles and roads and enforcement has also been adopted by the World Health Organization
(WHO; 2010) and, in a similar form, by the World Bank (WB; 2009).
2Before 2000, there were 25 states and 7 Union Territories. We had to exclude three states because these were later split up into several states.
We also excluded the UT of Lackshadweep because of its very small size.
3To fill in the missing information for years for which no census data is available, we imputed values based on a geometrical extrapolation.
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Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework
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Under-reporting of road traffic accident fatalities is a potentially important problem in the case of India. Dan-
dona et al. (2008) investigate the magnitude of under-reporting of road traffic accident injuries and fatalities by
comparing police data with population-based and hospital-based data. The authors highlight the limitations of
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the police data but come to the conclusion that under-reporting of injuries is much higher than of fatalities. In-
deed, they show that 77.8% and 98.1% of road traffic accident fatalities that could be found in the population-based
and the hospital-based data respectively were reported to the police. Under-reporting of road traffic accident in-
juries is shown to be much larger, something also acknowledged by Mohan (2009). Adjustments to the data would
be possible for specific years using census data or data from the ‘Million Death Study’ (MHA; 2009), but in the
absence of any reliable information that could help to adjust these numbers across states and over time, we refrain
from making any corrections. However, most of our analysis relies on fixed effects estimates, which means that
at least all state-specific measurement error is absorbed as long as it is roughly constant over time. Visual inspec-
tion of the time series state-by-state suggest that this is a plausible assumption for almost all states. Moreover,
we conduct various robustness checks of which the results are briefly summarized below. Finally, we would like
to highlight that despite WHO efforts to harmonize data, the comparability of road traffic fatality data in cross-
country data sets – which have been used many times – is obviously also limited.
Regarding the explanatory variables, it was not possible to find data on all the aspects discussed in our concep-
tual framework. For instance, there is no variable that would measure the quality of health services on a per state
basis for our observation period. Hence, there is a clear trade-off between the level of spatial disaggregation and
the length of the observation window on the one hand and the exhaustiveness of the data set on the other.
1.2.3 Empirical specification
To analyze our data, we use a two-way fixed effects model:
ln( f at al i t i esst )=α+β1 ln N DPst +β2(ln N DPst )2+X ′stδ+µs +µt +εst , (1.1)
where ln( f at al i t i esst ) stands for the log road traffic fatalities per 100,000 population in the State (or UT) s in
period t . Alternatively we use pedestrian, two-wheeler and four-wheeler fatalities. NDP stands for net state do-
mestic product per capita in 1993 Rupees (income per capita hereafter), which we introduce in linear and squared
form to account for possible non-linearities. The vector Xst stands for the set of potential determinants discussed
above. Year effects are denoted µt . They control for all time-specific effects that are uniform across states such
as the general trend in the safety level of vehicles or general changes in traffic regulations. State level fixed effects
are denoted µs . They account for all the heterogeneity between states that is constant over time such as general
weather conditions, the topography and cultural attitudes and norms but also under-reporting as long as this is
constant over time. The test statistics that guided the choice of the model are briefly discussed below. We always
estimate the model first with income alone and then subsequently introduce all other potential determinants.
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1.3 Results
Table 1.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of all variables in our data set, including the within and between
state variation. The sample mean fatality rate is 9.7 deaths per 100,000 population (1994 to 2006). Across states this
rate varies from about 3 (Assam in 1996) to 21 (Goa in 2006). Over time the mean increased from 7.4 in 1994 to 12
in 2006. For India as a whole, Kopits and Cropper (2005) projected this rate to rise to 24 by 2042. The motorization
level also varies substantially across states and time. In 1994 Tripura had 104 (min) vehicles (any motorized vehi-
cle, including two-wheelers) per 10,000 inhabitants, whereas Chandigarh had 4,417 (max). In 2006 the minimum
increased to 189 (Arunachal Pradesh) and the maximum to 5,862 (Chandigarh).4 Figure 1.3 shows that fatalities
per population are positively correlated with income. Nevertheless, the slope is smaller for higher levels of income
and even starts to become negative, suggesting a turning point similar to what cross-country studies found. This is
further discussed below. Conversely, fatalities per vehicle are somewhat negatively correlated with income. In our
regression analysis we control for vehicles per population (motorization), hence the estimated effects of the other
explanatory variables reflect first of all their effect through fatalities per vehicle.
4Note that data on motorization is not accounting for exits. This is however not a major problem for our analysis as long as exits are propor-
tional to the stock, which we think is a reasonable assumption.
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Figure 1.3: Income per capita and road traffic accident fatalities per population and vehicle in India, 1994-2006
Source: See Table 1.6.
Table 1.3 shows multivariate regression results for road traffic fatalities per population. In the model in column
(1) we only include the log of income and the log of income squared. We then successively introduce state fixed
effects (col.(2)), time effects (col.(3)) and all other control variables (cols.(5) and (6)). Column (5) is a simple OLS
regression without fixed effects, allowing us to also focus on between-state differences. Column (4) shows, in
addition, a regression on a larger sample including, i.e. all states and using also those state-year observations in
which one or several of our control variables are missing. Column (7) in turn shows a regression in which we use a
balanced panel, using 20 states/UTs observed over 9 years. Prior tests indicated that state fixed effects are indeed
required (Preusch-Pagan test) and that at least in those cases where all controls are included fixed effects (FE) are
appropriate whereas random effects are not (see results of Hausman tests in Table 1.3). Moreover, modified Wald
tests reject the homoskedasticity of our models (not reported), and hence we compute and show robust standard
errors.
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Column (1) suggests an inverted u-shaped fatalities-income relationship with an estimated turning point, i.e.
the income threshold at which fatalities start to decline, of about Rs. 105,000 (or 1993 Intl. $18,000). This turning
point is shifted to the left, as state fixed effects and time effects are introduced. If both are considered (col. (3))
the estimated turning point declines to Rs. 9,970 (or 1993 Intl. $1,740). However, the key finding is that the un-
conditional relationship is concave with an estimated turning point that is situated at the top end of the income
distribution in our sample. This can also be seen in Figure 1.5a. Correspondingly, a simple F -test (not reported)
does not reject the quadratic form of the income effect. These findings are confirmed if we use the larger sample.
If we add further explanatory variables to the model in column (3) and first leave out the state and time fixed ef-
fects (col. (5)), the inverted u-shaped fatalities-income relationship is still significant. If we introduce time and
state fixed effects together with all control variables (col. (6)), income loses its significance, but we now find a
significant positive effect for urbanization and literacy and a significant negative effect for expenditure per police
officer. The other enforcement variables turned out to be insignificant and hence, we do not keep them in the
model. In column (5) motorization has a significant positive effect on the number of fatalities whereas the share
of four-wheelers relative to the share of two-wheelers (controlling for motorization) has a negative effect. These
effects still have the same signs in column (6), but are no longer statistically significant once state fixed effects are
introduced. If we just rely on the balanced panel, which has 65 fewer observations, the three effects associated with
urbanization, literacy and expenditure per police officer are still significant but of an even higher magnitude. We
also checked whether multicollinearity poses a problem. Although some of the independent variables do indeed
show relatively high pairwise correlation coefficients (e.g. urbanization and population density (0.85), urbaniza-
tion and motorization (0.86) and income and literacy (0.61), the regression results are surprisingly robust to the
inclusion/exclusion of some of these variables.
We now turn to fatalities by road user category. Figure 1.4a shows the trends over time. The number of pedes-
trian fatalities per population is more or less constant. Fatalities per population of two-wheelers strongly increases
and fatalities per population of four-wheelers fell until 2002 and then increased again quite substantially. As men-
tioned above, almost 50% of all fatalities concern pedestrians and two-wheelers. Figure 4b shows that the relative
importance of each of these categories varies significantly across states. Delhi, with more than 2,000 fatalities per
year, is the only state in which the fatalities of pedestrians alone dominate the fatality rate with car, truck and bus
occupants are least represented.
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Figure 1.4: Road traffic accident fatalities by type of road user across time and states
Source: See Table 1.6.
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In Table 1.4, we run regressions similar to those in Table 1.3, but instead of using the overall fatality rate per
population we use the number of pedestrian (columns (1)-(3)), two-wheeler (columns (4)-(6)) and four-wheeler
fatalities (columns (7)-(9)) per 100,000 population. For each type of death, we present a regression with only in-
come and income squared and time effects, a regression with income, all controls and time effects and a regression
with income, all controls and with state-fixed and time effects. As can be seen, the inclusion of state-fixed effects
in columns (3), (6) and (9) has a huge impact on the size and sometimes the sign of the regression coefficients.
They also turn out to be very different from those in Table 1.3. The coefficient associated with population density
for example increases if fixed-effects are introduced by a factor of 60 in column (3) and by a factor of more than 100
in columns (6) and (9). The intercept also increases considerably and overall the estimated coefficients are very
sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of certain variables. The Hausman test even rejects the use of fixed-effects
in columns (6) and (9). Hence, in what follows we focus uniquely on the pooled OLS estimates, but control for time
effects. Regressions using random-effects instead of fixed effects yield very similar regression coefficients to those
seen in the pooled OLS results (results not reported in Table 1.4).
The unconditional income effects indicate an exponential growth of pedestrian and two-wheeler fatalities with
income and a concave increase of four-wheeler fatalities (Figure 1.5). The turning point for four-wheeler fatalities
(conditional on time-effects) is computed in column (7) of Table 1.4. It is situated at about 12,350 Rs. per capita
per year (or 1993 Intl. $ 2,150). Figure 1.5 shows that the unconditional turning point for four-wheeler fatalities
is significantly lower than the turning point for all categories of fatalities taken together, implying that in the pro-
cess of income growth four-wheeler fatalities start to decline earlier than pedestrian and two-wheeler fatalities.
The regression results suggest further that the pedestrian fatality rate increases with urbanization and slightly de-
creases with population density (holding urbanization constant). For example a 1% increase of the share of urban
residents, increases the pedestrian fatality rate by about 1% (column (2)). A 1% increase in the population per
km2 however, decreases the pedestrian fatality rate by about 0.15%. Moreover, still focusing on column (2), pedes-
trian fatalities increase with higher literacy and decrease with the share of the male population. Motorization and
the share of four-wheelers are both positively associated with pedestrian fatalities, implying that controlling for
urbanization and population density, increased motorization and an increased share of four wheelers increase
pedestrian fatalities. However, the two latter effects are not statistically significant.
Two-wheeler fatalities strongly increase with the motorization level and, surprisingly decline with the share of
four-wheelers. For example an increase in the number of vehicles per population by 1%, increases the two-wheeler
fatality rate by about 0.5% (column (5)). Two-wheeler fatalities also decline, quite plausibly, with expenditure
per police officer and with the share of males. If for example, expenditures per police officer are increased by
1%, two-wheeler fatalities decline by 0.3%. Lastly, the estimates for four-wheeler fatalities suggest a decline with
urbanization and the share of four-wheelers. This seems to suggest that in urbanized areas with a large number of
four-wheelers, vehicles are slower and hence, four-wheeler fatalities are less likely. Literacy has a negative effect.
Hence, taking all results together, literacy increases pedestrian fatalities, has no impact on two-wheeler fatalities
and reduces four-wheeler fatalities. These effects are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of income but not to state
1.3. RESULTS 35
fixed effects.
Figure 1.5: Unconditionnal correlation between road traffic accident fatalities and income, 1994-2006
Source: See Table 1.6.
To see whether differences in religion can explain differences in fatality rates, we use the state fixed effects
from Tables 1.3 and 1.4 and regress these on the religious composition in each state/UT, i.e. we treat the religious
composition as a quasi fixed factor as these shares change only very slowly over time. In Table 1.5 we only report
the regression coefficients, the R2 as well as a joint F -Test. Note that religious composition is not available for all
observations covered by the regressions in Table 1.3. Moreover, as explained above, the results by fatality type need
to be interpreted with caution, as we do not have much confidence in the underlying fixed effect estimates. The
joint F -test suggests that religion matters. For instance, whereas the proportion of Muslims seems, on average,
to increase the fatality rate (although the effect is not significant), the proportions of Christians and in particular
of Buddhists and Jains seem to reduce the fatality rate. If these regressions are alternatively run on pedestrian,
two-wheeler and four-wheeler deaths, we find very similar results for two-wheelers only. The larger the share of
these latter two groups, the lower the fatality rate. In general, religion can explain between 50% and 80% of the
total variance in the fixed effects.
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As discussed in the data section, under-reporting of road traffic accident fatalities is a potential problem in
India. According to Dandona et al. (2008) up to 20% of the cases might not be recorded by the police. Comparisons
with WHO (2009) data show even larger gaps, but the WHO only provides predictions with the aim of producing
coherent cross-country data sets. To be sure that our results are not much affected by measurement error, we
conducted various robustness checks. In particular we simulated the impact of under-reporting on our regression
results varying both the general magnitude as well as the correlation of under-reporting with income and police
expenditure. For plausible ranges regarding the magnitude and these correlations, our results are very robust to
under-reporting. Moreover, we have checked that the removal of states where reported data is somewhat erratic
and hence systematic under-reporting might be an explanation does also not substantially affect our results.
1.4 Discussion
The role of aggregate income
The weakly concave relationship between road traffic accident fatalities and income is coherent with the inverted
u-shaped relationship that other studies using cross-country panel data have found before (see e.g. Kopits and
Cropper; 2005; Bishai et al.; 2006). Given India’s GDP, we expect most Indian states to still be on the rising branch
of this curve. And indeed, the turning point we identify is reached only by the richest states and towards the end
of the observation window. If we break down fatalities by type of road users, we find that pedestrian fatalities
and two-wheeler fatalities steadily increase with income, whereas four-wheeler fatalities first increase and then
decline. This can be seen in Figure 1.5. The effect of motorization on four-wheeler fatalities is in fact weakly
negative. This is not surprising in the Indian context, where rising motorization is accompanied by urbanization,
increased population density and a steady increase in vulnerable road users, i.e. pedestrians and two-wheelers
(see also Nantulya and Reich; 2003; Ameratunga et al.; 2006). Paulozzi et al. (2007) in fact shows that fatalities
are highest during a critical transition to motorized travel, when many pedestrians and other vulnerable road
users share the roadways with many motor vehicles. This observation is consistent with our findings. Likewise,
Kopits and Cropper (2008) emphasize that a higher population density and urbanization results in an increase in
pedestrian activity and hence higher pedestrian fatalities (per vehicle). Traynor (2008) shows similar evidence for
the state of Ohio (USA). Our results differ in just one respect holding urbanization constant pedestrian fatalities
decline slightly with population density. A plausible explanation might be that higher density is associated with
a lower average speed of vehicles. Our multivariate analysis suggests that the decline of four-wheeler fatalities is
indeed mainly driven by increased urbanization and a higher share of four wheelers in the traffic mix which may
slow down the average speed, simply due to the size of four-wheelers as compared to two-wheelers (Table 1.4).
Taken together, the estimates suggest that if the urbanization rate increases by 1%, the four-wheeler fatality rate
per 100,000 of the population decreases by about 0.3%, whereas the pedestrian fatality rate increases by about 1%.
This is an important finding.
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Road and health infrastructure
Due to the paucity of available data, the role of road and health infrastructure was difficult to study. We do not
find any effect related to the road density (length per km2) or the quality of roads (results not shown). We believe
there are different explanations for this. First, these variables are probably poor measures of road infrastructure
and hence are probably better captured by urbanization. Second, better roads may have contrasting effects on
road safety. On the one hand they may increase road safety e.g. through the absence of potholes and a better
separation of vulnerable and non-vulnerable road users. On the other hand, as Keeler (1994) pointed out, better
road infrastructure may also lead to faster driving and thus off-set some of the positive effects of improved health
infrastructure. In the literature this is known as the ‘Peltzman hypothesis’. Peltzman (1975) theorized that a road
user is likely to be concerned with both the time the journey takes and his/her safety. Hence, if roads become
safer, the motorist will likely offset the higher level of safety with faster driving, so that some of the enhanced
safety is used to provide a faster trip. Such effects might be particularly relevant in a context like India, where the
enforcement of road rules is low.
For richer countries, Bishai et al. (2006) identified lower injury severity and better post-injury medical care
as one of the main mediating factors that reduce road accident fatalities (see also Jacobs and Cuttings; 1986;
Van Beeck et al.; 2000; Kopits and Cropper; 2008). As we mentioned above, we were only able to find scarce and
incomplete information on health infrastructure by state and year and hence we could not analyze this relation-
ship quantitatively. However, given that the number of hospitals per population decreased rather than increased
over time (Table 1.2), we speculate that the number of hospitals did not, in fact, contribute to the observed drop in
fatalities. From our fieldwork we noted that the main issue may not in fact be the general presence or absence of
hospitals but rather the poor quality of on-site first aid; many deaths could be prevented by transporting casualties
to the medical facility more quickly.
Motorization and vehicle mix
With respect to motorization and the vehicle mix, we find distinct patterns for different categories of fatalities.
Pedestrian fatalities seem to increase with the general level of motorization and with the share of four-wheelers,
although these effects are not statistically significant in our regressions. For two-wheelers we find a strong positive
effect associated with the level of motorization and a negative effect associated with the share of four-wheelers,
which in turn suggests that – quasi mechanically – the two-wheeler fatality rate decreases with the share of two-
wheelers. For car occupants and other four-wheelers, we find only a weak and, if any, rather negative effect of
increased motorization. The share of four-wheelers significantly reduces four-wheeler fatalities, most likely be-
cause a higher share of four-wheelers, holding constant the level of motorization, means more congestion and
hence a lower average speed as well as a more omogenous vehicle mix which together increase road safety.
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Institutional quality
A very robust finding of our analysis is the significant negative impact of expenditure per police officer on road
traffic accident fatalities. An increase in expenditure per police officer by 1% induces a decline of the fatality rate by
about 0.15%. This is a sizeable effect. Table 1.4 suggests that this effect is mainly driven by two-wheeler fatalities.
Looking at this group alone, suggests that an increase in expenditures per police officer by 1% induces an even
greater decline of two-wheeler fatalities by 0.3%. We take this as an indication that a better paid and equipped
police force is more effective in enforcing road traffic rules and that a higher enforcement rate has a direct effect
on the frequency of road traffic accident fatalities, in particular those involving two-wheelers.
Socio-demographic characteristics
The effects related to urbanization and population density have already been discussed together with income and
motorization, hence we focus now on the population composition by gender, education and religion. A higher
share of women seems to be associated with more two-wheeler and pedestrian fatalities. A 10% increase in the
male ratio, increases pedestrian and two-wheeler fatalities by about 0.8% to 0.9%. This is plausible, as women
disproportionately walk, since they less often have a driving license and because they travel on average shorter
distances as, among other things, their labor force participation is lower. Moreover, and maybe even more im-
portantly, helmet usage is very low among female two-wheelers (drivers and passengers). A representative survey
among two-wheelers that we conducted from July to September 2011 in Delhi revealed that 74% of men but only
31% of women regularly wear a helmet.
Quite unexpectedly we find a quite robust positive effect of literacy on the overall fatality rate. This may sur-
prise, as one would assume that general formal education is correlated with, for example, awareness of road traffic
laws and regulations, knowledge of traffic signs or offences and related penalties. However, our own experience
in the Indian context based on a small survey that we undertook in Delhi in 2010, seems to show that road traffic-
related knowledge was, in fact, very low in general and uncorrelated with formal education. In that survey we asked
road users about the meaning of road signs such as ‘stop’, ‘no parking’, or ‘pedestrian crossing’. The results were
quite surprising. Indeed, out of the ten questions asked, 27% of the 250 persons interviewed could not explain the
meaning of any of the presented road signs, and 80% of them had more than six wrong answers. Even professional
drivers such as taxi and cycle rickshaw drivers did not perform better on this test. Moreover, Fosgerau (2005) and
others have argued that better education and hence a higher income may increase the perceived value of time and
decrease the ‘real cost’ of fines (see also Polinsky and Shavell; 1979; Blomquist; 1986; Boyer and Dionne; 1987).
Better educated and hence richer individuals may, therefore, drive faster, which will increase their chance of being
involved in an accident. In light of this background, it is almost surprising that we find a negative effect of educa-
tion on four-wheeler mortality (Table 1.4). However, we do not know how robust this finding is, as with state-fixed
effects this variable loses significance. If it could be confirmed, it may capture vehicle quality or access to health
care, but we think it is safe to say that more micro evidence is necessary to find out how education relates to risk
attitude, exposure and knowledge.
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Our regression analysis identified religion as an important driver of cross-sectional differences in the fatality
rate. Although we do not find very robust differences between Hindus and Muslims, the two main religious groups,
we find that the share of Christians and in particular Buddhists and Jains seems to reduce the fatality rate. Jains
reject the caste system which may influence their behavior towards vulnerable road users. They also explicitly
prescribe a path of non-violence towards all living beings which could also characterize their behavior as road
users.
1.5 Conclusion
A strong increase in motorization levels coupled with urbanization are the general drivers of road traffic crash fa-
talities across Indian states. This is partly due to the increased number of vulnerable road users, i.e. pedestrians
and two-wheelers. Some of the richer states can expect that they will soon have reached the turning point after
which fatalities per population will decline again with further income growth. To accelerate this process, our anal-
ysis highlights the following areas where policy intervention can be particularly effective. First, our study suggests
that increased enforcement of road traffic rules can lower road traffic crash fatality rates. In our sample, if mean
expenditure per police officer is increased by 10%, the fatality rate is reduced, for instance, by 2%. Second, urban-
ization strongly increases the road accident fatality rate. This can possibly be best prevented by clearly separating
pedestrians and vehicle users, for instance through the construction of sidewalks, traffic lights and properly indi-
cated bus stops. Third, we find a clear female bias in the mortality among vulnerable road users. Hence, awareness
campaigns should particularly target women, for instance to promote the use of helmets on motorbikes. Fourth,
we find that certain religious groups are less involved in accidents than others. Although we cannot control for
the intensity of road use, this suggests that road users behavior may differ across religious groups and that aware-
ness and behavioral change campaigns should be targeted at those groups with more involvement. We think our
findings may also apply to other countries, in particular those that are also still in the phase where fatalities per
population are increasing, not decreasing, with income. More micro data covering information about road users
risk attitude, risk knowledge and risk exposure would further enrich this kind of analysis.
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Chapter 2
Presentation of the Road Safety Survey
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2.1 Motivations
In Chapter 1, we explored the determinants of road traffic crash fatalities at the state level. Besides, quality of road
infrastructures, individual behaviors appear to partly explain the road mortality burden as a higher expenditure
per police officer is associated with a lower fatality rate and some sub-groups, such as women, seem to be more at
risk.
Better prevention could, however, reduce the road crash burden on both household’s income and economic
growth. Nonetheless, the mechanisms supporting safer behaviors need to be first assessed in order to implement
efficient and targeted prevention programmes which could effectively reduce and limit the frequency and severity
of road traffic accidents.
The use of helmets has been proven to be really efficient in preventing road traffic mortality. In particular, Liu
et al. (2008), based on 53 observational studies, concluded that wearing a standardized quality helmet reduces by
40% and 70% the risk of death and severe injuries respectively. When successful in raising the share of motorcy-
clists wearing a helmet, such policies have managed to cut down road fatalities at a reasonable cost. This has been
the case in Vietnam or Cambodia (see WHO; 2013).1 In India, helmet use has been made compulsory by the 1988
Motor Vehicle Act, each state being responsible for its implementation. Yet, its enforcement has failed to actually
make all motorcyclists use a helmet. Indeed, it is quite common to see a whole family traveling on a motorbike,
the driver being the only one wearing a helmet. Is it a financial matter? Helmets are of a relatively low cost when
1In 2008, 1,400 less individuals died on Vietnamese roads corresponding to an 11% annual decrease in road mortality. Despite this en-
couraging result, some problems related to the proper use of helmet still remain. According to a survey implemented in 2008 by the Vietnam
Consumer Safety Association, 80% of vietnamese helmets did not met the safety criteria of national standards. In September 2013, a media
road safety campaign promoting the use of quality helmet have been launched in Vietnam to tackle this issue.
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compared to the purchase of a motorbike, the gasoline expenditures or the financial consequences of road traffic
accidents. Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of a helmet may rather correspond to buying completely different
consumption goods. If it is the case, households may decide to have only one helmet for all their members. Income
earner family members are then likely to be prioritized for the use of this protective device. Do people underesti-
mate road risks? Individuals’ lack of awareness of road hazards are likely to partly explain the decision of not using
a helmet. Hence, perceived enforcement of road rules, road risk awareness but also opinion regarding the utility of
a helmet are factors likely to influence the motorcyclist’s decision process regarding safe attitudes while traveling
on a motorbike. Furthermore, individual risk aversion, previous experiences of road accident or neighbor’s behav-
iors may also influence motorcyclists’ conducts.
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no available database which contains information on road crash
and road behaviors at the individual level in India (or in any other developing country). No module related to
road habits or safety behaviors is included in Indian national surveys such as the National Sample Survey or the
National Family and Health Survey. Even a simple estimation of the helmet use rate in India is not currently
available neither at the national, regional nor local level.2 Moreover, the police department, which is in charge
of collecting data on road accidents, often only gather the information on the circumstances of the crash leaving
aside additional characteristics of road users involved in the event. Information on use of safety devices (helmets,
seat belts), on risky driving (drunk driving, speeding) and other road factors are sadly missing from police records
(Barffour et al.; 2012). Therefore no database links the road traffic crashes with individuals’ socio-demographic
characteristics, information on risk aversion, awareness and perception of road risks; which all are certainly key to
better identify the mechanisms leading to safe behaviors such as the use of a helmet.
2.2 Objectives and expected outcomes of the survey
The absence of data on behaviors adopted by road users, and in particular by motorbike drivers and passengers
made the collection of original data necessary to study this topic. Such a survey will allow to (i) document the road
habits of motorcyclists in a big city like New Delhi with a particular focus on road safety attitudes; (ii) identify the
determinants of safe conducts such as helmet adoption; (iii) suggest relevant policy measures to be implemented
and particular subgroups to be targeted. More precisely, based on the information gathered with this survey, we
aim at understanding what make two-wheeler users wear a helmet and what prevent them from adopting such
behavior. In particular, we will attempt to disentangle the respective roles of individual characteristics (such as
income), peers’ behaviors, financial incentives or awareness on helmet adoption and other safety behaviors.
2Some cities provide figures on helmet use rates, this is notably the case of Bangalore (Gururaj; 2011). As for Banu et al. (2013), they inter-
viewed college youths two-wheeler riders in Delhi. 50% of their respondents declare that they use almost always the helmet while 25% of them
use it less than 75% of the times.
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2.3 Data collection
Thanks to fundings by the Health chair of Paris-Dauphine University, the International Institute of Social Studies -
Erasmus Rotterdam University (ISS - EUR) and the Paris School of Economics (PSE) research fund, we developed
an original questionnaire, presented in further details hereinafter. We benefited greatly from advice and feedbacks
from Professors at the ISS and PSE.3 I spent four months from June to September 2011 in New Delhi in order to
monitor and supervise the implementation of the survey done by a local firm specialized in data collection, Sigma
Research and Consulting.4 The first year of my PhD has therefore been mainly dedicated to the search of funding,
elaboration of the questionnaire and implementation of the survey. Both the questionnaire and the data collection
are presented in depth below.
2.3.1 Questionnaire
Informations on road behaviors, risk aversion, road rules enforcement, as well as awareness, road crash expe-
riences, road safety attitudes, motorbike characteristics and insurance coverage were gathered. Moreover, sub-
jective probabilities of injury and police halt if not wearing the helmet and subsequent financial consequences
(respectively medical expenditures and fines) were also elicited. This, in addition to many socio-demographic
characteristics. Table 2.10 lists the questionnaire’s modules and blocks. The english version of the questionnaire is
also included in the Appendices.
To our knowledge, it is the first time that information on road behaviors, road risk perceptions and risk prefer-
ences are all collected in one survey implemented in a developing country.
2.3.2 Implementation of the survey
In the subsequent paragraphs, I briefly summarize the different steps of the survey implementation. The precise
timeline is reported in Figure 2.1. We first did a qualitative survey on road safety in Delhi with the collaboration of a
local NGO – Initiative for Transportation and Development Programmes (ITDP-Delhi). We subsequently designed
and implemented a household survey. I had the great opportunity of participating at each step of the process: from
the sample drawing, the pre-testing, the interviewers’ training to the supervision and monitoring of the survey and
the data entry. Such presence during the field work provided additional insights regarding the quality of the data
collected. In particular, interviewers and respondents had some difficulties in understanding some of the survey
questions because of differences between Occidental and Indian ways of thinking. These field feedbacks were also
of great help in interpreting some results found when analyzing the data.
3In particular, the content of the questionnaire has been presented in a seminar at the ISS in March 2011.
4http://www.sigma-india.in
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Sample drawing
Our study focuses on motorcyclists. Nevertheless, we were not able to base our sample design either on a list of
two-wheeler users, or on a list of households owning a motorbike. Instead, we randomly selected households from
Delhi’s entire population.5
We took advantage of the administrative decomposition of the Indian capital city. Delhi is composed of five
zones – Central, East, North, South and West – and 70 constituencies. Each constituency contains on average 153
polling booths. These polling booths are gathered by location.6 These locations correspond to what we called
“starting points”. Based on a rough calculation, it seemed that 1,000 respondents were a minimum to be reached
in order to be able to stratify our sample by religion. According to the 64th round of the National Sample Survey
(2007-2008), 40% of households are motorbike owners in Delhi. Given this figure and assuming that on average a
bit less than two motorcyclists per eligible household would be interviewed; we needed 1,500 households in order
to end up with a sample of around 1,000 motorcyclists7,8. To reach that number, 10 polling booths corresponding
to 10 starting points were randomly drawn in each zone.9 The size of the sample was also constrained by the
duration of each questionnaire and the available budget.
In order to randomly draw the 50 starting points, the following procedure has been adopted. First, in each
of the five zones of Delhi, constituencies have been ordered and polling booths numbered. Second, an interval
value I corresponding to one tenth of the total number of polling booths have been computed. Then a number
N inferior to the value I was randomly drawn. The location of the related polling booth corresponded to the first
selected starting point. The second starting point was obtained by adding the value I to the random number N and
looking at the corresponding polling booth. The same procedure was followed until 10 locations have been chosen
per zone. The interval I ensures a certain geographical distance between the starting points. Indeed, the polling
booths attached to one unique location were ranked one after the other. By using this procedure, 47 different
constituencies have been selected. In three of them two starting points were drawn. The other 44 selected starting
points are all in different constituencies. Table 2.1 reports the number of constituencies and polling booths per
zone along with the corresponding values I and the numbers drawn N . The list of constituencies and the exact
location of the drawn polling booths are reported in Table 2.11 in the Appendices.
In each starting point, households have been selected following a precise routine: from the address of the
polling booth and going in two different directions10 every fifth household was selected for the interview until 15
households agreed to answer the questionnaire.
In each household the list of all members aged above 15 has been collected.11 The motorbike status – user or
5This will allow us to study the particularities of households with members who use the motorbike compared to others households (cf.
section 3 below).
6These locations are actually governmental schools where people assigned to each polling booth are supposed to go and vote.
71,500 households × 0.4 eligible households × 1.8 respondents = 1,080 respondents.
8This computation does not take into account households who don’t own a motorbike but who have some of their members who use such
mode of transportation.
95 zones × 10 starting points × 2 sides × 15 households = 1,500 households.
10Enumerators were told to go either to the left or to the right of the polling booth’s location.
11Up to a maximum of 8 members.
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Table 2.1: Sample drawing
Delhi’s zones Central East North South West Total
# of constituency assemblees 9 16 8 14 23 70
# of polling booths 1,440 2,426 1,194 2,074 3,567 10,701
Value I 144 242.6 119.4 207.4 356.7
Random number N = 1st SP 36 109 69 110 235
N + I = 2nd SP 180 352 188 317 592
N + 2 × I = 3rd SP 324 595 308 525 949
N + 3 × I = 4th SP 468 837 427 732 1,305
N + 4 × I = 5th SP 612 1,080 546 939 1,662
N + 5 × I = 6th SP 756 1,322 666 1,147 2,019
N + 6 × I = 7th SP 900 1,565 785 1,354 2,375
N + 7 × I = 8th SP 1,044 1,808 905 1,562 2,732
N + 8 × I = 9th SP 1,188 2,050 1,024 1,769 3,089
N + 9 × I = 10th SP 1,332 2,293 1,143 1,976 3,446
Notes: SP stands for starting point.
non user, driver and/or passenger – of each household member has been assessed. More precisely, an individual
was considered as a motorcyclist if he had traveled at least once on a motorbike in the previous four weeks. A short
questionnaire was filled by one member of the family in case there was no motorcyclist in the household; such
households were qualified as ‘non-eligible’. A longer questionnaire was completed by up to three motorcyclists
among the ‘eligible’ households. A preference for head of household and his spouse has been applied. A Kish grid
(Kish; 1965) has been used to select the remaining eligible individuals to be interviewed within each household (cf.
instructions to enumerators in the Appendices).
In total, 1,502 households were surveyed. In 545 households at least one member had used a motorbike in
the previous four weeks. Up to three users per household, either drivers or passengers, were interviewed. 212
selected individuals refused to answer to the questionnaire, leading to a final sample of 902 motorcyclists. Figure
2.212 presents the share of eligible households per constituency13, along with the average number of motorcy-
clists, selected individuals and respondents per eligible household per constituency. We note that these numbers
vary quite substancially across constituencies. While the variation in the share of eligible households (from 6.7%
to 90%) and number of motorcyclists per household (from 1.3 to 4.4 members) may come from the population
characteristics of each area, the variation in the refusal rate14 partly comes from the ability of each interviewer to
convince selected individuals to answer the survey.
12All maps have been realized using Philcarto software. The map of Delhi’s constituencies have first been digilitalized using Phildigit software.
13The GPS code of starting points or households have not been collected by the survey firm. Given that for the vast majority of cases there is
only one polling booth per constituency we decided to use this unit of desagreggation to represent graphically starting point characteristics.
14Refusal rate =
# of selected individuals - # of respondents
# of selected individuals
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Figure 2.2: Selection of respondents per constituency
(a) share of (b) average number of motorcyclists
eligible households per eligible household
(c) average number of selected people (d) average number of interviewed people
per eligible household per eligible household
Translation of the questionnaire into hindi
The questionnaire has been translated into Hindi, which is the most commonly used language in New Delhi. Of
course, such translation may slightly alter the initial formulation of questions. As a further precaution, the most
sensitive questions have been extensively discussed and explained to the project manager in charge of the imple-
mentation of the survey, so that he could provide all the necessary clarifications to the translator if needed.
Pilot-phase
Three senior interviewers, who later supervised the final survey, were in charge of the pilot-phase. They first at-
tended a one day training where the project manager and myself presented the questionnaire module by module.
Mocked tests were then performed. The pilot of the questionnaire was conducted on the 10th of July in Lajpat
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Nagar III, South Delhi.15 Eight households were interviewed. The pre-test was implemented in order to get some
sense of how the households would react to the survey, the actual duration of the questionnaire as well as poten-
tial misunderstanding of questions. Depending on the interviewer and the number of individuals interviewed per
household, the completion of the questionnaire lasted between one and two hours.
Based on these feedbacks, some questions have been modified and a particular focus has been given to cer-
tain points during the following training sessions. In particular, the pre-test highlighted that some questions were
either not formulated adequatly, too difficult to understand or required that the interviewer made some compu-
tation which led to a loss of interest and a rise in the respondent’s fatigue. This was in particular the case for the
elicitation of the subjective distribution of medical expenditures and fines. In the initial version of the question-
naire, the respondent was first asked about the minimum and maximum amount of medical expenditures and
fines, then the inquirer computed three thresholds and asked what was the probability the individual would have
to pay less than each of these four limits (the three thresholds and the maximum). This, following the elicitation
methodology used for instance by Dominitz and Manski (1997b). Given the enumerator’s difficulties in comput-
ing the intervals and the subsequent impatience or disinterest shown by respondents, we decided to replace the
self-anchored methodology by pre-determined scales.
Training sessions
Training sessions were done in Hindi by the project manager and supervisors who had been trained for the pilot-
phase.16 Before starting the detailed reading of the questionnaire, I personally presented the objective of the survey
as well as the institutions involved in the project.
The training was organised as follows. First, the different modules were reviewed. Then each module was read,
explained, and role-playing was performed by the trainees. Sections on risk aversion and anticipations of injuries
and fines received particular attention due to their complexity. The attitude to be adopted in front of the selected
households to convince them to answer the survey and limit the refusal rate was subsequently described. Finally,
the process of selection of individuals among the motorcyclist members was presented in depth. In particular,
interviewer trainees practiced the Kish matrix which was used to select eligible members.
In addition to the role-playing exercices, a field session has been organised nearby the office (South extension-
part II, South Delhi). Each interviewer completed at least one long questionnaire. Subsequently, I personally
checked their work and provided them a one-to-one debriefing in order to stress the sections which appeared not
to be understood correctly. The training session ended with a summary of the observed difficulties faced by differ-
ent enumerators. The routine to be adopted for the selection of households as well as the choice of motorcyclists
within eligible households was again recalled. A document summarizing all the instructions to be followed during
the interviews was distributed to each interviewer (cf. Appendices).
15This zone has been chosen due to his location nearby Sigma’s office headquarters. No starting point was selected near this area.
16Hindi lessons, which I took during the first semester of 2011 at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, allow me to follow roughly speaking the
delivery of the training.
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Due to an important turn-over of enumerators, new interviewers were actually hired all along the survey imple-
mentation in order to be able to complete the survey on time. In total three training sessions have been organised
(July 13-16, July 25-26 and August 23-24). Basic information regarding supervisors and interviewers is reported in
Table 2.12.
Implementation of the survey
The survey was launched on July 18th. Teams of two enumerators were sent to cover each starting point. To en-
sure that enumerators followed correctly the household selection routine, they were asked to fill a ‘context sheet’
with the adresses of selected households, whether they agreed or not to do the survey and if they answered the
questionnaire whether they were eligible or not. If the selected motorcyclists were absent at the time of the first
visit, a new visit was scheduled. Enumerators were asked to record the date and hour of those appointments in
the context sheet. Supervisors were supposed to accompany interviewers who started a new area to make sure the
selection of households started from the right location. They were also in charge of checking whether the routine
was correctly followed, gathering the questionnaires once completed and keeping track of the survey progress. In
total, 17 interviewers and 4 supervisors worked on the survey. The number of long questionnaires completed by
each enumerator depends on the date at which s/he started to work and on whether s/he was sent to areas with
an important share of motorcyclists. On average each area has been covered by 2.3 interviewers and each enumer-
ator went to 6.7 starting points. The latter interviewed on average 53 motorcyclists. While the presence of other
family members during the interview is likely to alter the quality of the data collected (Tourangeau and Yan; 2007),
we acknowledge that in the context of our survey neither an isolated interview has been required nor information
about which members of the household were present during the interview has been gathered.
External monitoring and supervision
In addition to the internal supervision made by Sigma Research and Consulting, I set up a back-checking and
cross-checking of the data collected by the interviewers. To do so, I hired a hindi speaking person, external to the
survey firm, who helped me in verifying the quality of the information contained in the questionnaire.
This external audit aimed at controlling whether (i) the households were properly selected, (ii) all eligible
households and individuals were recorded and (iii) selected individuals were actually interviewed. More precisely,
the verifications were of two types. First, based on the landline or mobile number provided by each interviewed
household, phone calls were made to verify their name, address, and the approximative duration of the survey.
Partial interviews were also done. In particular we verified whether the household was eligible or not and how
many members were motorcyclists and thus were supposed to answer to the questionnaire. Second, we randomly
selected a subsample of starting points and went back on the field. By doing so, we were able to check if the routine
had been followed; this based on the context sheet interviewers completed. Moreover, by reinterviewing house-
holds we verified that individuals from eligible households were indeed asked long questionnaires and not only
short ones. Finally, we asked a set of random questions from the survey to respondents in order to later compare
them to the answers filled by Sigma’s staff. This set of external checks started on the 25th of July, just one week
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after the launching of the survey. It turned out to be essential in order to ensure the quality of the data provided
by the local firm. Indeed, some interviewers cheated on the eligibility of the selected household or simply filled
themselves the questionnaires in order to finish sooner their work. These controls allowed us to detect such falsi-
fications. In several areas the routine was not followed or the right individuals were not interviewed. We therefore
decided to cancel the corresponding questionnaires and select new households. The cancellation of some of the
starting points translated into some confusion regarding the state of progress of the survey and some delay re-
garding the expected end of the data collection phase. Extra staff was therefore hired in August to compensate for
this extension and ensure that the survey would be completed on time. The data collection ended on the 11th of
September.
Data capture
Several meetings were set up with the data programming manager in July and August to discuss the data entry
program. We agreed on the precise coding to be used and the presentation of the final data to be delivered.
The data capture was done by an external specialized firm. Before sending the questionnaires to the subcon-
tractor, they were all scrutinized by Sigma’s staff. In particular identification codes were added to ease the task of
the data entry employees. A specific training session was organized for the latter on September 9th. The question-
naire was presented and the coding explained in depth. Data entry of the first questionnaires started right after
the practice.
The data capture has been done using the CS-Pro package. Because of budget constraints, no double entry of
the data has been performed. Nonetheless, I checked the correctness of 5% of the questionnaires. A mistake rate
of around 1% was found.
Final data was provided to us in STATA format by Sigma Research and Consulting on the 17th of September.
2.4 Description of the data
1,502 households were interviewed, out of which 545 had at least one member who had used the motorbike in the
past four weeks. Up to three individuals per household could be interviewed: one, two and three individuals have
been interviewed in respectively 51%, 32% and 17% of eligible households (cf. Table 2.2), leading to a final sample
of 902 motorcyclists.
54 ROAD SAFETY SURVEY
Table 2.2: Distribution of respondents per eligible household
% of household # of passengers
# of respondents % of households # of drivers 0 1 2 3
1 51.38 0 3.49 16.33 3.49 0.55
2 31.74 1 32.48 21.28 7.16 0
3 16.88 2 6.61 7.52 0 0
observations 545 3 1.10 0 0 0
Notes: 27 individuals declare they were both driver and passenger. This explains why 3.49%
of households have no driver and no passenger. Those household may have one, two or three
uncategorized motorcyclists.
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Before describing the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample, I provide evidence of the representa-
tiveness of this database. To do so, I first investigate whether our selected households are representative of the
Delhi population by comparing them with the 64th National Sample Survey (2007-2008). In a second step, I in-
vestigate the similarity of the selected and non selected motorcyclists. Finally, I make sure that individuals who
refused to answer the survey are not too different from those who agreed.
2.4.1 Representativeness of our sample
Comparing our sample with the National Sample Survey
In order to provide evidence that our survey is representative of Delhi inhabitants, I compare our sample with
the data on Delhi provided by the 64th National Sample Survey (NSS-2007). I look at household’s and head of
household’s characteristics of (i) all households, (ii) households who own a motorbike and (iii) other households
from the two surveys. When considering households who own a motorbike, we note that they don’t differ in terms
of religion or social groups (cf. Table 2.3). Regarding the head of household’s characteristics, they are more likely to
have some tertiary education and are older in our sample than in the NSS. However, distribution of gender, marital
status and literacy is similar across samples for these particular households. Therefore, our sample has not been
reweighted in the analyses presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Differences between selected and other motorcyclists
When selecting motorcyclists, a priority was given to the head of the household and his spouse. In other words,
in case these individuals did use the motorbike in the previous month, they were automatically selected. The re-
maining interviewees were then randomly chosen thanks to the Kish grid. Given this feature of the sample design,
it is not surprising to see that selected motorcyclists are more often married, more likely to have children and more
likely to work and to contribute substantially to the income. The differences in the distribution of highest educa-
tion degree reached among selected and other motorcyclists can also be explained by the higher and lower level of
education of respectively household heads and their spouses (cf. Table 2.4, columns (3) and (4)).
Differences between selected individuals who agreed to answer and those who refused
Table 2.4 (columns (5) and (6)) also compares individuals who answered to the survey and those who didn’t. The
only significant differences between refusals and consents are gender and status in the household. More precisely,
the shares of men and heads of household among individuals refusing to answer to the survey are significantly
lower. This may be due to pressure on some women who were actually not allowed by their family to answer
the survey.17 Overall, individuals who did not fill in the questionnaire appear to have similar socio-demographic
characteristics as the final respondents; which gives us confidence in the quality and the representativeness of our
data.
17Such behavior has been reported by a few interviewers in particular in areas with a higher share of Muslims.
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Table 2.3: Comparing HH characteristics between NSS-2007 and our Road Safety Survey
All HH Two wheeler non owners Two wheeler owners
NSS RSS NSS RSS NSS RSS
Observations (621) (1502) (374) (1045) (247) (457)
Variables Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test
HH characteristics
HH size 4.03 4.94 ?? 3.98 4.76 not 4.11 5.35 ??
Religion
Hindu (%) 82.13 82.42 not 81.02 82.20 not 83.81 82.93 not
Muslim (%) 11.92 12.38 not 13.64 12.63 not 9.31 11.82 not
Sikh (%) 4.51 3.99 not 4.01 4.02 not 5.26 3.94 not
Christian (%) 0.97 0.87 not 1.07 0.86 not 0.81 0.88 not
Social group
ST, SC or BC (%) 39.45 40.55 not 40.91 44.59 not 37.25 31.29 not
Head of HH characteristics
Age (in years) 41.56 46.70 ?? 41.24 45.70 ?? 42.06 49.00 ??
Male (%) 92.91 90.48 ?? 93.58 90.05 not 91.90 91.47 not
Marital Status
Never married (%) 10.14 3.73 ?? 11.76 3.92 ?? 7.69 3.28 not
Currently married (%) 81.80 85.69 not 81.28 85.26 not 82.59 86.65 not
Widowed (%) 7.73 10.05 not 6.68 10.24 not 9.31 9.63 not
Divorced (%) 0.32 0.53 not 0.27 0.57 not 0.40 0.44 not
Education
illiterate (%) 10.95 18.97 ?? 9.09 22.58 ?? 13.77 10.72 not
> graduation (%) 25.12 28.50 not 26.20 21.82 not 23.48 43.76 ??
Notes: ?? Significant at 5%
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Table 2.4: Socio-demographic differences between individuals belonging to eligible households
Within eligible households all members motorcyclists selected motorcyclists
motorcyclists others p-value selected others p-value answers refusals p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
observations 1323 832 1114 209 902 212
Age (years) 34.63 38.22 0.000 36.16 26.46 0.000 36.47 34.84 0.109
Male (%) 64.22 39.90 0.000 65.85 55.50 0.004 67.40 59.43 0.028
Status in the household (%)
HH head 29.48 18.72 0.000 34.92 0.48 0.000 37.69 23.11 0.000
spouse of HH head 18.14 26.21 0.000 21.36 0.96 0.000 21.51 20.75 0.810
Marital status (%)
Never married 27.79 31.33 0.079 24.71 44.23 0.000 24.05 27.49 0.298
Married 69.78 62.05 0.000 72.86 53.37 0.000 73.39 70.62 0.416
Divorced 0.53 0.36 0.573 0.36 1.44 0.049 0.33 0.47 0.761
Widowed 1.90 6.27 0.000 2.07 0.96 0.281 2.23 1.42 0.461
Has no children (%) 8.24 6.35 0.108 7.23 13.66 0.002 7.49 6.16 0.504
number of children (#) 1.91 1.97 0.333 1.99 1.26 0.000 1.97 2.09 0.266
Education level (%)
illiterate 6.71 14.93 0.000 7.26 3.83 0.069 6.95 8.57 0.416
primary education 15.03 22.09 0.000 15.79 11.00 0.076 15.36 17.62 0.420
secondary education 33.94 30.22 0.074 32.49 41.63 0.011 32.96 30.48 0.490
tertiary education 44.32 32.77 0.000 44.46 43.54 0.806 44.73 43.33 0.714
Sector of work (%)
public 9.98 6.05 0.002 10.86 5.26 0.012 11.31 8.96 0.323
private 22.60 9.44 0.000 23.52 17.70 0.065 23.84 22.17 0.607
self-employed 17.23 7.14 0.000 18.04 12.92 0.072 18.18 17.45 0.804
unemployed 2.65 3.51 0.251 2.33 4.31 0.103 21.51 3.77 0.123
inactive 46.86 73.61 0.000 44.52 59.33 0.000 43.90 47.17 0.390
Contributes to HH income (%) 50.68 22.83 0.000 53.87 33.65 0.000 55.00 49.06 0.119
Share of the contribution (%)
less than 20% 52.33 79.11 0.000 48.69 72.06 0.000 47.09 55.45 0.029
20 to 40% 9.17 5.92 0.007 7.78 16.67 0.000 7.49 9.00 0.462
40 to 60% 13.67 8.09 0.000 14.48 9.31 0.049 14.77 13.27 0.579
60 to 80% 4.05 1.81 0.004 4.52 1.47 0.042 4.81 3.32 0.349
more than 80% 20.78 5.07 0.000 24.52 0.49 0.000 25.84 18.96 0.037
2.4.2 What are the particularities of motorcyclists?
A first outcome of this survey is to provide information regarding motorbike users. More precisely, I first document
on which dimensions households with at least one member using a moto as mean of transportation differ from
other families. Given that basic socio-demographic characteristics of all members older than 15 years old have
been gathered, I subsequently investigate the differences within motorbike households between motorcyclists and
other members and between type of motorcyclists. Table 2.5 displays the socio-demographic differences between
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‘eligible’ and ‘non eligible’ households on the one hand and between households who own a motorbike and other
motorcyclist households on the other hand. Table 2.4 considers only ‘eligible’ households and compares members
according to their motorbike status (users vs. non users). Finally, Table 2.6 compares drivers and passengers who
were selected for the interview and accepted to complete the questionnaire.
Comparing ‘eligible’ and ‘non eligible’ households
36.3% of households have at least one member who used the motorbike in the past four weeks. From Table 2.5
(columns (2) and (3)) we note that the eligible households are significantly bigger (on average 5.3 members vs. 4.7
individuals). There is no difference in terms of religion distribution, but households with motorcyclist members
are less likely to belong to a schedule caste or schedule tribe.18 Similarly, they are richer than non motorcyclist
households. Regarding the characteristics of the household’s head, in ‘eligible’ households the latter is a bit older,
less likely to have no child, more educated, more likely to work in the public sector and less likely to work in the
private one.
Differences between motorbike owners and other eligible households
84% of ‘eligible’ households own a motorbike. When comparing households who have a motorbike and those who
have motorcyclist members but no motorbike, we observe that the latter are more likely to belong to a low caste
and earn less than 10,000 INR per month. The head of household is also more likely to have only primary education
and to be unemployed. As for the former households they are more likely to earn more than 20,000 INR per month,
their household’s heads have also more often tertiary education. Not suprisingly, families who own a motorbike
have a higher social status than households with members who use this mode of transport but who don’t possess
their own vehicle (cf. Table 2.5, columns (4) and (5)).
18Schedule castes and schedule tribes are two groups of people who have been historically disadvantaged in India.
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Table 2.5: Socio-demographic differences between different type of households
all households eligible households
all eligible non eligible p-value moto owners others p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of the HH
observations 1502 545 957 457 87
Household size (#) 4.94 5.31 4.73 0.000 5.35 5.09 0.353
Religion (%)
hindu 82.42 84.22 81.40 0.168 82.93 91.95 0.034
muslim 12.38 11.19 13.06 0.291 11.82 6.90 0.180
sikh 3.99 3.49 4.28 0.448 3.94 1.15 0.195
Caste (%)
ST or SC 15.20 10.99 17.58 0.000 10.22 15.12 0.185
OBC 25.76 22.72 27.47 0.044 21.56 29.07 0.128
General 58.46 65.32 54.55 0.000 68.22 55.81 0.026
HH monthly income (%)
observations 1254 447 807 368 78
less than 5,000 INR 29.35 15.44 37.05 0.000 12.77 26.92 0.002
5,000 to 10,000 INR 28.87 24.61 31.23 0.013 22.83 33.33 0.051
10,000 to 15,000 INR 18.82 24.61 15.61 0.000 26.09 17.95 0.131
15,000 to 20,000 INR 11.48 16.11 8.92 0.000 16.85 12.82 0.381
more than 20,000 INR 11.48 19.24 7.19 0.000 21.47 8.97 0.011
Characteristics of HH’s head
observations 1502 545 957 456 87
Age (years) 46.61 48.69 45.42 0.000 48.95 47.41 0.334
Male (%) 90.51 92.10 89.61 0.115 91.67 94.25 0.414
Marital status (%)
Never married 3.74 3.67 3.78 0.921 3.29 5.75 0.266
Married 85.64 86.21 85.31 0.632 86.62 83.91 0.502
Divorced 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.946 0.44 1.15 0.413
Widowed 10.09 9.56 10.39 0.609 9.65 9.20 0.895
Has no children 9.69 4.79 12.51 0.000 4.82 4.65 0.945
number of children 2.17 2.19 2.15 0.610 2.17 2.26 0.586
Education level (%)
illiterate 19.22 11.50 23.62 0.000 10.84 15.12 0.256
primary education 26.77 17.44 32.10 0.000 13.94 36.05 0.000
secondary education 25.22 30.80 22.03 0.000 30.97 29.07 0.726
tertiary education 28.79 40.26 22.25 0.000 44.25 19.77 0.000
Sector of work (%)
public 15.98 19.67 13.87 0.003 20.83 13.79 0.131
private 34.49 30.88 36.55 0.026 29.39 37.93 0.114
self-employed 28.61 26.84 29.62 0.252 26.97 26.44 0.918
unemployed 1.40 1.29 1.47 0.771 0.88 3.45 0.051
inactive 17.11 19.85 15.55 0.033 20.61 16.09 0.334
Contributes to HH income (%) 85.48 82.72 87.07 0.022 82.02 86.21 0.345
Share of the contribution (%)
less than 20% 15.86 19.52 13.77 0.003 20.44 14.94 0.237
20 to 40% 4.02 4.24 3.89 0.744 4.18 4.60 0.858
40 to 60% 15.73 17.31 14.83 0.205 16.48 21.84 0.228
60 to 80% 10.78 9.02 11.78 0.099 9.89 4.60 0.115
more than 80% 53.61 49.91 55.73 0.030 49.01 54.02 0.393
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Table 2.6: Socio-economic characteristics breakdown by motorcyclist and gender
all all all difference
respondents drivers passengers significance
[1] [2] [2] -[1]
Male (%) 67.37 97.02 25,07 0.000
observations 901 503 371
all male male difference female
respondents drivers passengers significance passengers
[1] [2] [2] -[1]
Age (%)
15-19 years old 7.10 7.17 13.98 0.029 4.32
20-29 years old 27.83 30.53 18.28 0.017 23.38
30-39 years old 26.05 25.41 13.98 0.017 32.37
40-49 years old 20.84 20.29 15.05 0.243 25.18
50-59 years old 10.98 11.27 17.20 0.110 8.99
60 years and above 7.21 5.33 21.51 0.000 5.76
mean (in years) 36.47 35.47 42.10 0.000 37.00
observations 902 488 93 278
Married (%) 73.39 68.82 69.48 0.898 85.56
observations 898 485 93 277
Number of children 1.5 1.33 1.52 0.233 1.86
observations 893 481 93 276
Contributes to hh income (%) 55.00 80.94 68.82 0.009 5.78
observations 900 488 93 276
Contribution share (%)
less than 20% 47.09 20.75 35.48 0.002 94.93
between 20 and 40% 7.49 11.20 8.60 0.460 1.09
between 40 and 60% 14.77 19.71 22.58 0.528 3.62
between 60 and 80% 4.81 7.68 4.30 0.248 0.36
more than 80% 25.84 40.66 29.03 0.035 0.00
observations 894 482 93 276
Education level (%)
illiterate 6.95 2.49 7.53 0.013 14.91
primary education 15.36 11.02 27.96 0.000 18.18
secondary education 32.96 33.06 44.09 0.041 31.27
tertiary education 44.73 53.43 20.43 0.000 35.64
observations 892 481 93 275
Religion (%)
Hindu 84.37 83.40 86.02 0.530 86.69
Muslim 11.09 12.09 10.75 0.715 9.35
Sikh 3.44 3.28 2.15 0.566 3.24
observations 902 488 93 278
Pray daily 71.24 65.23 74.19 0.093 80.73
Believes fate is in god’s hands 88.18 87.47 90.22 0.460 87.27
observations 897 486 93 275
Notes: Difference between the number of total respondents and the sum of male drivers and passengers is due to
27 individuals who declare to be both passenger and driver and 24 female drivers.
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Differences between motorcyclists and other members of the same household
From Table 2.4 (columns (1) and (2)), we see that motorcyclists are significantly younger, more likely to be male,
head of household and married. Motorcyclists are much more likely to have tertiary education. They are also
more often income earners; this regardless of the amount of revenue they bring to the family and the sector in
which they work (public, private or self-employed). From these observations it seems that being active is the
main determinant of motorbike use. We can guess that the use of the two-wheeler is given to workers in priority,
the other members of the household, who travel less and for shorter distances, relying rather on other means of
transportation if needed. Indeed, respondents who are bread earners are much more likely than those who don’t
contribute to the household income to report motorbike as their main transport mode (57.8% vs. 48.6%). The
latter in turn are more likely than the former to declare that they mainly use the bus (20.7% vs. 13.7%) or travel by
foot (11.6% vs. 7.9%).
Differences between drivers and passengers
Table 2.6 shows some basic descriptive statistics of our sample, separated by drivers and passengers. The average
age is 35 years for drivers and 38 years for passengers. Almost all drivers are men, passengers are predominantly
female (75%). Drivers are typically married and are the main breadwinners in their household. Male passengers
contribute much less often to the family revenues and when they do it is for a smaller share. Only 6% of female
passengers contribute to total household income. As for the education level, it is relatively high. Almost 50%
of all drivers completed middle or high school and 44% have some university education. The education level
of passengers is significantly lower, partly reflecting the gender gap in education. The religious composition is
similar among drivers and passengers and shows that more than 80% of respondents are Hindus. Muslims and
Sikhs represent respectively around 10% and 3% of the sample. 65% of male drivers report to pray daily, they are
significantly more among male passengers (74%). Among female passengers this share is, at 81%, even a bit higher.
Moreover, when asked whether they believe that their life was in the hand of a superior force, 88% of respondents
definitively agreed with this statement.
2.4.3 Content of the survey
Motorbike use and traveling habits
The data collected allows in particular to document why and how motorcyclists use this mode of transport. More
precisely, thanks to the information gathered I am able to present their habits (frequency of trips, type of roads,
distances traveled, time spent on the road, number of people on the same motorbike), the characteristics of their
motorbike (age, price, size) and the related expenditures (insurance, gasoline, maintenance).
Table 2.7 reports the share of households and respondents who own a motorbike, while Tables 2.8 and 2.9
display the characteristics of the vehicle (the one mostly used in case the household owns several motorbikes)
and the associated expenses respectively. 84% of eligible households own at least one motorbike.19 87% or our
1989% of them have only one motorbike.
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respondents belong to such household. While interviewed male drivers and female passengers mostly belong to
households who own a motorbike, more than 50% of male passengers actually don’t possess such asset. This may
explain why they are mainly passenger. The motorbike is half of the time driven by different household members.
Regarding the size of the vehicles, they are rather small, only 15% of them are 150 cubic centimeters or bigger ones.
The most common type is between 100 and 150 cubic centimeters (55%). 80% of motorbikes have been purchased
first hand, average price paid being 46,000 INR.20
Table 2.7: Motorbike ownership
all male male female
respondents drivers passengers passengers per household
HH owns a motorbike (%) 87.35 92.61 48.39 90.65 84.01
# of motorbike owned
no motorbike 12.65 7.39 51.61 9.35 15.99
one motorbike 77.80 84.19 38.71 79.50 76.65
two or three motorbikes 9.54 8.42 9.68 11.15 7.36
observations 901 487 93 278 544
HH owns a car (%) 27,01 29.61 15.21 26.98 26.90
observations 896 483 92 278 539
20More precisely, the average price for first hand purchased moto is 50,370 INR while it is of 26,280 INR for second hand purchased vehicles.
When considering the global average price, it corresponded to 920 EUR in 2011 or 5,500 EUR in PPP 2011.
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Table 2.8: Characteristics of the motorbike and related expenditures
all male male female
respondents drivers passengers passengers per household
Characteristics of motorbike #1 among respondents whose HH owns a motorbike
Moto driven by several drivers 48.91 50.00 40.00 50.60 55.51
observations 783 450 45 249 454
Size of the motorbike (%)
less than 100cc 29.45 28.14 30.00 32.58 29.20
From 100 to 150cc 54.52 54.42 57.50 53.39 55.47
above 150cc 16.03 17.44 12.50 14.03 15.33
observations 730 430 40 221 411
Date of acquisition (%)
this year 15.02 15.25 8.89 16.47 14.82
one year ago 14.12 12.33 26.67 14.46 15.27
two years ago 18.36 16.82 20.00 19.68 18.14
three years ago 13.61 14.57 11.11 12.45 13.94
four years ago 10.91 11.21 8.89 10.04 10.62
five years ago 7.45 7.62 6.67 7.63 6.86
more than five years ago 20,45 22.20 17.78 19.28 20.35
observations 779 446 45 249 452
Mode of acquisition (%)
first hand 81.11 81.17 86.67 79.84 81.11
second hand 15.42 15.25 11.11 16.53 16.22
donation 3.47 3.59 2.22 3.63 2.67
observations 778 446 45 248 450
Average purchasing cost (in INR)
mean 46,012 46,884 46,538 44,166 45,827
std. dev. 15,216 16,346 13,167 13,913 15,685
min 10,000 10,000 20,000 10,000 10,000
max 108,000 108,000 72,000 78,000 108,000
observations 644 364 39 206 365
Technical checks (%)
yes 91.56 91.28 88.64 92.50 91.14
observations 758 436 44 240 440
Frequency of checks (%)
each month 36.67 35.60 28.89 38.77 37.91
every 3 months 41.95 41.96 44.44 41.85 41.86
twice a year 11.50 12.59 13.33 10.57 10.23
once a year or less 9.88 9.56 13.33 8.81 10.00
observations 739 429 45 227 430
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Table 2.9: Motorbike related expenditures
all male male female
respondents drivers passengers passengers per household
Expenditures (in INR) related to motorbike
in gasoline in the last 30 days
mean 1,230 1,197 1,209 1,237 1,251
std. dev. 996 964 868 1,020 1,017
observations 596 368 29 166 332
in lubricant products in the last year
mean 1,188 1,311 709 982 1,329
std. dev. 2,014 2,358 910 1,339 2,424
observations 523 321 28 142 289
in maintenance in the last year
mean 2,061 2,149 1,818 1,841 2,113
std. dev. 3,424 3,297 5,363 2,754 3,556
observations 526 326 28 140 291
Has a motorbike insurance (%) 81.61 80.92 85.71 82.25 81.57
observations 745 435 42 231 434
Among those who have an insurance (%)
public insurance 59.90 62.82 67.65 55.25 63.13
full coverage 79.66 81.32 88.57 75.27 79.82
observations 595 348 35 182 342
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Road safety effort
Respondents reported whether they use a helmet when traveling on a motorbike; this breakdown by type of roads
and length of the journeys. We therefore know if each individual wear a helmet when moving within residential
areas, or on main roads for long or rather short trips. Helmet ownership, motives for its use and perceived utility
of head protection were also elicited.
Driving skills
Questions related to driving skills were included in the survey. Regarding formal training, while 91% of male
drivers21 have a driving license, only 72% and 46% of them took a driving exam or driving lessons respectively.
The driving license is issued by the Regional Transport Offices and its obtention is a two-step procedure. First in-
dividuals must apply for a learner’s license. In addition to some administrative papers,22 applicants must pay a fee
of 360 INR, pass a color blindness exam and a written test on traffic rules and regulations. After 30 days, they can
apply for a permanent license, for which a 90 INR fee is charged and a driving road test must be undertaken. This
leads to an official total cost of 450 INR. In our sample, 80% of drivers who declare having a license reported the
cost of getting it. On average they paid 500 INR or less.23 Besides formal training, drivers were asked whether they
think they drive more carefully and better than other drivers.
Road traffic accidents
Personal and relatives’ road traffic accident involvement were reported by motorcyclists. In particular, data re-
garding the circumstances of the crash, the type of injuries and their severity as well as the legal, financial and job
consequences were collected. In addition to these experiences, information on respondents’ knowledge of road
risks was gathered. More precisely, they were interrogated about the number of annual road deaths and injuries
that occured in 2010 in Delhi as well as the type of road users they think were most at risks. The answers provided
were then confronted to official figures collected by the National Crime Record Bureau.24 This comparison allows
to identify individuals who underestimate, accurately estimate or overestimate road casualties.
Police enforcement
Respondents were asked whether they already have been caught by the traffic police and if it was the case which
was the road rule they infringed. Besides, general enforcement of different traffic offences were elicited along
with opinion on the level of corruption among policemen and the possibility of bribing officers to avoid the legal
penalty.
2197% of drivers are men in our sample.
22Individuals must provide to the administration proof of residence, proof of age, passport size photography and a medical certificate.
23Bertrand et al. (2007) implemented a randomized control trial to investigate the influence of corruption in the driving license process in
New Delhi. While the official cost of driving license was 450 INR, the average actual cost of getting a driving license was around 1,100 INR
among drivers belonging to the “control group”. The rather low level of expenditures we find may be partly due to the fact that cost of driving
license is likely to have increase over time and the mentioned figure doesn’t control for the date at which the drivers got their license.
24The National Crime Record Bureau is a governmental agency of India responsible for collecting and alayzing crime data. In particular, it is
in charge of putting together all data on road traffic accident transmitted by police local offices.
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2.5 Conclusion
To our knowledge, it is the first time that information regarding road habits and safety behaviors of motorcyclists
have been collected in a survey in India or in any other developing country. The representativeness of the data
collected has been checked by comparing socio demographic characteristics of our respondents with the National
Sample Survey’ ones. The richness of our questionnaire allows me to document, in this thesis, the road habits of
motorcyclists, their safety attitudes as well as their previous experiences of police stops and road traffic accidents.
Risk aversion and respondents’ expectations regarding injuries and fines have also been collected through our
survey. These dimensions will be presented in details in the following Chapters.
2.6. APPENDICES 67
2.6 Appendices
Table 2.10: Content of the questionnaire
Module 0 General information
Block 1 Information on the household
Block 2 Information on the interview
Block 3 Particulars of field operations
Module 1 Household characteristics
Module 2 Demographics and other particulars of the household
Block 1 Demographic and economic characteristics
Block 2 Religious practices and beliefs
Module 3 Transport
Block 1 Transport habits
Block 2 Transport habits and helmet use
Block 3 Insurance and other vehicle expenditures
Module 4 Risk attitude
Block 1 Self-reported risk aversion
Block 2 Lotteries
Block 3 Risk aversion in financial matters
Block 4 Risk aversion in health
Block 5 Preference for the present
Module 5 Road risk awareness and perception
Block 1 Road risk awareness
Block 2 Overconfidence and driving skills
Block 3 Situation on the road
Block 4 Elicitation of subjective probabilities and outcomes
Module 6 Police enforcement
Block 1 Perception of police enforcement and road rules knowledge
Block 2 Elicitation of subjective probabilities and outcomes
Module 7 Accident experience
Final questions
MODULE 0 – GENERAL INFORMATION
M0 – BLOCK 1 – INFORMATION ON THE HOUSEHOLD
Starting point 
Direction    Right 1 Left 2
Household Number
Zone
Address
Name of head of household 
Contact number (cell phone or landline) 
Household unique ID code 
M0 – BLOCK 2 – INFORMATION ON THE INTERVIEW
Interviewer's name 
Date of interview Day Month Year Time interview  
First visit start
end
Second visit start
end
M0 – BLOCK 3 – PARTICULARS OF FIELD OPERATIONS
Senior Investigator's name Date of survey inspection
Other supervisor officer's name Date of survey inspection
Remarks by investigator Comments by supervisor officer
INTRODUCTION
May I begin the interview now ?
Respondent agrees for interview 1
Respondent doesn't agree for interview 2 → CLOSE
Namaste. My name is … . I am from Sigma Research, a social research agency. From time to time, we conduct 
studies on issues related to health, awareness and general issues. Currently, we are carrying out a research 
study in Delhi to understand behavior related to road.
As part of this study, we are talking to people like you here (name of the area) … in order to find out the 
attitude and behavior on the road among road users of Delhi. Your views are important to us. Your 
participation is voluntary and you are free to stop the interview at any time. Please be assured that the 
information given by you will be treated as confidential and will only be used for research purposes.
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MODULE 1 – HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Q n°
M1 REPORT THE ID CODE OF HH Code category HH ID code
Q1
Q2 To which religion your household belong to ? Hinduism 1
Islam 2
Christianity 3
Sikhism 4
Other : specify 9
Q3 Scheduled tribe 1
Scheduled caste 2
Other backward class 3
General 4
Q4 Is your dwelling … ? Owned 1
Rented 2
Other  9
Q5 What is the type of your dwelling ? Independent house 1
Flat 2
Other  9
Q6 How many rooms does your dwelling have ?
(excluding kitchen and bathrooms)In 
Q7 Less than 5,000 INR 1
Between 5,000 and 10,000 INR 2
Between 10,000 and 15,000 INR 3
Between 15,000 and 20,000 INR 4
Between 20,000 and 25,000 INR 5
Between 25,000 and 40,000 INR 6
Between 40,000 and 60,000 INR 7
Between 60,000 and 100,000 INR 8
More than 100,000 INR 9
Questions
How many persons are there in your  household ?
To which social group does your household belong to ?
In which of the following brackets does the monthly 
income of the head of the household range ?
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MODULE 2 – DEMOGRAPHICS AND OTHER PARTICULARS OF THE HOUSEHOLD
M2 – BLOCK 1 – DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Instructions : List all members of the household who have 15 years old or more
M1B1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6A Q6B Q7
ID code Name Age Gender Relation to the head Marital status Sector of work Occupation Number of children 
living in the household
in years Male 1 Household head 1 Never married 1 Unskilled work 1
Female 2 Spouse of head 2 Married 2 1 Skilled work 2
Married child 3 Widowed 3 Private firm 2 Petty trader 3
Spouse of married NGO 3 Shop owner 4
child 4 4 Self-employed 4 Businessman 5
Unmarried child 5 Unemployed 5 Salesman 6
Grandchild 6 Teaching 7
Father/ mother in law 7 6 Supervisory level 8
Student 7 Junior executive 10
8 Retired 8 Senio executive 11
Other 9 Not working 12
9 Other 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
NOT LESS 
THAN 15 
YEARS 
OLD
Public firm or 
government
Divorced/ 
separated
Inactive/ 
housewife
Brother/ sister/ other 
relative
Servant/ employee/ 
other non relative
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M1B1 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13
ID code Level of education Share of the 
contribution
Illiterate 1 Yes 1 Less than 20% 1 Yes 1 Driver 1
Below primary (1-4) 2 No 0 From 20 to 40% 2 No 0 Passenger 2
Primary (5-6) 3 From 40 to 60% 3 Both 3
Middle (7-9) 4 From 60 to 80% 4 1
Secondary (10-11) 5 More than 80% 5
Higher secondary 6 2
Below graduation 7
Graduation 8
Post graduation 10
Other : specify 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Contribution to 
the household 
income
In the last four weeks, 
did [NAME] travel by 
motorbike/ scooter ?
In the last four weeks, 
how often did [NAME] 
travel by motorbike ?
He/ she traveled 
frequently by motorbike 
(always or most of the 
time)→ IF NO THEN SKIP TO 
NEXT HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBER
He/ she occasionnally 
travel by motorbike
Is [NAME] 
mainly a driver 
or a passenger ?
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M2 – BLOCK 2 – RELIGOUS PRACTICES AND BELIEFS
Q n°
M2B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1 How often do you go to place like temple ? Never 0
READ OUT Less than once a month 1
Once a month 2
Once a week 3
More than once a week 4
Q2 How often do you pray ? Never 1
READ OUT Rarely 2
Once a week 3
Everyday 4
Q3 Yes, definitively 1
Yes, this is quite true 2
READ OUT No, not really 3
No, definitively not 0
Instructions : The following questions are asked to eligible and selected individuals as well as to the head of household of 
non eligible households
Questions
Do you believe your life is in the hands of a 
superior force ?
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MODULE 3 – TRANSPORT
M3 – BLOCK 1 – TRANSPORT HABITS
Q n°
M3B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Means of transport Walk 1
Bicycle 2
Cycle rickshaw 3
Auto rickshaw 4
Motorbike 5
Q1A FIRST Car or jeep 6
Q1B SECOND Taxi 7
Q1C THIRD Bus 8
Metro 10
Other 9
Q2 Do you use the bus to travel ? Yes 1
No 0
Q3 Do you usually use the … ? Public bus 1
READ OUT Private bus 2
Both 3
Q4 Workplace/ office 1
Social/ familial gathering 3
READ OUT Entertainment 4
Other : specify 9
Q5 Yes 1
No 0
Q6A Yes 1
No 0
Q6B Yes 1
No 0
M3 – BLOCK 2– TRANSPORT HABITS AND HELMET USE
Q n°
M3B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Workplace/office/school 1
Delivery man/woman 2
READ OUT Social/ familial gathering 3
Q1A FIRST Entertainment 4
Q1B SECOND Other : specify 9
In order of frequency of use, what are the 
means of transport you usually use ?
If No  → SKIP TO BLOCK 2
or END THE INTERVIEW
What is the main reason why you take the 
bus ?
Do you feel unsafe when traveling by bus ?
Would you complain if the bus driver drives 
too fast ?
Would you complain if the bus driver stops in 
the middle of the road far away from the bus 
stop ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Formulation : Please each time consider the last 4 weeks
Questions
What are the 2 main reasons why you travel 
by motorbike ?
Questions
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Q n°
M3B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q2
kms
Q3
minutes
How often do you use Always, almost every trip 1
READ OUT
Q4A highways ? 2
Q4B rural roads ?
Q4C ring roads ? 3
Q4D inner cities/ main roads ? Never or almost never 0
Q4E colonies/ market roads ?
Q5 Type of motorbike user ? Driver → ASK Q6A 1
Passenger → ASK Q6B 2
Both                                          3
→ ASK BOTH Q6A and Q6B
Q6A I travel alone 1
One person 2
Two persons 3
More than two persons 4
Q6B One person 1
Two persons 2
More than two persons 3
Q7A Do you have a helmet ? Yes, I have my own helmet 1
2
No, I don't have helmet 0
If 1 or 2 → SKIP TO Q8
Q7B
It is too expensive 1
It is not elegant 2
It is too warm/ not comfortable 3
→ SKIP TO Q11 I do not like helmet 4
I do not have bike 5
Q8A Your helmet is Full head helmet 1
READ OUT ¾ helmet 2
Half helmet 3
Building site helmet 4
Other 9
Q8B Good condition 1
2
Broken but manually fixed 3
Completely broken 4
Q9 Does your helmet have a strap ? Yes 1
No 0
Often, more than half of the 
times
On average, how long do you travel by 
motorbike a week ?
How many people travel usually with you on 
the motorbike when you are a driver ?
How many people travel usually with you on 
the motorbike when you are a passenger ?
Yes, but I share it with an other 
household member
Approximatively, how many km do you travel 
by motorbike a week ?
Questions
ASK Q7B ONLY IF ANSWER IS NO IN Q7A
Which is the main reason why you don't have 
a helmet ?
SHOW THE PICTURES OF DIFFERENT 
HELMETS
TRY TO SEE THE HELMET CONDITION 
AND COMMENT Good condition but some 
scretches
Sometimes, less than half of 
the times
If No  → SKIP TO Q11
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Q n°
M3B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q10 IF YES IN Q9 THEN ASK I always attach it 1
I attach it in most cases 2
I sometimes attach it 3
I never attach it 4
Q11 Yes, always 1
Yes, in most cases 2
No, I never use the helmet 0
Yes, always 1
Q12A for short trips Yes, in most cases 2
Q12B for long trips No, I never use the helmet 0
Q13 Safety reason 1
Family wish 2
Community wish 3
Police threat 4
Other : specify 9
ASK IF 0 CODED IN Q11/Q12A/Q12B Your family asked you to 1
Would you use regularly the helmet if...
(choose no more than 2 options) 2
READ OUT The police asked you to 3
MULTIPLE RESPONSE
4
Q14A No 0
Q14B Other : specify 9
Q15 Yes 1
No 0
If Yes → SKIP TO NEXT BLOCK
ASK IF NO IN Q15
Would you say that : It is never useful 1
Q16A READ OUT It is not useful in highways 2
Q16B MULTIPLE RESPONSE It is not useful in colonies 3
Q16C It is not useful around markets 4
Q16D UP TO 4 RESPONSES It is not useful during the day 5
When you travel to local market/ near by area, 
do you use the helmet ?
Information campaign asked 
you to
Do you think it is useful to wear helmets ?
When you travel, how often do you attach the 
strap ?
Questions
When you travel on main roads, do you use 
the helmet ?
ASK IF 1 OR 2 CODED IN Q11/Q12A/Q12B
Which is the main reason why you use it ?
The chief of your (religious) 
community asked you to
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M3 - BLOCK 3 – INSURANCE AND OTHER VEHICLE EXPENDITURES
Instructions : The following questions can be asked to only one of the respondents
Q n°
M3B3 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID of the household
Q1 Yes 1
No 0
Q2 Yes 1
No 0
If No  → SKIP TO MODULE 4
Q3
Motorbike code 1 2 3
Q4A
NAME
Q4B
NAME
Q5 What is the size of the motorbike ? Less than 50cc 1
Between 50cc and 100cc 2
READ OUT Between 101cc and 150cc 3
Between 151cc and 250cc 4
Between 251cc and 350cc 5
More than 350cc 6
Electronic bike 7
Q6
1
0
Q7A When did you acquire the motorbike ? This year 1
One year ago 2
READ OUT Two years ago 3
Three years ago 4
Four years ago 5
Five years ago 6
More than five years ago 7
Q7B How did you acquire it ? Purchase first hand 1
Purchase second hand 2
READ OUT Donation or gift 3
Q8 How much did it cost ?
in INR
Q9
in INR
Questions
Does anyone in the household possess a car ?
Does anyone in the household possess a 
motorbike ?
How many motorbikes do you currently have 
?
TOTAL NUMBER OF BIKES IN THE 
HOUSEHOLD
Indicate the name of the owner of the 
motorbike (registration)
If different, indicate the name of the main 
user of the motorbike
Is the motorbike shared with other persons ?
CHOOSE THE 3 MOTORBIKES MOST 
FREQUENTLY USED AND RANK THEM
Yes, other members of the 
household drive the motorbike
No, the person is the only who 
drives the motorbike
For how much could you sell it currently ?
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Q n° Questions
M3B3 1 2 3
Q10 Yes, this year 1
Yes, next year 2
Yes, in two years 3
READ OUT Yes, in 3 to 5 years 4
Yes, in 6 to 10 years 5No 0
Q11 Yes 1
No 0
If No  → SKIP TO Q13
Q12 Each month 1
Every 3 months 2
Twice a year 3
READ OUT Once a year 4
Every two years 5
Q13 Yes 1
No 0
If No  → SKIP TO Q15
Q14
1
READ OUT 2
3
No 0
Q15
in INR
Q16
in INR
Q17
in INR
Q18A Is your motorbike insured ? Yes 1
No 0
If No  → SKIP TO MODULE 4
Q18B Public 1
Private 2
Q18C What is your coverage contract ? Full coverage 1
Partial coverage 2
Q18D
in INR
Q18E Are you satisfied with this deal ? Yes 1
No 0
Do you think of replacing this motorbike 
anytime soon ?
Do you regularly make technical checks on 
your motorbike ?
How often do you make technical checks ?
Is the insurance company private or public ?
How much do you pay in insurance premiums 
per year ?
Yes, material damages on the 
vehicle
Yes, material damages on the 
other vehicle
Yes, material damage on both 
vehicles
During the 365 days, how much did you spend 
in lubricants and other fuels for motorbike ?
During the 365 days, how much did you spend 
in maintenance and reparation of the 
motorbike ?
REPORT THE ID CODE OF MOTORBIKE
During the last 30 days, how much did you 
spend in gasoline for the motorbike ?
Was this vehicle involved in any road accident
Did this accident lead to material damages ?
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MODULE 4 – RISK ATTITUDE
M4 – BLOCK 1 – SELF-REPORTED RISK AVERSION
Q n°
M4B1 Code category ID code ID code ID code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How would you describe yourself:
Q1A In general ?
Q1B While driving ?
Q1C For financial matters ?
Q1D Regarding leisure and sport ?
Q1E With your health ?
M4 – BLOCK 2 – LOTTERIES
Q n°
M4B2 Code category ID code ID code ID code
Safe Lottery payoffs
Q1 
Q2
Q3 SEE INSTRUCTION MANUAL
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
A
B
Safe amount
Lottery pay-offs
19 9000 0 12000
20 9500 0 12000
17 8000 0 12000
18 8500 0 12000
15 7000 0 12000
16 7500 0 12000
13 6000 0 12000
14 6500 0 12000
11 5000 0 12000
12 5500 0 12000
9 4000 0 12000
10 4500 0 12000
7 3000 0 12000
8 3500 0 12000
5 2000 0 12000
6 2500 0 12000
3 1000 0 12000
4 1500 0 12000
0 12000
2 500 0 12000
Questions
REPORT THE ID CODE OF 
RESPONDENT
Do you prefer to receive X amount for 
sure or to have 50% chance to get 
nothing and 50% chance to get 12,000 
INR ?
Lottery table – all amounts are in INR
Row amount P=0.5 P=0.5
1 0
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
REPORT THE ID CODE OF 
RESPONDENT
People behave differently in different 
situations. On a risky scale going from 0 
(not at all prepared to take risk) to 7 
(fully prepared to take risk)
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
For each row in the lottery table, the interviewer asks each respondent which option between the safe amount and the lottery 
he/ she prefers.
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M4 – BLOCK 3 – RISK AVERSION IN FINANCIAL MATTERS
Q n°
M4B3 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1
Amount in INR
Q2A
Yes 1
No 0
Q2B Yes 1
No 0
Q2C Yes 1
No 0
Q3A
Amount in INR
Q3B
Amount in INR
Q4
Yes 1
No 0
Q5A
Yes 1
No 0
Q5B Yes 1
No 0
Q5C Yes 1
No 0
Q6A Are you enrolled in Health insurance ? Yes 1
No 0
Q7A What is your coverage contract ? Full coverage 1
READ OUT Partial coverage 2
Q8A Did you subscribe for it yourself ? Yes 1
No 0
If No  → SKIP TO Q6B
Would you pay a 2,000 INR premium for full 
insurance ?
 → SKIP TO Q6A
Would you pay a 1,000 INR premium for full 
insurance ?
If No  → SKIP TO Q6B
What is the maximum amount you would pay for a 
lottery ticket with 50 percent chance of winning 
10,000 INR ?
Imagine you are in a situation where you can 
afford to lend money to one of your friends.
Would you do it if he/she asks you to lend him 
10,000 INR ?
With a one percent chance (in other words one 
chance out of 100) risk of losing 100,000 INR (due 
to water damage, fire, theft)
Would you pay a 1,500 INR premium for full 
insurance ? If No  → SKIP TO Q5C
Would you like to take the opportunity of a 50 
percent chance of doubling your income and a 50 
percent chance of reducing your income by one 
third ? If No  → SKIP TO Q2C
Would you take it for a 50 percent chance of 
reducing your income by one half ?
If No  →  SKIP TO Q3A
Would you take it for a 50 percent chance of 
reducing your income by one fifth ?
What is the maximum amount you would pay for a 
lottery ticket with 50 percent chance of winning 
500 INR ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
Imagine you had just won 100,000 INR in a lottery 
and you can invest this money in a business.
 It is equally likely that the business goes well or 
not. If it goes well you can double the amount 
invested after one year ; if it does not you will lose 
half of the money you invested.
Out of these 100,000 INR, how much would you 
like to invest in such business ?
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Q n°
M4B3 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q9A1 What type of insurance ? Individual 1
Family 2
Q9A2 How much did you pay in premium last year ? Amount in INR
Q6B Are you enrolled in Health insurance ? Yes 1
No 0
Q7B What is your coverage contract ? Full coverage 1
READ OUT Partial coverage 2
Q9B2 How much did you pay in premium last year ? Amount in INR
Q6C Are you enrolled in dwelling insurance ? Yes 1
No 0
Q9C2 How much did you pay in premium last year ? Amount in INR
If No  → SKIP TO Q6C
Instructions : the following questions will be asked only to one individual in the household
If No  → SKIP TO NEXT BLOCK
Questions
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M4 – BLOCK 4 – RISK AVERSION IN HEALTH
Q n°
M4B4 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1 Currently, your general health is : Very good 1
READ OUT Good 2
Neither good nor bad 3
Bad 4
Really bad 5
Q2 When you feel sick, would you rather : Go to the doctor/ hospital 1
READ OUT Try to cure yourself alone 2
3
Q3 Yes, definitively 1
Yes, pretty much 2
READ OUT No, not really 3
No, not at all 0
Q4 How do you access the medical care ? 1
READ OUT 2
3
Q5
Yes, definitively 1
Yes, pretty much 2
No, not really 3
READ OUT No, not at all 0
Q6A
Yes 1
No 0
Would you accept this deal ?
Q6B Till which age do you think you will live ? years
Q6C years
Q7
1
A 30% chance to be harmful 2
A 10% chance to be harmful 3
READ OUT A 1% chance to be harmful 4
Let's assume now that by the age of 20 someone 
assures you that you could live a life without any 
health problem and pass away while sleeping at 
the age of 85. However, to be eligible you have, at 
the age of 20, to drink an elixir that can also be 
fatal.
I will never take such product
I accept to take the product 
knowing that there is
What probability for this to happen would you 
accept ?
I can access medical care but 
with some costs
It is difficult for me to access 
medical care
Do you think it is worth in order to live longer to 
deprive yourself of the so-called pleasure of life 
(such as good food, drinking, smoking, eventful 
life, etc...)
Let's assume that by the age of 20 someone assures 
you that you will live without any health problem, 
but in return your life will be shortened.
If No  → SKIP TO Q7
How many years would you accept to sacrifice ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
Wait and see if it goes better 
itself
Would you define yourself as an anxious person ?
I can easily get care without 
paying
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Q n°
M4B4 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q8A Do you or did you smoke ? Yes, I am currently a smoker 1
READ OUT Yes, I used to smoke but I quit 2
No, I never smoke 0
Q8B Since how long or for how long ? years
Q8C How often do (did) you smoke ? More than 10 cigarettes a day 1
5 to 10 cigarettes a day 2
2 to 4 cigarettes a day 3
One cigarette a day 4
At least once a week 5
At least once a month 6
Less than once a month 7
Q9A Yes 1
No 0
Q9B Think back over the last 2 weeks. None 1
Once 2
Twice 3
3 to 5 times 4
6 to 9 times 5
10 or more times 6
M4 – BLOCK 5 – PREFERENCE FOR THE PRESENT
Q n°
M4B5 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1A Which offer would you prefer ?
READ OUT 1
2
Q1B
Amount in INR
Q1C
Amount in INR
You can receive 5,000 INR now, or wait 5 years to 
receive the money.  
What would be the amount for which you would 
agree to wait 5 years ?
Questions
a payment of 52,000 INR this 
month
a payment of 58,000 INR next 
month
You can receive 5,000 INR now, or wait one year 
to receive the money.  
What would be the amount for which you would 
agree to wait one year ?
If No  → SKIP TO Q9A
Have you ever had any alcoholic beverage to drink 
(more than just few sips) ?
If No  → SKIP TO BLOCK 5
How many times have you had three or more 
drinks in a row (more precisely 3 beers or more/ 2 
pegs or more) ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Instructions : For all Q1A to Q1C, please ask questions indicating that it is « given the current condition of the market » 
(interest rate, etc...)
Questions
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MODULE 5 – ROAD RISK AWARENESS AND PERCEPTION
M5 – BLOCK 1 – ROAD RISK AWARENESS
Q n°
M5B1 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1 Less than 100 people 1
From 101 to 500 people 2
From 501 to 1,000 people 3
READ OUT From 1,001 to 2,000 people 4
From 2,001 to 5,000 people 5
From 5,001 to 10,000 people 6
More than 10,000 people 7
Q2 Less than 500 people 1
From 501 to 1,000 people 2
From 1,001 to 5,000 people 3
READ OUT From 5,001 to 10,000 people 4
From 10,001 to 15,000 people 5
From 15,001 to 20,000 people 6
More than 20,000 people 7
Q3A How many are pedestrians ?
Q3B How many are motorbike users ?
Q3C How many are car users ?
In your opinion, out of 100 persons who die from 
road traffic accidents :
MAKE SURE THAT THE SUM IS LESS THAN 100
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
In your opinion, how many individuals died 
through road traffic accidents last year (2010) in 
Delhi ?
In your opinion, how many persons suffer from 
severe injuries caused by road traffic accidents 
which occured last year (2010) in Delhi ?
Different types of road users die every year in 
road traffic accidents (pedestrians, bus 
passengers, auto rickshaw drivers, etc...)
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M5 -BLOCK 2 – OVERCONFIDENCE AND DRIVING SKILLS
Q n°
M5B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1 1
I drive as carefully than others 2
READ OUT I drive less carefully than others 3
Q2 ASK ONLY TO DRIVER OR BOTH Worse than others 1
How do you rate your driving skills ? Same as others 2
READ OUT Better than others 3
ASK ONLY TO DRIVER OR BOTH
Q3A Yes 1
No 0
Q3B When did you get it ? Past year 1
READ OUT 1 or 2 years ago 2
Between 3 and 5 years ago 3
Between 5 and 10 years ago 4
More than 10 years ago 5
Q3C Did you pass a driving exam to obtain it ? Yes 1
No 0
Q3D Did you take motorbike driving training ? Yes 1
No 0
Q3E
in INR
ASK ONLY TO PASSENGER OR BOTH
Q4 Yes 1
No 0
M5 – BLOCK 3 – SITUATION ON THE ROAD
Instructions : Show the related photos when presenting each of the following situations
SITUATION 1 : Vehicles are coming. There is a little gap and Rashmi is running and crossing the road.
SITUATION 2 : Gupta is on his motorbike, he decides to overtake a car from the left.
SITUATION 3 : Sundar is on his motorbike with his wife, he chooses to overtake a car from the left.
Q n°
M5B3 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
READ OUT Not al all risky 1
Slightly risky 2
Q1 SITUATION 1 Somewhat risky 3
Q2 SITUATION 2 Moderately risky 4
Q3 SITUATION 3 Risky 5
Q4 SITUATION 4 Very risky 6
Extremely risky 7
In your opinion, which is the level of risk taken by 
each of these individuals ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
I drive more carefully than other 
drivers
Do you have a driving licence for your 
motorbike ?
Comparing your driving to the other road users, 
how would you qualify yourself ?
ASK ONLY TO DRIVER OR BOTH
If No  → SKIP TO BLOCK 3
How much did it cost you to get your driving 
licence ?
Do you think your driver should drive more 
carefully ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
SITUATION 4 : Verma and his family are on their motorbike, in front of them there is one bus and one truck. There is still a small 
gap between the two vehicles and Verma decides to overtake the two vehicles by engaging in this gap.
Questions
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M5 – BLOCK 4 – ELICITATION OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND OUTCOME
Instructions : Show the related photos when presenting each of the following situations
There is no right or wrong answer. I just want to know what you think. »
SCALE 0 It is sure the event will fot happen
1 The event is not likely to happen but it is still possible
2
3
4 It is slightly more likely that the event will not happen
5 It is as likely that the event will happen than not happen
6 It is slightly more likely that the event will happen
7
8
9
10 It is sure the even will happen
Q n°
M5B4 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1A
0 to 10 scale
Q1B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q2A
0 to 10 scale
Q2B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q3A
0 to 10 scale
Q3B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q4A
0 to 10 scale
Q4B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q5A
0 to 10 scale
Q5B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q6A
0 to 10 scale
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS 0
→ GO DIRECTLY TO Q7A
Q6B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
How likely are you to go to the market sometime 
in the next two days ?
How likely are you to go to the market sometime 
in the next two weeks ?
How likely do you think it is that you will go out 
of the house for any reason in the next month ?
How likely it is that CHRISTMAS will fall in the 
month of June ?
Think about the way you generally travel on the 
motorcycle. Given this, how likely do you think it 
is that you have an accident in which you get 
injured ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
INTERVIEWER : « I will ask you several questions about the chance or likelihood that certain events are going to 
happen. On a scale going from 0 to 10, I would like you to tell me what you think the likelihood or chance that a specific 
event will happen is. 1 represents one chance out of 10. If you choose 0, it means that you think the event will NOT 
happen. As you choose a higher number on the scale, it means that you think the likelihood that the event will happen 
increases. For example, if you say 1 or 2, it means that you think the event is NOT likely to happen but it is still possible. 
If you say 5, it means that you think it is as likely that the event will happen that it will not happen (fifty-fifty). If you say 
6, it means that the evt is slightly more likely to happen than not happen. Finally, if you say 10, it means you are sure the 
event will happen.
Instructions : For questions using the above scale, if the respondent say 10 (or 0), prompt : « Are you sure that this event 
will almost surely (not) happen ? ». Circle 1 in column «  Prompt 0 or 10 », if you prompted the respondent and report 
his/ her final answer only.
Questions
Imagine I have 5 balls, one is red and four are 
blue. If you pick one of these balls without 
looking, how likely it is that you pick the red 
ball ?
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Q n°
M5B4 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q6C
Broken arm/ hand/ leg 1
Arm/ hand/ leg dismemberment 2
Cerebral trauma 3
Problems related to back bone 4
READ OUT Other : specify 9
Q7A 0 to 10 scale
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS 0
→ GO DIRECTLY TO MODULE 6
Q7B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10
Q7C
Broken arm/ hand/ leg 1
Arm/ hand/ leg dismemberment 2
Cerebral trauma 3
Problems related to back bone 4
READ OUT Other : specify 9
Q8A Less than 500 INR
Q8B Less than 1,000 INR
Q8C Less than 2,000 INR
Q8D Less than 3,000 INR
Q8E Less than 5,000 INR
Q8F Less than 10,000 INR
Q8G Less than 20,000 INR
Q8H Less than 50,000 INR
Q8I Less than 80,000 INR
Q8J REPORT THE % Less than 100,000 INR
Q8K Less than 150,000 INR
Q8L Less than 200,000 INR
ONCE THE RESPONDENT REACHES 100% GO 
TO MODULE 6 
What type of injury do you think is the most 
likely yo happen ?
Thinking about the medical expenditures you 
would have to pay if you were injured in a road 
crash right now without wearing a helmet, what 
do you think is the percent chance that this 
amount would be
ASK ONLY INDIVIDUALS WHO ANSWERED 1-
10 IN Q6A
What type of injury do you think is the most 
likely yo happen ?
In case you are not wearing a helmet, how likely 
do you think that you have an accident in which 
you get injured ?
ASK ONLY INDIVIDUALS WHO ANSWERED 1-
10 IN Q7A
Questions
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MODULE 6 – POLICE ENFORCEMENT
M6 – BLOCK 1 – PERCEPTION OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT AND ROAD RULES KNOWLEDGE
Q n°
M6B1 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1A Non use of helmet by male driver
Q1B Non use of helmet by male passenger
Q1C Non use of helmet by female driver Yes, often 1
Q1D Drink and driving Yes, but rarely 2
Q1E Non use of seat belt by car driver No, never 0
Q1F Traffic light jumping
Q1G Over speeding
FIRST READ OUT ALL CATEGORIES
Q2A Non use of helmet by driver
Q2B Non use of helmet by passenger
Q2C Drink and drive
Q2D Non use of seat belt by car driver
Q2E Traffic light jumping
Q2F Over speeding
Q2G Driving licence verification
TOTAL
Q3A
Q3B
Q3C
Q4A Have to pay the fine 1
2
READ OUT 3
Other : specify 9
Q5 Have you ever been penalized by the police ? Yes 1
No 0
Driver's non use of helmet 1
Passenger's non use of helmet 2
CHOOSE NO MORE THAN 3 Drink and driving 3
Driver's non use of seat belt 4
Q6A FIRST  REASON Traffic light jumping 5
Q6B SECOND REASON Over speeding 6
Q6C THIRD REASON Driving licence verification 7
Other reason 9
Can negociate the amount of the 
fine
If No  → SKIP TO BLOCK 2
For which reasons have you been stopped by the 
police ? 
Out of 100 motorbike trips, according to you, 
what is the number of times : 
A male driver who never wears a helmet would be 
arrested by the police ?
A male passenger who never wears a helmet 
would be arrested by the police ?
A female driver who never wears a helmet would 
be arrested by the police ?
When someone is stopped by the police because 
of infringing the road rules, do you think he 
usually :
Can bribe the policeman not to 
pay the fine
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
Can you tell us if for the following situations 
police stops the individuals     READ OUT
Out of 100 police arrests, how much do you think 
concern each of the following behaviors ?
The interviewer has to make sure the answers sum 
up to 100
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M6 – BLOCK 2 – ELICITATION OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND OUTCOMES
SCALE 0 It is sure the event will fot happen
1 The event is not likely to happen but it is still possible
2
3
4 It is slightly more likely that the event will not happen
5 It is as likely that the event will happen than not happen
6 It is slightly more likely that the event will happen
7
8
9
10 It is sure the even will happen
Q n°
M6B2 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1
0 to 10 scale
Q1B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q2
0 to 10 scale
Q2B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q3
0 to 10 scale
Q3B CIRCLE IF PROMPT ANSWER 0 OR 10 1 1 1
Q4A Less than 50 INR
Q4B Less than 100 INR
Q4C Less than 200 INR
Q4D Less than 300 INR
Q4E Less than 400 INR
Q4F Less than 500 INR
Q4G Less than 600 INR
Q4H REPORT THE % Less than 700 INR
Q4I Less than 800 INR
Q4J Less than 900 INR
Q4K Less than 1,000 INR
Q5 Would this money go : To the policeman 1
READ OUT To the government 2
According to you what is the likelihood you will 
be stopped by the police for no reason during the 
next month ?
Instructions : Ask the next question to all individuals who expressed a percent chance greater than zero of being 
stopped by the police in question 2
Thinking about the fine you would have to pay if 
you were stopped right now without wearing a 
helmet, what do you think is the percent chance 
that this amount would be
ONCE THE RESPONDENT REACHES 100% GO 
TO Q5
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Instructions : Recall the respondent that it is the same scale and procedure that the one used in Module 5 – Block4
Questions
Think about the way you generally travel on the 
motorcycle, what is the likelihood that you will 
be stopped by the police in the next month ?
If you do not use the helmet at all during the 
next month, what is the probability the police 
stop you at least once over the period ?
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MODULE 7 – ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE
Q n°
M7 REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q1 Yes 1
No 0
INDICATE THE NUMBER
Q2A in which people have been injured ?  OF TIMES
Q2B in which there was only material damages ?
In case you have been involved in several road accidents, think to the most severe one you had.
Q3 Were you : A motorbike's driver 1
A motorbike's passenger 2
READ OUT A pedestrian 3
A biker 4
A car driver 5
A car passenger 6
A bus passenger 7
In a cycle rickshaw 8
In an auto rickshaw 10
Other 9
Q4 You had this accident with a … Pedestrian 1
Biker 2
READ OUT Cycle rickshaw 3
Auto rickshaw 4
Car 5
Taxi 6
Bus 7
Animal 8
Material obstacles 10
Other 9
Q5 Would you classify this accident as : Light 1
Severe 2
READ OUT Very severe 3
Fatal 4
Q6 How long ago did this accident happen ? Past week 1
Past month 2
READ OUT In the past 6 months 3
Past year 4
In the past 5 years 5
More than 5 years ago 6
Q7A Other road user's fault 1
I partly caused it 2
READ OUT My fault 3
Q7B Would you agree with him/ her ? Yes 1
No 0
Q8 Following this accident, did you ? Claimed for compensation 1
READ OUT Abused the other driver 2
Took legal action 3
MULTIPLE RESPONSES Any other action 4
UP TO TWO RESPONSES Did not do anything 5
How would you think a police officer would 
assess the accident ?
Instructions : The following questions are asked to all eligible and selected individuals
Questions
Have you ever been involved, either as a person 
at fault or as a victim, in a road trafic accident ?
If No  → SKIP TO Q13
Consider the last 5 years, how many times have 
you been involved in a road trafic accident :
2.6. APPENDICES 89
Q n°
M7ID REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q9 In this accident, have you been injured ? Yes 1
No 0
Q10A What type of injuries have you got ? Broken arm/ hand or leg 1
READ OUT Arm/ hand or leg dismemberment 2
Cerebral trauma 3
MULTIPLE RESPONSES Problems related to back bone 4
UP TO TWO RESPONSES Any other : specify 9
Q11A
1
READ OUT 2
No 0
Q11B Yes 1
No 0
Q12 Yes, completely 1
Yes, slightly 2
No 0
Q13 Yes 1
No 0
Q14 What is your relation to this person ? Spouse 1
Parent or children 2
READ OUT Other relatives 3
Close friend 4
Friend 5
Q15 Were he/ she : A motorbike's driver 1
A motorbike's passenger 2
READ OUT A pedestrian 3
A biker 4
A car driver 5
A car passenger 6
A bus passenger 7
In a cycle rickshaw 8
In an auto rickshaw 10
Other 9
Q16 He/she had this accident with a … Pedestrian 1
Biker 2
READ OUT Cycle rickshaw 3
Auto rickshaw 4
Car 5
Taxi 6
Bus 7
Animal 8
Material obstacles 10
Other 9
Q17 Would you classify this accident as : Light 1
Severe 2
READ OUT Very severe 3
Fatal 4
Questions
If No  → SKIP TO Q12
Did your injuries have lasting effects on your 
professional occupation ?
Yes, I had to change/ quit my 
previous job after this event
Yes, I have some difficulties but 
still do the same job
Did your injuries have lasting effects on your well-
being ?
Did this acident modify your attitude on the 
road ?
Did some of your family relatives or friends have 
ever been involved, either as a person at fault or 
as victim, in a road trafic accident ? If No  → END OF THE INTERVIEW
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Q n°
 M7ID REPORT THE ID CODE OF RESPONDENT Code category ID code ID code ID code
Q18 How long ago did this accident happen ? Past week 1
Past month 2
READ OUT In the past 6 months 3
Past year 4
In the past 5 years 5
More than 5 years ago 6
Q19 In this accident, was the person injured ? Yes 1
No 0
Q20 Broken arm/ hand or leg 1
Arm/ hand or leg dismemberment 2
READ OUT Cerebral trauma 3
MULTIPLE RESPONSES Problems related to back bone 4
UP TO TWO RESPONSES Any other : specify 9
Q21 Yes 1
No 0
Q22 Yes, borrow money 1
Yes, start to work to bring income 2
Yes, provide medical care 
assistance 3
READ OUT Yes, other support : specify 4
No 0
FINAL QUESTIONS BEFORE ENDING THE INTERVIEW
Instructions : These questions can be asked only to the head of the household os his spouse.
Q n°
MFID REPORT THE ID CODE OF HOUSEHOLD Code category ID of the household
AIQ1
Yes 1
No 0
AIQ2 Relative or friend name
AIQ3 Relative of friend's phone number
AIA4 Relative of friend's address
Did you provide any financial or time support to 
this person ?
Questions
Would you agree if we come back in a few 
months to ask you again some questions 
regarding road transport habits ?
Questions
If No  → END OF THE INTERVIEW
What type of injuries did this person suffer from?
Did his/ her injuries have lasting effects on his/ 
her professional occupation ?
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Study on helmet use and risk aversion among motorcyclists in New Delhi, India 
 
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS FOR ENUMERATORS 
 
I. Role of Enumerator 
The success of the survey depends on the capacity of the enumerator to collect precise information from the interviewed 
persons. 
 
As an enumerator, your role will include the following tasks: 
 Identify all members of the household and start a conversation with; 
 Conduct the interview in accordance with the procedures described in this manual; 
 Review the whole questionnaire before ending the conversation, make sure that the questions have been answered 
correctly and that the spaces left for questions that are not supposed to be answered are left blank as indicated in 
the questionnaire; 
 In case information on certain household members is not available at the time of your first visit, return to the 
household again; 
 Check all questionnaires completely before handing them over to the supervisor.  
 
You should never make corrections in the questionnaire (other than small irregularities) without reviewing the content with 
the interviewee. Besides, you should never copy information obtained during an interview into a new questionnaire.  
Establish a rapport with the interviewee: The first impression you make on the interviewee will determine his/ her 
motivation to cooperate in the survey. 
 
1. Presentation: You should introduce yourself by name and show the interviewee your enumerator id card. Then you 
should politely ask to speak to the head of the household. 
2. First impression:  When you approach an interviewee for the first time, you should: 
a) Use a choice of words that will make the person feel at ease;  
b) Begin the interview by greeting the person and smiling, and phrase the questions in a simple manner since 
using technical jargon might make the interviewed person feel uncomfortable;  
c) Dress appropriately since this is a sign of respect for the interviewed persons, and in order to adequately 
represent the institution you work for.  
 
IMPORTANT! ASSURE YOURSELF THAT YOU ARE TALKING TO THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD OR HIS/HER 
SPOUSE. IF NEITHER OF THEM IS AVAILABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW YOU SHOULD PROCEDE 
AS OUTLINED IN SECTION III. 
 
Good morning/ Good evening, my name is ................. (INTRODUCE YOURSELF BY NAME AND SHOW YOUR 
CURRENT ID-CARD) and I work for Sigma Research and Consulting, a survey company based in New Delhi. We 
are here to conduct a survey on the transport habits of New Delhi inhabitants.  
 
This survey is funded by a French institution and will serve as a base for future development projects. In order to 
develop projects that are adapted to the population’s needs and that contribute to the general improvement of 
transport safety we need precise information. It is necessary to talk to the person who best knows the household 
and also with members of the household who use regularly a motorbike if there is any in your household.  
All the information that you give us is absolutely confidential and will not be passed on to others or used for 
purposes other than the study at hand.  
The questionnaire will take max. 60 minutes.  
Are you prepared to participate? 
 
IF HE/SHE ABSOLUTELY DOES NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE, END THE INTERVIEW. 
IF YES, - Terrific! So, we start with the questionnaire. 
 
3. Confidentiality: The interviewed persons should be assured that the information they are giving will be treated 
confidentially and will not be handed over to unauthorized persons. The given information will be used in order to 
realize the objectives of the survey and not for any other purposes. None of the individual information will be 
analyzed. In this context, you should make sure that the questionnaires are completed with the utmost care. 
4. Neutrality during the interview: Most of the interviewed persons are polite and have the tendency to give the 
responses that they think you would like to hear. Consequently, it is very important for you to be absolutely neutral  
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during the interview; i.e. you must be sure to neither through your tone of voice nor through your facial expressions 
give the interviewed person the impression that he/ she is giving the right or wrong answer to the posed questions.  
5. Make sure to always use the same wording and the same sequence of questions: The wording and the question 
sequence should be maintained in all interviews. If the person being interviewed does not understand a question 
correctly, you should read out the question again clearly and slowly. Aside from following the question sequence 
you should make sure to include the filter questions and follow the instructions in the questionnaire about skipping 
questions. 
6. Act tactfully: In case a person you are interviewing does not show any interest in the interview, seems annoyed or 
distanced, or, if she/ he contradicts responses given earlier or refuses to respond to questions, you should tactfully 
animate the person to show interest in the interview. 
7. Don’t interrupt the interview: You should pose the questions slowly and give the interviewee enough time to reflect 
upon the question, in order to be sure that he/ she understands what you are asking. If the interviewed person does 
not have the time to reflect upon the questions and to form his/ her own opinion, the response could be « I’m not 
sure » or he/ she could give you a wrong answer. If the interviewee takes a longer time to respond, it is not necessary 
to put him/ her under pressure or to interrupt the interview. 
 
II. Concepts and important definitions 
 HOUSEHOLD AND HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
The household is the unit of observation for certain modules of this survey. It is important to be familiar with how a 
household is definde, as well as with the exceptions to this definition. A household is a basic socio-economic unit in which 
the different members who live in the same house or yard, related or not, combine their resources and satisfy their basic 
needs as a community, under the authority of one person called the head of household. 
There are several special types of households which will be treated in the following. 
1. All individuals who live alone in a dwelling and provide for their own basic needs (alimentation, rent, clothing, etc.) 
should be considered as a one-person household. If this is not the case, they should be linked to the local 
household which provides for their basic needs. In order to do this you should ask the following type of questions: 
« Where do you normally eat your meals? », « Do you pay the rent yourself? » 
2. (Full time) Household servants (maids, boys, etc.) are part of the household where they work. 
3. Certain households are collective. A collective household constitutes several people from one institution who are 
not related to each other but who live in a community for reasons linked to travelling, studying, health, or for work 
related reasons, etc. This type of household can be found e.g. in hotels, boarding schools, military barracks, prisons, 
and construction sites. These households should not be interviewed. 
 
 PERMANENT RESIDENTS 
Three criteria apply to persons considered as regular/ permanent members of the household: 
1. The person should usually live in the household and take his/her regular meals there. 
2. The person should respect the authority of the head of household. 
3. The person should have been present in the household during at least six of the twelve months prior to the 
interview. If a person was absent from the household for more than six months of the twelve month period, he or 
she cannot be considered a member of the household (the head of household is an exception; he/ she remains a 
member of the household even if he/ she is absent for more than six of the twelve months prior to the interview). If 
a person is present in the household for less than six months but has the definite intention of staying, he/ she 
should be considered a household member. 
Examples: newborn children are household members, even if they are under six months of age ; newly-wed wives are 
considered members of the household, even if they have been married for less than six months. 
 
Visitors who are present in the household at the time of the interview should be excluded from the respective household. All 
persons who do not live in the household normally are considered visitors, i.e. Persons who have been present in the 
household for less than six months prior to the interview and who do not have the intention of staying for six months. 
 
III. How to act in cases when interviewees are not present 
Head of household 
The head of household is the key decision maker for the household, and his authority is respected by the other members of 
the household. It is possible that the principal contributor to the household income is not necessarily the head of household. 
Since the head of household makes the key decisions, he/ she is the person with the most knowledge on what is going on in 
the household, and he/ she is often the most appropriate person to direct the questions to. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
the head of household is not able to respond to all questions posed accurately, e.g. if he/ she is not the principal contributor 
to household income, or if other household members have their own areas of responsibility. In these cases, other members of 
the household can assist the head of household during the interview. For example, the older siblings might be better  
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informed on the level of schooling of the younger household members. In the second part of the questionnaire, three 
members of the households will be consecutively interviewed. In the Module 3 – Block 3, the questions should be asked, if 
applicable, to the driver and owner of the motorbike. 
 
      
 
  
MAN 
(head of household*) 
 
   present absent  
 WOMAN 
(spouse) 
present case 1 case 2  
 absent case 3 case 4  
      
 
Note: *The head of household can also be a woman, if for example her husband lives elsewhere or if he is deceased.  
 
Case 1: Direct the questions to the head of household and the other selected members as indicated in the questionnaire.  
 
Case 2: Ask the wife if her husband happens to be close by.  
If YES…  Ask the questions directed at the wife and look for her husband afterwards.  
If NO…  Ask, when and if he is available on the days foreseen for the respective survey zone.  
 If  YES… Ask the questions directed at the wife and return at the agreed time. 
If NO… Ask whether the wife or another person present is sufficiently informed about the household. 
  If YES… Ask the questions. 
  If NO…  Interview a replacement household. 
 
Case 3: Ask the husband if his wife happens to be close by. 
If YES…  Ask the questions directed at the husband and look for his wife afterwards.  
If NO…  Ask when and if she is available on the days foreseen for the respective survey zone.  
 If YES… Ask the questions directed at the husband and return at the agreed time.  
 If NO…  Interview a replacement household.  
 
Case 4: Ask the neighbors if you can find the respective household members somewhere nearby or at a later time at their 
house.  
If YES…  Look for them at the place indicated by the neighbors or later at their house.  
If NO…  Interview a replacement household. 
 
In case 2 and 3, if the person to be interviewed is not available, you should follow the same approach with the exception of 
the first step. You should always take notes on the Module 0 (e.g. household interviewed or not). 
 
In the case no member of the household is using regularly a motorbike (Module 2 – Block 1, q.11), the head of household 
will be the only person interviewed and the questionnaire will be shorter (restricted to Module 2 – Block 2 and Module 3 – 
Block 1, see the indications on the questionnaire itself). 
 
In the households where at least one member of the household use regularly the motorbike (which therefore makes the 
household eligible to the second part of the questionnaire), three eligible members have to be selected. The spouse and head 
of household (if eligible) are automatically selected. In addition, a third individual will be selected among the eligible 
individuals of the household. In case either the head of household or the spouse are not eligible, two other members of the 
household will be selected among the pool of eligible members. In the case both head of household and spouse are not 
eligible, three other members of the household will be selected among the pool of eligible members. In the case there are less 
eligible members than the number supposed to be interviewed all eligible individuals will be interviewed but you should not 
replace one respondent with a non eligible member of the household. 
 
IV. Instructions concerning the completion of the questionnaire  
THE INSTRUCTIONS DIRECTED AT THE ENUMERATORS ARE WRITTEN IN PARENTHESIS IN CAPITAL LETTERS OR 
IN ITALIC LETTERS. THEY ARE EXCLUSIVELY DIRECTED AT THE ENUMERATOR AND SHOULD NOT BE READ TO 
THE INTERVIEWEES. 
 
Example: In order of frequency of use, what are the means of transport you usually use? [READ ALL THE  MODALITIES] 
 
YOU MUST READ THE QUESTIONS WORD FOR WORD TO THE INTERVIEWED PERSON. 
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THE RESPONSE CATEGORIES THAT SHOULD NOT BE READ TO THE INTERVIEWEE ARE INDICATED WITH [DO NOT 
READ]. IN THIS CASE YOU SHOULD CLASSIFY THE INTERVIEWEE’S RESPONSES YOURSELF. 
(Choose no more than 3 options) INDICATES THAT THE RESPONDENT CAN (BUT IS NOT OBLIGED TO) CHOOSE 
MORE THAN ONE BUT LESS THAN 3 OPTIONS. 
IN CASE THE RESPONDANT DOES NOT WANT TO OR CANNOT RESPOND TO THE QUESTION OR IF THE QUESTION 
DOES NOT APPLY, WRITE  
-1 FOR “DON’T KNOW” 
-2 FOR “REFUSED”  
-3 FOR “NOT APPLICABLE”  
-5 FOR “IRREGULAR” 
AS INDICATED ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE AT THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE. 
AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH BLOCK, A NOTE REMINDS YOU WHO ARE THE RELEVANT PERSONS  THAT NEED TO 
BE INTERVIEWED. 
Example: Module 4 – Block 1: “The items of this module are asked to all selected individuals of the eligible households” 
DO NOT FORGET TO REPORT THE CORRECT ID CODE OF EACH HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHEN THEY ANSWER TO 
EACH OF THE QUESTIONS. 
FOR CERTAIN QUESTIONS, SOME FILTERS (in italic) HAVE TO BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE ANSWER GIVEN BY 
THE RESPONDENT. YOU HAVE TO CAREFULLY FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS.  
Example: Module 4 – Block 3 
q.2a 
Would you take the opportunity of a 1 chance out of 2 of doubling your income and a 1 chance out of 2 of reducing your 
income by one third? 
Yes No 
Ask question 2b Ask question 2c 
 
Example: Module 7 
q.1 
Have you ever been involved, either as a person at fault or as a victim, in a road traffic accident? 
Yes No 
 If No, go directly to item 13 
 
V. The questionnaire  
 
 Module 1 – Household characteristics 
q.1: « How many persons are there in your household? ». c.f. Section II for the definition of household members. 
q.7: « How many rooms does your dwelling have? ». This refers to the total number of rooms that can be found in different 
buildings within the household. The rooms taken into account are bedrooms, dining rooms, and living rooms. However, 
lavatories, bathrooms, hallways, verandas, and kitchens do not count as rooms. 
 
 Module 2 – Demographic and other characteristics of the household  
The first step concerning Module 2 - Block 1 is to establish a list of all the members of the household. Only after this list has 
been established you can begin to ask the other questions. You can include up to 8 persons over the age of 12 on the list. 
In cases in which the household has more members, then you should list the 8 oldest persons. The total number of 
individuals is already included in Module 1, q.1 – Household size. 
The person in the first row of the list is always the head of the household. Even if the respondent is not the head of the 
household, the head of the household will still be listed in the first row (and not the person interviewed). If the head of 
household is absent during the interview, he/ she will also be listed in the first row. 
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q.8: The general level of education refers to the highest achieved level. Someone who is currently enrolled in primary school 
would be listed as having gone to “primary”. 
 
 Module 3 – Block 1 – Transport habits 
q.1: the respondent has to rank by frequency of use the three means of transport he use most often. The enumerator report 
the code of the number one mean of transport in the first column, the number two in the second column and the number 
three in the third column. 
q.4: only one reason can be provided, it has to be the main purpose of bus trips. 
 
 Module 3 – Block 2 – Transport habits and helmet use 
q.7: the respondent has to give the 2 main reasons of his/ her motorbike trips and rank them. The enumerator reports the 
code of the # one reason in the first column, the # two in the second column. If the respondent chose the option “other”, the 
enumerator asks him/ her to specify and report the reason in the “other” column. 
q. 11: report the answer made in Module 2 – Block 1 - item 12.  
q.12: For driver indicates report the answer in 12a, for passenger in 12b. For individuals that are both ask the question in the 
two different cases and report the respective answers in 12a and 12b. 
q.14: show the card with the different helmet types. If possible kindly ask whether you can see the helmet they are referring 
too. This may be quite sensitive to introduce so be careful not to make them feel uncomfortable or untrusted. 
q.17 and q.18: let the respondent say yes or no and if yes ask whether it is always or not.  
 
 Module 3 – Block 3 – Insurance and other vehicle expenditures  
q.3: number of motorbikes owned by the household members.  
In the following questions of this block (q.4 to q.18) every motorbike will be coded starting with the number 1. In other 
words, if the household members own 3 motorbikes in total, all questions will be asked for each motorbike. The latter being 
coded respectively 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 Module 4 – Block 1 – Self reported risk aversion 
In this block, you start with the introductive sentence indicated on the questionnaire and present the scale which goes from 
0 for « not prepared to take risks at all » to 7 « fully prepared to take risks » 
 
 Module 4 – Block 2 - Lotteries 
In this block, you first present the lottery game and ask if the respondent agree to answer to these questions.  
In the case the person does not want to answer to lottery questions, indicate this situation by coding all the answers by -2 
(code for REFUSED). 
If he agrees, then you explain that 20 different lotteries will be presented and that the respondent will have to choose 
between a safe amount (always the same) and a lottery pay-out for which there is a 50 percent chance to get nothing and a 50 
percent chance to get 12,000 Rs. The respondent has to say which option between the safe amount and the lottery he would 
prefer. You need to make sure the respondent take the lottery seriously and that his/ her answers are honest.  
For each row, you ask the respondent if he prefers receiving for sure X Rs or receiving nothing with a 50 percent chance and 
12,000 Rs with a 50 percent chance. X varies with each row (cf. Lottery table).  
You report the choice of the respondent for each row in the questionnaire. 
 
Example : (row 10) « Between receiving for sure 4,500 Rs or receiving nothing with a 50 percent chance but 12,000 Rs with a 
50 percent chance, which of these two alternatives would you prefer? » 
 
 Module 4 – Block 3 – Risk aversion in financial matters 
item 6 to 9: Insurance coverage questions are asked for two different types of insurance. The enumerator will proceed the 
following way: questions 6 to 9 will be asked for one insurance type at a time. In other words, the enumerator will first ask 
items 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A and then pass to the second type of insurance by asking items 6B, 7B, 8B, 9B. 
 
 Module 5 – Block  1 – Road risk awareness 
q.3a, q.3b and q.3c: the sum of the three answers can be lower but not higher than 100. You have to make sure that it is the 
case. 
 
 Module 5 – Block 4 and Module 6 – Block 2 – Elicitation of subjective probabilities 
The objective here is to make the respondent revealing his personal perception of the probability either to be injured 
(Module 5) or to be stopped by the police (Module 6) 
 
 
 
 
96 ROAD SAFETY SURVEY
2.6. APPENDICES 97
Ta
b
le
2.
11
:L
is
to
fs
ta
rt
in
g
p
o
in
ts
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
se
le
ct
ed
Z
o
n
e
C
o
d
e
C
o
n
st
it
u
en
cy
St
ar
ti
n
g
P
o
in
ta
d
d
re
ss
10
1
Sa
d
ar
B
az
ar
Sa
rv
o
d
ya
K
an
ya
Sc
h
o
o
l,
La
li
ta
B
lo
ck
,S
as
h
tr
iN
ag
ar
10
2
C
h
an
d
n
iC
h
ow
k
G
ov
t.
G
ir
ls
Se
c.
Sc
h
o
o
l,
K
al
an
M
ah
al
,D
ar
ya
G
an
j
10
3
M
at
ia
M
ah
al
A
n
gl
o
ar
ab
ic
sc
h
o
o
l,
A
jm
er
ig
at
e
10
4
B
al
lim
ar
an
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
G
al
iN
o
10
,M
u
lt
an
iD
h
an
d
a
C
en
tr
al
10
5
B
al
lim
ar
an
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
La
h
o
ri
G
at
e
10
6
K
ar
o
lB
ag
h
(S
C
)
G
ov
t.
Sa
rv
o
d
ay
a
B
al
V
id
ya
la
ya
,K
as
er
u
w
al
an
,P
ah
ar
G
an
j
10
7
Pa
te
lN
ag
ar
(S
C
)
N
ag
ar
N
ig
am
P
ra
th
m
ik
B
al
ik
a
vi
d
ya
la
ya
,W
es
tP
at
el
N
ag
ar
10
8
M
o
ti
N
ag
ar
G
.G
.S
.S
Sc
h
o
o
l,
A
B
lo
ck
,K
ir
ti
N
ag
ar
10
9
R
aj
in
d
er
N
ag
ar
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
Sc
h
o
o
l,
J.
J.
C
o
lo
n
y,
In
d
er
P
u
ri
11
0
N
ew
D
el
h
i
N
.P
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
B
ab
ar
R
o
ad
20
1
B
ab
ar
p
u
r
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Z
af
ar
ab
d
ex
tn
(P
il
iM
it
ti
)
Is
ts
h
if
t
20
2
G
h
o
n
d
a
G
ov
t.
B
oy
s
Sr
.S
ec
.s
ch
o
o
lN
o
1,
C
-b
lo
ck
,Y
am
u
n
a
V
ih
ar
20
3
G
o
ka
lp
u
r
(S
C
)
G
ov
tG
ir
ls
Se
c.
Sc
h
o
o
l,
Sa
b
o
li
20
4
K
o
n
d
li
(S
C
)
M
C
.D
P
ry
Sc
h
o
o
l,
B
lo
ck
-1
6
K
al
ya
n
p
u
ri
II
n
d
sh
if
t
E
as
t
20
5
K
ri
sh
n
a
N
ag
ar
M
.C
P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
R
am
N
ag
ar
(s
in
gl
e
sh
if
t)
20
6
M
u
ta
fa
b
ad
D
-B
lo
ck
,D
ay
al
P
u
r
E
-I
I,
N
eh
ru
V
ih
ar
20
7
R
o
h
ta
s
N
ag
ar
M
C
P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
A
sh
o
k
N
ag
ar
,S
h
ah
d
ar
a
20
8
Se
el
am
p
u
r
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
lS
ab
zi
M
an
d
i,
Ii
n
d
sh
if
t,
M
au
jP
u
r
20
9
Sh
ah
d
ra
M
.C
.P
ry
Sc
h
o
o
l,
C
ir
cu
la
r
R
o
ad
,J
h
il
m
il
So
u
th
Z
o
n
e,
Jw
al
a
N
ag
ar
21
0
V
is
h
w
as
N
ag
ar
M
C
.P
ry
.s
ch
o
o
l-
II
,B
h
ik
am
Si
n
gh
C
o
lo
n
y
30
1
T
im
ar
p
u
r
Sa
rv
o
d
ay
a
B
al
V
id
h
ya
la
,T
im
ar
p
u
r
30
2
A
d
ar
sh
N
ag
ar
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
D
h
ir
p
u
r
30
3
R
o
h
in
i
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Se
ct
io
n
-1
8,
R
o
h
in
i
30
4
R
o
h
in
i
G
ov
tC
o
-E
d
Sr
.S
ec
.S
ch
o
o
l,
Se
ct
io
n
-7
,R
o
h
in
i
N
o
rt
h
30
5
Sh
al
im
ar
B
ag
h
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
A
G
B
lo
ck
30
6
Sh
ak
u
r
B
as
ti
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
b
as
ic
sc
h
o
o
l,
N
ew
M
u
lt
an
N
ag
ar
30
7
Tr
iN
ag
ar
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
I-
B
lo
ck
,S
h
ak
u
rp
u
r
30
8
W
az
ir
p
u
r
To
o
lR
o
o
m
Tr
ai
n
in
g
C
en
te
r
W
az
ir
p
u
r,
In
d
lA
re
a
30
9
W
az
ir
p
u
r
M
.C
.P
ry
M
o
d
el
sc
h
o
o
l,
N
im
ri
C
o
lo
n
y
31
0
M
o
d
el
To
w
n
G
u
ru
N
an
k
Sr
.S
ec
.S
ch
o
o
l,
Si
n
gh
Sa
b
h
a
R
o
ad
98 ROAD SAFETY SURVEY
Li
st
o
fs
ta
rt
in
g
p
o
in
ts
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
Z
o
n
e
C
o
d
e
C
o
n
st
it
u
en
cy
St
ar
ti
n
g
P
o
in
ta
d
d
re
ss
40
1
Ja
n
gp
u
ra
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Je
ew
an
N
ag
ar
40
2
M
al
vi
ya
N
ag
ar
C
en
tr
al
sc
h
o
o
l,
II
T
C
am
p
u
s
40
3
R
.K
.P
u
ra
m
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
M
o
d
el
Sc
h
o
o
l,
In
d
ia
n
A
ir
li
n
es
C
o
lo
n
y,
V
as
an
tV
ih
ar
40
4
C
h
h
at
ar
p
u
r
A
ch
ar
ya
Tu
ls
iS
ar
vo
d
ya
V
id
ya
la
ya
,C
h
h
at
ta
rp
u
r
So
u
th
40
5
D
eo
li
(S
C
)
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
B
lo
ck
-G
,S
an
ga
m
V
ih
ar
40
6
Sa
n
ga
m
vi
h
ar
M
.C
.D
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
B
lo
ck
-F
2,
Sa
n
ga
m
V
ih
ar
40
7
G
re
at
er
K
ai
la
sh
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Sl
u
m
-I
I,
D
D
A
fl
at
K
al
ka
ji
40
8
Tu
gh
la
ka
b
ad
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Sa
n
ja
y
C
o
lo
n
y
40
9
B
ad
ar
p
u
r
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
Ja
it
p
u
r
41
0
O
kh
la
G
ov
tB
oy
s
Sr
Se
c.
Sc
h
o
o
l,
N
o
o
r
N
ag
ar
50
1
B
aw
an
a
(S
C
)
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
E
-5
J.
J.
C
o
lo
n
y,
B
aw
an
a
50
2
B
u
ra
ri
M
.C
.P
ry
.s
ch
o
o
l,
M
u
ku
n
d
P
u
r
50
3
H
ar
iN
ag
ar
M
.C
.D
P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
D
-1
/A
,J
an
ak
P
u
ri
50
4
K
ir
ar
i
G
ov
tM
id
d
le
sc
h
o
o
l(
B
oy
s)
,N
it
h
ar
i
W
es
t
50
5
M
at
ia
la
A
C
-3
4,
M
at
ia
la
,C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
C
en
tr
e,
H
o
u
si
n
g
C
o
m
p
le
x,
K
ak
ro
lla
50
6
N
aj
af
ga
rh
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
K
ai
r
N
aj
af
ga
rh
50
7
N
ar
el
a
M
.C
.P
ry
sc
h
o
o
l,
H
o
la
m
b
iK
al
an
50
8
R
aj
o
u
ri
G
ar
d
en
N
ig
am
P
ra
rt
h
am
ik
V
id
ya
la
ya
R
aj
o
u
ri
G
ar
d
en
(M
ai
n
)
b
et
w
ee
n
F
&
C
B
lo
ck
50
9
T
ila
k
N
ag
ar
M
.C
.P
.C
o
-E
d
,A
d
ar
sh
N
ag
ar
,G
G
-3
,V
ik
as
p
u
ri
51
0
V
ik
as
p
u
ri
G
ov
tG
ir
ls
Se
c.
Sc
h
o
o
l,
J.
J.
C
o
lo
n
y,
Sh
iv
V
ih
ar
2.6. APPENDICES 99
Ta
b
le
2.
12
:I
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
o
n
su
rv
ey
st
af
f
N
am
e
G
en
d
er
A
ge
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
‡
E
xp
er
ie
n
ce
Tr
ai
n
in
g
se
ss
io
n
†
#
o
fl
o
n
g
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
s
(i
n
ye
ar
s)
(i
n
ye
ar
s)
to
ta
l
co
m
p
le
te
d
L
is
to
fs
u
p
er
vi
so
rs
Su
d
h
ak
ar
G
au
r
M
al
e
21
2
5
1
A
sh
w
in
iT
h
ak
u
r
M
al
e
35
2
10
1
In
d
ra
je
et
Si
n
gh
M
al
e
24
2
5
2
Sh
ik
h
a
P
ra
ja
p
at
i
Fe
m
al
e
24
3
8
3
L
is
to
fi
n
te
rv
ie
w
er
s
A
ja
y
Sh
u
kl
a
M
al
e
23
2
5
1
64
57
D
h
ir
en
d
ra
K
u
m
ar
M
al
e
26
2
6
1
94
82
R
ek
h
a
R
ic
h
ar
d
Fe
m
al
e
28
2
4
1
10
3
66
D
.P
Si
n
gh
M
al
e
37
1
3
1
22
2
20
0
Sa
n
ja
y
K
u
m
ar
M
al
e
37
2
8
2
8
8
Sh
iv
Sh
an
ka
r
M
al
e
23
3
1
2
83
75
Sh
am
N
ar
ay
an
M
is
h
ra
M
al
e
25
2
1
2
15
4
10
7
D
h
ar
m
en
d
ra
p
ra
ja
p
at
i
M
al
e
22
2
2
3
60
43
A
ja
y
ku
m
ar
M
al
e
19
2
4
3
11
7
Sh
iv
am
M
al
e
19
2
1
3
22
14
A
n
an
ya
D
w
iv
ed
i
Fe
m
al
e
20
2
5
3
55
50
H
ar
iS
h
an
ka
r
M
al
e
25
2
2
3
66
49
A
n
is
h
K
u
m
ar
M
al
e
21
1
1
3
99
81
Su
n
il
C
h
at
u
rv
ed
i
M
al
e
30
3
2
3
13
13
A
m
ir
an
Fe
m
al
e
22
2
1
2
11
7
Su
n
it
a
Fe
m
al
e
25
3
1
2
23
23
A
sh
is
h
M
al
e
28
2
1
2
26
20
N
ot
es
:†
Tr
ai
n
in
g
d
at
es
:1
st
se
ss
io
n
=
13
-
16
ju
ly
20
11
;2
n
d
se
ss
io
n
=
25
an
d
26
ju
ly
20
11
;3
rd
se
ss
io
n
=
23
an
d
24
au
gu
st
20
11
.
‡
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
le
ve
l:
1
=
12
th
gr
ad
e;
2
=
B
.A
,B
.C
O
M
,B
SC
,B
SW
an
d
3
=
M
SW
,M
A
100 ROAD SAFETY SURVEY
Chapter 3
“Tell me, are you risk averse?”
The influence of survey design and
interviewer characteristics on the
measurement of risk aversion in a low
income context
101
102 RISK AVERSIONMEASUREMENT
Abstract
Using an original dataset collected among motorcyclists in New Delhi (2011), this paper compares three different
survey measures of risk attitudes: self assessment, hypothetical lotteries and income prospect choices. The con-
tribution of the paper is twofold. First, I investigate the socio demographic determinants of risk aversion for each
of the three suggested measures. While self reported risk attitudes appear to be significantly correlated with both
risky health behaviors and labor decisions for all three measures, I find that lotteries differ substantially from the
two other measures in important respects. Second, I investigate the influence of interviewers on reported mea-
sures of risk aversion. I provide evidence that part of the variance in the elicited preferences toward risk comes
from the interviewers themselves. However, this influence does not affect the previous relations between risk
aversion and risky conducts once interviewer effects are controlled for. This analysis shows that individual risk
preferences can be measured through self assessments in large scale surveys in a developing country context like
India. Nonetheless, a careful allocation of interviewers is recommended when implementing surveys in order to
be able in the analysis to control for their impact.
JEL Classification: C42, D81, I10, O53.
Key words: Risk aversion, India, Survey design, Interviewer bias.
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3.1 Introduction
Preferences toward risk are a key concept used in economics to explain individual decision making. In the con-
text of low income countries, individuals’ risk aversion is often mentioned as a possible explanation for the lack of
entrepreneurship or the technological innovation delays maintaining individuals in poverty and impeding growth
and development (Cardenas and Carpenter; 2008). However, standard household surveys, such as the World Bank’s
Living Standard Measurement Surveys, do not ask questions about risk aversion and hence cannot be used to an-
alyze the effect of risk preferences on various economic outcomes. In addition, risk attitude measurement is a
difficult challenge which is still debated in the literature. The various existing methodologies include Likert scales
(Dohmen et al.; 2011); lotteries (Holt and Laury; 2002); prospect choices on lifetime income (Barsky et al.; 1997);
domain specific risk taking scales1 (Weber et al.; 2002); scores based on the item response theory (Arrondel et al.;
2004); or actual behaviors (smoking, seat-belt use). One key aspect of the debate is whether each individual has
1Such scales measure both risk attitudes and perceived riskiness.
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one unique preference toward risk or whether his or her risk aversion varies depending on the domain consid-
ered. Dohmen et al. (2011), Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) provided evidence against the stability
hypothesis of risk preferences across contexts. Furthermore, based on evidence from the safety literature, Wilde
(1998) documented the fact that individuals do not try to minimize risk but rather target a certain level of risk and
adapt their behaviors accordingly. Some compensation may thus appear with respect to the risk individuals are
willing to take in different domains. The degree of substitution between domains, the role of risk perceptions but
also the formulation of questions make the measurement of risk aversion and the study of its influence on risky
behaviors quite complex.
Along with this growing literature on the measurement of risk preferences, empirical research has compared
many of these risk aversion methods, both in developed and developing countries (see Binswanger; 1980; Dohmen
et al.; 2011; Anderson and Mellor; 2008; Ding et al.; 2010; Hardeweg et al.; 2012). This strand of research aims at
investigating which measure, if any, predicts individual risk behavior better. Moreover, it intends to see whether
questions easily implementable in a survey are indeed able to capture individuals’ preferences toward risk. Finally,
the cultural context may modify the impact of the elicited risk aversion parameters on risky decisions. In partic-
ular, religious beliefs, like fate, widespread in developing countries may change the influence of risk aversion on
risky conducts. Therefore, one measure which has been proven to predict behaviors in one country may not be
appropriate in another context. It is therefore interesting to replicate the comparison of risk aversion variables
obtained with various methodologies in different regions of the world.
Besides the measurement issue per se, the interviewer him or herself may modify the respondents’ responses
regarding risk aversion, in particular in a face to face interview. Indeed, the interviewer may systematically shift the
answers toward one direction, as a result of his or her own observable and unobservable characteristics (such as
his or her survey skills, understanding of the questionnaire, ability or own risk aversion). Indeed, the interviewer’s
socio demographic characteristics have been shown to alter the respondent’s answers in particular when sensi-
tive questions are asked (see Tourangeau and Yan; 2007, for a review). Social desirability and positive self image
are some of the reasons why individuals may not disclose their true opinions and conducts. Finally, the influence
of the enumerator may vary from one respondent to the other. For instance, a male may tend to reveal different
risky behaviors and preferences toward risk if it is a woman rather than a man who is interviewing him (see Flores-
Macias and Lawson; 2008; Lutz and Lipps; 2011).
In this paper, I aim at contributing to the debate on risk aversion measurement through the use of an original
dataset collected among motorcyclists in Delhi in the year 2011. Methodologies widely used in the literature (self
assessment of risk aversion, hypothetical lotteries and income choice prospects) were included in the survey. I
first explore to what extent the information collected differs across methodologies and domains. To do so, I look at
the share of risk averse individuals in each type of measure and at correlations between the different risk aversion
variables. It seems that lotteries differ substantially from other measures regarding the information they actually
capture. In a second step, I study the socio demographic determinants of individuals’ risk aversion and test if they
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are the same as the ones mentioned in the literature. Subsequently, I investigate whether the different survey mea-
sures are appropriate in the Indian context. More precisely, I study if the various risk preference parameters are
good predictors of work sector choices and risky health behaviors, even after controlling for cultural specificities
such as religious beliefs. I find that self reported risk aversion predict well the choice of working in the private
sector and risky behaviors in health matters. Results found when using the hypothetical lotteries can either be
interpreted as evidence for a risk compensating effect across domains or as evidence that such methodology is not
adequate in the Indian context (may be partly because of the absence of financial incentives). As for the measure
based on the income prospect choices, it is associated with smoking and drinking behaviors but not with the oc-
cupational decisions. Finally, I analyze whether interviewers alter the answers provided by the respondents. I first
look at the share of variance explained by the interviewers’ characteristics. Subsequently, I go back to the analysis
of risky conducts. Once interviewers’ characteristics are controlled for, a more context specific relation between
risk attitudes and risky health behaviors is detected, which is in line with Ding et al. (2010)’s or Wölbert and Riedl
(2013)’s findings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some conceptual considerations on
risk aversion measurement and interviewer bias. Section 3 introduces the data and presents the various method-
ologies used to measure risk preferences. In Section 4, I report the empirical results regarding accuracy of risk
aversion measures in the Indian context and information consistency across survey methods. I also document
there the interviewers’ influence on the quality of the data collected and on the subsequent analysis made. Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual considerations
3.2.1 What do we want to capture?
Preference toward risk corresponds to an individual specific characteristic which supposedly plays a role in the
agents’ decision process under uncertainty. This parameter is usually assumed to be exogenous, i.e. innate and
immutable. If a person can choose between two different situations which are identical regarding their expected
outcomes but which differ with respect to the probability of realization of the final state, a risk averse individual
will derive more utility from the case without uncertainty. In an expected utility framework, such definition is
reflected in the concavity of the utility function. Applied researchers aim at capturing this individual characteristic
to be able to predict whether a person would engage in risky conducts or not.
3.2.2 How can we measure risk aversion?
Although risk aversion is a fundamental element in standard decision theories, experimental research has provided
little guidance as to how risk attitude should be modeled. Instead, many different methodologies have been used to
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proxy or capture individual risk preferences and study their impact on individual decisions. Anderson and Mellor
(2008) pointed out the wide range of risk aversion measures used in the literature ranging from actual behaviors2
to hypothetical choices or self reported attitudes. In the following paragraph, I present some of these elicitation
methods.
Holt and Laury (2002) developed a lottery choice experiment which allows them to measure the degree of risk
aversion over a wide range of payoffs, going from a few dollars to several hundred ones. More precisely, in their
setting each agent was supposed to choose between two lottery options. The risk aversion being there seen as
the fact of avoiding a high variation in the outcomes. The series of paired lottery choices is structured so that the
crossover point from the high risk lottery to the low risk lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion
of the individual. In other words, by knowing the lottery for which the individual switches from one option to the
other, the authors computed the constant relative risk aversion parameter and categorized respondents into either
risk averse, risk neutral or risk prone subgroups. The comparison of two lotteries may appear quite complicated
for certain populations. That’s why, in order to ease the understanding of the proposed alternatives, Hardeweg
et al. (2012), for example, confronted Thai farmers with 20 choices between an increasing safe payment and a fixed
lottery. This simplified method was also implemented by Dohmen et al. (2010) or Guiso et al. (2013) in developed
countries and by Vieider, Chmura, Fisher, Kusawaka, Martinsson, Thompson and Sunday (2014) in developing
ones. De Palma et al. (2011) also offered a series of choices between a lottery and a sure payoff when investigating
individual and couple behaviors under risk. In prospect theory, the weighting probability function is a key param-
eter in elicitating individual risk aversion. Varying the probability that each option occurs, instead of the amount
of the payoffs, allows to capture such information (see Abdellaoui; 2000; Bleichrodt; 2001).
Barsky et al. (1997) used questions introduced in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) where interviewees
were offered job opportunities leading to different lifetime income outcomes. Yes/no questions and a two step
procedure are adopted in that questionnaire. The questions separate respondents into four distinct risk preference
categories, depending on the answers provided in the two questions.3 The categories can be ranked by degree
of risk aversion without having to assume a particular functional form. Nonetheless, this survey measure has
been criticized on the ground that individuals may value their current job for reasons other than the income flow
associated with it and therefore might be reluctant to switch jobs even for high expected increases in income.
Likert scales have also been included in surveys. In the German Socio Economic Panel (G-SOEP), for example,
respondents were asked to assess their risk aversion in general and in specific domains (such as career, health,
finance, or leisure) using an 11 point response scale. Despite the easiness of its implementation, critics highlighted
that, because of the generality of the formulation, it is rather difficult to know exactly to what each individual is
referring to when replying to the question. More over individuals may use differently the extent of the scale. This
thus implies some difficulties when comparing answers between individuals.
In order to counteract this issue, summated rating scales have been developed to measure risk attitudes. This
methodology is based on specific and factual questions involving risk taking in different situations. Spector (1992)
2Viscusi and Hersch (2001) and Hakes and Viscusi (2007) used respectively smoking status and seatbelt use.
3A more precise classification (with more categories) can be made by introducing an additional yes/no question.
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summarized the criteria of a good score along with the methodology to be followed in order to compute it and ver-
ify its quality. He emphasized that each item composing the score should be clear, precise, non ambiguous and as
concrete as possible. Arrondel et al. (2004) implemented a risk attitude score based on this item response theory in
the PATER survey.4 They asked a large set of questions in domains such as consumption, finance, labor, health or
family matters and with respect to different time horizons. Hence, unlike qualitative scales or hypothetical ques-
tions, they introduced specific and contextualized items. The score built by Arrondel et al. (2004) is based on more
than 50 items. In the end, a single score is computed assuming that individuals do not have different risk aversion
in different areas but a single one which is just better captured by precise questions. This method certainly permits
to better measure the global level of individual risk aversion but requires more time to be collected. Furthermore,
items must be adapted to the local context. An important testing phase is therefore needed.
As for Weber et al. (2002) and Blais and Weber (2006), they introduced a series of specific questions to esti-
mate individual risk tolerance. More precisely, they elaborated a risk taking scale (DOSPERT scale) to assess both
conventional risk attitudes (reported level of risk taking) and perceived risk attitudes (willingness to engage in a
risky activity as a function of its perceived riskiness) through scales going from 1 to 75 in five specific domains:
(i) ethical, (ii) financial (gambling and investment), (iii) health/safety, (iv) social, (v) recreational.6,7 The idea be-
hind the second scale is that the different behaviors adopted by the same person in two situations might be due
to differences in risk perceptions related to the two contexts. In the same way, differences in perceived riskiness
may lead two individuals with the same degree of risk aversion to adopt different conducts in a given situation.
The combination of risk preferences and risk perceptions may thus better predict an individual decision choice.
Nevertheless, this methodology mixed the drawbacks of both the summated rating scale and the qualitative scales.
On the one hand, it requires asking a lot of questions and adapting them to the local environment. On the other
hand, the qualitative answers may limit the comparison between individuals.
3.2.3 What measurement issues do we face?
In this section, I highlight the measurement issues applied researchers have to consider when designing and im-
plementing a survey aimed at capturing risk preferences.
How should one measure risk aversion?
Given the various methods developed to measure risk aversion, some of which have been presented in the previ-
ous subsection, survey designers are facing the dilemma of which measure they should introduce in their ques-
tionnaire. Methodologies differ by the number of questions to be asked and by the incentives that can be provided
4PATER for “Préférences et Patrimoines face au TEmps et au Risque” (“preferences and wealth in relation to time and risk”).
5For the risk taking scale, 1 corresponds to “Extremely unlikely” and 7 to “Extremely likely”. For the risk perception scale, 1 corresponds to
“Not at all risky” and 7 to “Extremely risky".
6A total of 30 questions, six in each domain, are asked to the respondents.
7Arrondel et al. (2004) also investigated more contextualised risk aversion by building subscores for each domain.
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to ensure that honest replies are obtained.8 But do all these methods lead to the same information? Or, is one
measure able to capture the individual risk aversion better than others? Does the cultural context alter the pre-
dictive power of such indicators? Several studies investigated some of these issues by comparing the accuracy and
consistency of elicited risk aversion parameters obtained through different methodologies. Researchers discussed
the relevance of experimental versus survey measures. Collecting evidence of the accuracy and the performance
of each method is crucial and of particular interest for survey designers. Survey questions are often more easily
extendable to large samples such as national households surveys; while incentivized lottery experiments are only
implementable at a reduced scale. If survey measures appeared to provide information on individual risk aver-
sion as good as the one obtained with experimental methods; gathering data on risk preferences could be greatly
facilitated. Moreover, only a limited number of questions on risk preferences can usually be introduced in a ques-
tionnaire due to budget and time constraints. Knowing which elicitation method provides the best measure of the
individual’s risk aversion could optimize the data collection on risk preferences. I report below the results found
by this strand of the literature.
Binswanger (1980) measured attitudes toward risks in rural India using both survey questions to elicit cer-
tainty equivalents and experimental gambling with real payoffs. He highlighted inconsistencies between the two
methodologies used and argued that the interview method is the one subject to bias. Anderson and Mellor (2008)
investigated the relation between risk preferences measured by lotteries and five health behaviors. They argued
that survey questions or hypothetical questions are likely to be biased or noisy, while paying one out of ten of the
lottery questions ensure an incentive compatible measure of individual risk attitudes. Nevertheless, the authors
didn’t actually compare their risk experimental measure with self reported risk aversion which limits the strength
of their argument.9 In another paper, using again U.S. data, the same authors compared the information provided
by lotteries and the one obtained through hypothetical gamble questions on inheritance and job choices.10 While
the two measures have been associated with many risky behaviors in finance, insurance, health or career choices,
Anderson and Mellor (2009) showed that different methods and formulations did not provide the same individual
risk aversion level. The classification of individuals in different risk aversion groups based on questions regard-
ing inheritance was more correlated to the risk aversion derived from lotteries than the classification based on
job choices. As to Ding et al. (2010), they interviewed 220 students from the University of Beijing. Respondents
were presented with an incentivized lottery, hypothetical reservation price of different lottery tickets as well as
self assessment risk taking questions in general and in five domains. The risk measure with the best prediction
score was the general risk attitude variable. The survey lottery questions had virtually no predictive power for the
risky behaviors the authors selected, and the real money experiment only had some power to predict rock climb-
ing. Moreover, their results showed evidence of domain specificity: significant correlations of drinking and rock
climbing with risk taking in leisure, of smoking with risk taking in health, of exam preparation with risk taking in
8It is common in the experimental literature implementing lotteries, to draw randomly one of the questions and pay the respondents ac-
cording to the result of the lottery and the choice they previously expressed.
9Wölbert and Riedl (2013), using monetary incentives, actually found that lotteries were not correlated with non financial risky behaviors.
10The hypothetical gamble questions are similar to the two yes/no questions used by Barsky et al. (1997).
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education and of buying stocks with risk taking in finance. Nevertheless, these correlations were not always very
large. Based on the analysis performed by Dohmen et al. (2011) on a German sample, Hardeweg et al. (2012) tested
the validity of a simple survey item on risk attitude by comparing it to a related field experiment. Using a sample
of more than 900 participants from rural Thailand, they compared three different measures: a survey item based
on a Likert scale, lottery questions and a hypothetical investment question. Results indicated that the self assessed
measure better predicted the purchase of lottery tickets and self employment than the experimental measure or
the hypothetical investment question. The authors therefore argued for the use of simple survey measures given
that they simultaneously provided useful information on risk attitude and were easily implementable.
In this paper, I focus on survey measures and compare risk attitudes obtained through various methodologies
and in different domains. For this purpose, I take advantage of an original dataset collected among motorcyclists
in New Delhi in 2011. While previous research on risk aversion measurement in developing countries focused on
specific groups such as rural farmers or students (see Hardeweg et al.; 2012; Ding et al.; 2010; Vieider, Chmura,
Fisher, Kusawaka, Martinsson, Thompson and Sunday; 2014), the dataset I use covers a large and heterogenous
urban population. Thanks to information on religious beliefs and practices, I am also able to verify that cultural
background does not change the results found on the influence of risk aversion on risky behaviors. To summa-
rize, this analysis provides additional evidence on the adequate measurement of risk aversion in general and in a
developing country in particular.
Do interviewers influence the measurement of risk aversion?
Reliability of survey data is one main concern for empirical researchers. The ability of collecting the ‘true’ value
of the individual’s characteristics and behaviors is the absolute prerequisite to the quality of the data collected
and the confidence one can have regarding the conclusions subsequently made. Error reporting for non sensitive
questions may lead to less precise estimates by increasing their variance.11 On the contrary, if individuals decide
to modify their response rather deliberately, error reporting may lead to biased estimates. Such misreporting is
likely to occur for sensitive questions related for instance to politics, racism, risky conducts or gender issues. So-
cial desirability, positive self image, defensive attitudes toward intrusive questions, expected consequences from
revealing certain health related information are different reasons why respondents may alter their true response
when answering to the interviewer. Interviewers may be more or less efficient in reducing this misreporting. In
case a same individual provides a different answer to different interviewers asking him the same question, inter-
viewer effects are taking place. Tourangeau and Yan (2007) highlighted that self administered surveys, the absence
of family members during the interview and encouragement to tell the truth are different strategies which help
improving the quality of the collected data.
Certain characteristics of interviewers, such as gender and ethnicity, are likely to move respondents’ answer
11Non responses and reporting errors may appear in non sensitive questions because of difficulties respondents might face in understanding
the questions, or in finding a response category in which his response fit.
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toward a certain direction. Studies on political attitudes, citizen’s duties, voting and racial issues looked at the in-
fluence of interviewer’s race on provided answers (see Lutz and Lipps; 2010, for a review). Huddy et al. (1997) or
Flores-Macias and Lawson (2008) showed that the gender of interviewers influenced replies to questions related
to abortion or women’s rights. In particular, Flores-Macias and Lawson (2008) took advantage of two gender sensi-
tive questions included in the first wave of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study.12 They found that male respondents were
more likely to report feminist views if interviewed by a woman. As for Catania et al. (1996), they examined items
on same gender sexual activity, condom use, number of sexual partners, extramarital sexual activity, sexual vio-
lence and sexual problems. They investigated in particular the influence of interviewer’ gender. They showed that
for most of the items gender matching provided better quality data. This conclusion is challenged by the results
reported in McCombie and Anarfi (2002). These authors found, using a survey on AIDS issues in Ghana, that all
respondents were more likely to report higher use of condom, “no need to worry about AIDS” and that there was
a cure for AIDS to female interviewers. Very young women respondents were more likely to tell men that they had
prior sexual activity.
Davis et al. (2010) stressed the importance of interviewer bias in public health surveys where information on
risky conducts such as alcohol consumption, drug use, unprotected sexual intercourses are likely to be underre-
ported in particular because of the social norms and low acceptance of such behaviors. Several studies showed that
the true information is sometimes rather disclosed to female or male interviewers depending on the nature of the
question. For instance, female interviewer collect higher physical abuse, while illicit drug use was higher among
male interviewers’ sample (Fendrich et al.; 1999). Cosper (1972) found that in addition to perceptible characteris-
tics like age, gender, education, interviewer attitudes may actually influence the behavior respondents declare to
adopt on sensitive issues like drinking behavior. For instance, religious interviewers made respondents report less
alcohol consumption than non religious ones.
In our face to face survey, respondents were asked about several risky behaviors and about their risk prefer-
ences. In addition to potential overreporting of safe conducts,13 the interviewer might impact the answers respon-
dents give regarding their risk aversion, and this in different ways. Young respondents may want to show off in
front of a young interviewer, men may want to present themselves as courageous or reckless in front of a female
interviewer. Therefore, the interaction between interviewee and interviewer characteristics might play a role in
the misreporting of answers. Moreover, the interviewer’s experience in survey work, his or her ability and own risk
aversion may impact the way he or she administers the risk aversion questions and systematically orientates inter-
viewees’ answers toward one particular direction. To my knowledge, no study has looked at interviewer effect on
individual risk aversion survey responses. In this paper, I fill the gap by bringing evidence that interviewer’s char-
acteristics indeed explain some of the elicited risk preferences’ variance. I then study whether relations between
risk attitudes and risky behaviors hold when controlling for interviewer effects.
12(i) whether or not abortion should be legal in case of rape ; (ii) among a battery of other items, whether women’s rights should be a urgent
priority for the next President.
13Stulginkas et al. (1985) provided in particular evidence of overreporting of helmet use.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 General presentation of the survey
In this paper, I take advantage of information on risk preferences introduced in a survey on road habits of mo-
torcyclists which has been implemented in Delhi in 2011. Besides socio demographic characteristics, information
regarding their job occupation and different risky health behaviors (smoking, drinking) were collected. We also
attempted to measure individual risk aversion using different methodologies already developed in the literature.
Further details on the measurement of individuals’ risk attitudes are presented below.
The following sampling design was adopted: (i) New Delhi was divided into five zones, (ii) in each zone, ten
polling booths were randomly drawn, (iii) the locations of these polling booths represented the starting points
from which every fifth household was selected for the interview. Around each polling booth, 30 households were
interrogated. In total 1,502 households were interviewed. In 545 households at least one member had traveled by
motorbike in the past four weeks. Up to three drivers or passengers per household could answered the survey. On
average, two individuals per household were interviewed; leading to a final sample of 902 motorbike users.
3.3.2 Interviewers characteristics
17 enumerators worked on the survey. Information regarding their gender, age, education level and experience in
survey work has been gathered. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on these socio demographic characteristics
along with the interviewers’ work load. 76% of them are men, on average they are 25 years old, hold an undergrad-
uate degree and have a bit less than three years of experience in survey work. The number of questionnaires done
by each interviewer varies for two main reasons: (i) the presence of motorcyclists in the areas they were sent to and
(ii) their starting day.14
On average, each area has been covered by two interviewers and each of them went to seven areas.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of interviewers
observations: 17 mean std. dev. minimum maximum
Male (=1) 0.76 0.44 0 1
Age (in years) 25.29 5.42 19 37
Education (Categories (1, 2, 3))† 2.06 0.56 1 3
Experience (in years) 2.82 2.16 1 8
Number of questionnaires done 66 58 8 222
Notes: The education variable takes 3 values: 12th grade (1), undergraduate (2) and master (3).
14Indeed, three training sessions have been organised due to an important turnover and delays in the completion of the project.
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3.3.3 Measures of risk aversion
Several methodologies to measure risk aversion have been included in the survey. In order to be able to compare
the different risk aversion variables, I restrict my sample to individuals who answered to all risk aversion questions.
I base my analysis on three elicitation methods (self reported risk aversion, hypothetical lotteries and income
prospect choices) as they are more commonly used in the literature and missing observations for some alternative
measures15 considerably reduce the number of respondents for whom I have the complete information.
Respondents were first asked to self assess their risk aversion in general and in four specific domains (on the
road, in sport or leisure, in health and in finance). They were offered to use a scale going from 0 “I am not ready
to take risks at all" to 7 “I am fully ready to take risks". Hereinafter I refer to these measures as the self reported
risk aversion (SRRA) variables. In addition to domain specific variables, I compute the average of the five SRRA
measures. In a second step, interviewees were offered to choose between a fixed lottery, where they had a fifty
percent chance to win either 12,000 INR or nothing, and a safe amount, starting at 0 and increasing by 500 INR
up to 9,500 INR. The number of times the individual opt for the safe amount is the variable used in the analysis.
The lottery questions are based on Holt and Laury (2002) but simplified as in Hardeweg et al. (2012). No financial
incentives were provided along with the lottery questions. This choice has two motives. First, the objective here
is to compare elicitation measures implementable in large surveys, where experimental design is hardly feasible.
Second, monetary incentives would have substantially increased the needed budget to collect our data. Finally,
following Barsky et al. (1997), questions regarding income prospect choices have been asked. These were organized
in a two step procedure which leads to create four different risk aversion group.
A detailed presentation of the wording used in the questionnaire and the variables built can be found in the
Appendices.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
As previously mentioned, I consider in my analysis only the individuals who answered to all three measures of
risk aversion. This leads to a restricted sample of 675 observations. Table 3.2 displays the socio demographic in-
formation of my sample. 70% of the respondents are men, they are on average 36 years old. 20% of them are
illiterate or only reached primary education while 47% attended some tertiary education. 30% of the interviewed
individuals belongs to families with less than 10,000 INR per month.16 17% of them are members of households
who earn more than 20,000 INR per month. Unfortunately an important share of the respondents did not agree to
provide information on household income. In order to keep these observations in the analysis I introduce income
information through dummies and include a “no answer” category. A comparison between the characteristics of
individuals who answered to all three risk aversion measures and the full sample can be found in the Appendices
15Willingness to invest in a risky business, to pay for a lotto ticket or to take a product which may be beneficial or detrimental for the respon-
dent’s health were also collected in the survey.
1610,000 INR corresponds to 183 EUR in 2011 or 1,092 EUR in PPP 2011.
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(Table 3.14).
Table 3.2: Socio demographic characteristics of respondents
observations %/mean
Male (=1) 674 69.73
Age (in years) 675 36.06
Education level 666
3 category variable† 2.26
Illiterate or primary education 20.42
Secondary education 32.88
Tertiary education 46.70
Household monthly income 675
Less than 10,000 INR 31.41
Between 10,000 and 20,000 INR 34.07
More than 20,000 INR 17.63
Did not answered 16.89
Religious beliefs and practices
Believes his life is in god’s hands (=1) 672 87.50
Prays daily (=1) 671 72.72
The purpose of the empirical analysis is two fold. First, to study the impact of survey design on the measure-
ment of risk aversion in a low income context. Second, to explore the influence of interviewer’s characteristics on
the elicited preferences toward risk and on their relation with risky behaviors.
Regarding the first objective, a “good” measure of risk aversion must be in line with the economic theory and
predict risky conducts. In addition, according to the empirical evidence, elicited parameters are expected to be
associated with some individual socio demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education or in-
come. I investigate whether every risk attitude variable included in the survey satisfies these criteria. Furthermore,
I compare the prediction power of the three different survey methodologies and explore the existence of domain
specific risk aversion. One concern regarding the latter aspect is the difficulty to distinguish between the fact that
risk preferences really differ across domains and the fact that some methods may not be able to capture this par-
ticular personal characteristic and lead to the construction of noisy measures. Different cases, which are described
below, may be found in the data.
Case 1 : Risk aversion is not domain specific
If the levels of individual risk aversion defined in different domains are similar for a same person and if regardless
of its domain, the risk aversion measure is positively correlated with the fact that the individual engages in a risky
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behavior.
Case 2 : Risk aversion is (partly) domain specific
If a risk aversion measure defined in a given domain doesn’t predict a risky behavior adopted in another domain
or doesn’t predict it as well as a risk aversion measure defined in the same domain as the risky conduct.
Case 3 : Evidence of risk compensation across domains
If a risk aversion measure defined over a specific domain is negatively correlated with the risk taken by the person
in another domain.
Case 4 : Risk aversion is noise
If one or several risk aversion measures defined over the same domain do not predict the risky behavior in that
domain.
Hereinafter, I start by studying if the different risk aversion measures elicited in the survey provide similar infor-
mation regarding the level of risk aversion of each respondent. I then investigate in which way the risk parameters
are associated with specific risky behaviors related either to finance matters or health issues. This analysis shed
therefore some additional light on the context specificity of risk aversion and the relevance of the different survey
methodologies.
3.4.1 Do survey measures capture the same information on individuals?
Evidence that risk aversion differs across domains and methods would be obtained if I find that the different mea-
sures are not highly positively correlated with one another.
Table 3.3 presents the distribution of the risk aversion measures. Given the proposed ladder for the self as-
sessment of risk preferences, one can define as risk averse any individual who has a score superior to 4, i.e. in the
middle of the scale (cf. Ding et al.; 2010). As for the lottery question, the neutrality point corresponds to choosing
the safe choice from 6,000 or 6,500 INR onwards.17 A risk averse person is therefore someone who chose at least
nine times the safe amount. By looking at the median, we note that most of the respondents are risk averse and this
for almost all measures.18 There exists some heterogeneity across measures though. While at least 75% of individ-
uals are categorized as being risk averse with the lotteries, they are less than 50% when looking at self assessment
of risk aversion in finance, in sport or with the income choice measure. Among SRRA questions, the highest share
of risk averse individuals is obtained with the question related to health and in general.
17Indeed, the expected gain of the lottery is 6,000 INR. A risk neutral agent is thus indifferent between playing a lottery with a 6,000 INR
expected gain and getting 6,000 INR for sure. Therefore he may opt for the safe amount at 6,000 INR or still choose the lottery at that point but
switch for the safe amount the next time, i.e. for a safe amount of 6,500 INR.
18While a risk aversion tendency is always found in developed countries, Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and
Martinsson (2014) pointed out that it is not the case in developing regions.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of our risk aversion measures
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Median perc. 25th† Minimum Maximum
Self reported risk aversion
in general 675 5.15 1.77 6 4 0 7
on the road 675 5.00 1.95 5 2 0 7
in sport or leisure 675 4.18 2.37 4 4 0 7
in health 675 5.13 2.24 6 4 0 7
in finance 675 4.47 2.22 4 3 0 7
average∗ 675 4.79 1.55 4.8 3.6 0 7
Lottery questions 675 13.31 5.34 13 9 0 20
Income prospect choices 675 2.47 1.32 2 1 1 4
Notes: ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures.
† ‘perc. 25th’ stands for the 25th percentile. In the case of SRRA in general, less than 25% of individuals report a risk aversion lower than 4.
To further investigate the consistency of my different risk aversion measures, I look at the pairwise correlations.
From Table 3.4, we note that all the risk aversion measures are positively and highly correlated with one another,
with the notable exception of the correlation between SRRA in finance and risk preferences derived from lotter-
ies. Moreover, correlation coefficients between lotteries and other variables are quite small in magnitude (less
than 0.10) and only two of them are significant (SRRA in sport and income prospect choices). SRRA measures are
more correlated with each other19 than with the measures based on the other methodologies. The income choice
measure is more correlated with the SRRA in finance while the risk aversion derived from lottery questions is more
correlated with the former variable. In addition, I perform Pearson Chi2 test.20 I find that all p-values are inferior to
0.001. Nevertheless, the Pearson Chi2 statistics is much lower when the lottery question is one of the two measures
considered.
These results reveal thus a higher correlation within both methods and domains. However, the use of a differ-
ent scale across methodologies may partly explain the greater correlation found across self reported risk aversion
measures.
To summarize, I find that my various risk aversion measures differ to varying extents from one another. Even
if lottery questions seem to provide really different information on individuals, risk aversion measures in financial
matters appear closer to one another. This is also the case within the self reported methodology. These pieces of
evidence suggest that risk aversion measures define through different methods or in different contexts differ from
one another. We can thus invalidate Case 1.
19Dohmen et al. (2011) also compared self reported risk aversion in different domains. They found that risk attitudes were not perfectly
correlated across contexts and that the pariwise correlation coefficients were around 0.5, which is similar to the results I obtain.
20The Pearson Chi2 test is a test of independence between two variables. In my case, rejecting the null hypothesis means that the two different
risk aversion measures are related to each other.
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Table 3.4: Pairwise correlation between our risk aversion measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Self-reported risk aversion
in general (1) 1.000
on the road (2) 0.585??? 1.000
in sport or leisure (3) 0.222??? 0.343??? 1.000
in health (4) 0.246??? 0.347??? 0.548??? 1.000
in finance (5) 0.332??? 0.499??? 0.631??? 0.408??? 1.000
average∗ (6) 0.610??? 0.733??? 0.782??? 0.718??? 0.799??? 1.000
Lottery questions (7) 0.018 0.013 0.085?? 0.036 0.025 0.051 1.000
Income prospect choices (8) 0.174??? 0.261??? 0.316??? 0.243??? 0.329??? 0.367??? 0.175???
Notes: Pairwise correlation coefficients are computed over the restricted sample of 675 observations.
∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
3.4.2 Are personal characteristics of respondents related with risk attitudes?
To further investigate the accuracy of my different survey measures in the Indian context, I investigate whether
gender, age, education and income are correlated with the individual’s level of risk aversion. Indeed, numerous
studies mainly conducted in developed countries, found that men as well as younger, more educated and wealthier
individuals21 are less risk averse (see Outreville; 2013, for a recent review). I therefore here tease out the correlations
between socio demographic characteristics and risk attitudes for the case of India and compare whether these fit
the evidence found for other countries.
Again I consider the restricted sample of respondents for which I have all answers for the three methodolo-
gies of risk aversion measurement: self assessment, hypothetical lotteries and job income choices. As dependent
variables, I consider each of my risk aversion measures. I run ordered logit estimations for the self reported risk
aversion measures in different domains and the job income choices (8 and 4 ordered values respectively). As for
the average of SRRA measures, I perform an ordinary least square regression. Finally, given that I consider the
number of safe choices made in the series of lottery questions, I use a negative binomial model for this particular
risk attitude measure.22 Table 3.5 shows the coefficients obtained with the different specifications used. Similar
results are found when using ordinary least square estimations. Results vary from one dependent variable to the
other. A gender effect (male being less risk averse) is found with SRRA on the road and in finance. An age ef-
fect (older individuals being more risk averse) is found for SRRA in general, on the road, in sport as well as with
lotteries. An education effect (more educated individuals being less risk averse) is detected for SRRA in sport, in
health, in finance and for income prospect choices. Finally, the income gradient (wealthier individuals being less
21For instance, Tanaka et al. (2010) showed the existence of a negative relation between income and risk aversion in the Vietnamese context.
22The Pearson goodness-of-fit test results indicate that the distribution of the number of safe choices significantly differs from a Poisson
distribution, according to the p-value of 0.000.
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risk averse) appears only for job income choices. Income and the two other risk aversion measures in finance are
not significantly correlated, even if these coefficients are negative. It is interesting to note that the average of SRRA
measure is significantly correlated with gender, age and level of education.
All in all, the same relations between socio demographic characteristics and risk attitudes as the ones already
presented in the literature are found with this Indian sample.
Table 3.5: Determinants of risk aversion measures
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
ordered ordered ordered ordered ordered negative ordered
Specification logit logit logit logit ologit ols binomial logit
Male (=1) -0.208 -0.369??? -0.198 0.055 -0.322?? -0.291?? -0.055 -0.176
(0.145) (0.139) (0.164) (0.155) (0.150) (0.123) (0.035) (0.161)
Age (in years) 0.017??? 0.016??? 0.020??? 0.008 0.006 0.014??? 0.003??? 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Education level (3 groups) -0.102 -0.170 -0.296??? -0.212?? -0.171? -0.194?? -0.006 -0.374???
(0.107) (0.104) (0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.081) (0.021) (0.100)
Household monthly income, ref: Less than 10,000 INR
From 10,000 to 20,000 INR -0.197 -0.050 -0.162 -0.087 -0.145 -0.157 -0.018 -0.325?
(0.190) (0.177) (0.180) (0.171) (0.181) (0.153) (0.041) (0.184)
More than 20,000 INR -0.353 -0.048 -0.029 -0.222 -0.070 -0.158 0.041 -0.073
(0.216) (0.227) (0.216) (0.234) (0.225) (0.188) (0.047) (0.224)
Pseudo R2/R2 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.072 0.003 0.020
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures.
3.4.3 Do survey measures predict risky conducts adopted by respondents?
In this survey, respondents were asked about both the sector in which they work and their conducts relative to
different health behaviors. From Table 3.6, we see that respectively 23% and 11% of individuals work in the private
and public sectors, while 20% declare being self employed and 44% inactive.23 Moreover, 13% of the interviewees
smoke and they are 16.5% to drink alcohol. These various decisions appear, in the literature, to be linked to indi-
viduals’ risk preferences. In particular, Dohmen et al. (2011) showed that smoking habits were associated with a
higher willingness to take risks. As for Bonin et al. (2007), they found that more risk averse individuals are more
likely to work in occupations with low earning risks.24 Cramer et al. (2002) highlighted that self employment is
23Only 34% of the inactive respondents are men. 75% of them are between 15 and 25 years old.
24Both studies used self assessed risk aversion from the German Socio Economic Panel data.
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considered a more risky occupation than being an employee and obtained a negative relation between risk aver-
sion and entrepreneurship. Yet, in the specific context of India, where public jobs are scarce, occupation may not
always result from the individual’s choice.
Table 3.6: Risky behaviors adopted by respondents
Sector of work choices
Private Public Self-
sector sector employment
Mean (%) 23.41 11.26 19.56
Std. dev. 42.37 31.63 39.69
Observations 675 675 675
Health risky behaviors
Smoking
Smoking Drinking or/and drinking
Mean (%) 12.93 11.88 16.51
Std. dev. 33.58 32.38 37.16
Observations 673 648 648
I thus look at the predictive power of my different risk aversion measures on the probability of being self em-
ployed and of working in the private or the public sectors, as well as on the probability of smoking, drinking, and
engaging in at least one of these two activities. Table 3.7 reports the result of probit estimations for the different
measures of risk attitudes. I also count the number of risky activities the individual declare to adopt. This variable
can take three values (0, 1 or 2). I therefore use negative binomial estimations to study the influence of risk aver-
sion on this counting dependent variable. Socio demographic controls are always included in the regressions and
robust standard errors are considered.
When looking at choice of sectors, self reported risk aversion on the road, in sport, in finance and the average
of the different SRRA are significantly and negatively correlated with working in the private sector. For instance,
a marginal change of the self assessed risk attitudes in finance decreases by 2.4% the probability of working in
the private sector (marginal effects not reported in Table 3.7). As expected, more risk averse individuals are less
likely to work in the private sector. No significant relation between the public sector and risk aversion is found,
this for any of the risk attitudes considered, except for the SRRA in health. In this latter case, a more risk averse
individual is less likely to work in the public sector, which contradicts previous research on occupational choice.
Nonetheless, when restricting the sample to individuals who contribute to the household income,25 this coefficient
is no longer significant and I find that SRRA in finance and sport are positively correlated with the probability
of working in the public sector (cf. Table 3.15 in the Appendices). Finally, the average of the SRRA measures is
positively and significantly correlated with being self employed. Similar results are found with SRRA in health and
25i.e. 56% of respondents, which corresponds to a sample of 372 persons.
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finance when restricting the sample to income contributors. In other words, the more risk averse individuals are
the more likely they will work in the public sector or be self employed. The unexpected positive relation obtained
between self employment and risk attitudes might be refined when taking into account the Indian context where
opportunities to get a safer job in the public sector are scarce and informal sector represent an important share
of the labor market. Private sector work and self employment won’t under these circumstances necessarily result
from the preferred choice of less risk averse individuals. We note that neither lottery questions nor income choice
prospects appear to be associated with the occupational choices in the expected way. Moreover, the preference
toward risk based on the lotteries are positively correlated with the probability of working in the private sector.
According to Case 4, one is inclined to conclude that lottery questions are not able to capture the preferences
toward risk. Nevertheless, in the case of occupational choices, a reverse causality issue may appear. More precisely,
once revenues are secured through a safe public sector job with a monthly salary, individuals may be more willing
to take risk in finance and in hypothetical lotteries (see Case 3).
In order to further explore the opportunity issue previously mentioned, I introduce interaction terms between
risk aversion and both education and caste. Indeed, I expect that more educated individuals have more oppor-
tunities and then their occupational choice is likely to result more from their preferred choice. As for individuals
belonging to a high caste, I expect them to have more opportunities, even if the effect of caste may be balanced
by the existence of positive discrimination national schemes. When introducing these interaction terms in the
self employment regressions, the coefficient of risk aversion becomes negative for all measures and is significant
for the income prospect choice variable. The level of education seem to reduce the effect of risk aversion on the
probability of being self employed. Individuals belonging to a schedule caste or tribe are less likely to be working
in the public sector. However, the magnitude of this effect is lowered by the individual’s level of risk aversion. The
more risk averse a low caste person is, the more likely he will work in the public sector. This result may reflect the
effort these persons may actually put to take advantage of the positive discrimination policy implemented by the
State (cf. Table 3.16 in the Appendices).
Regarding health behaviors, all the SRRA measures as well as the job income choice variable are highly and
negatively correlated with the probability of smoking or drinking. For instance, a marginal change in the average
individual’s self reported risk aversion decreases by respectively 3.8% and 2.9% the probability of smoking and
drinking. Notably, the risk aversion variable derived from the lottery question is unexpectedly positively correlated
with the probability of engaging in any of the risky health behaviors considered. Again, a first interpretation of
these results could be that in the context of India, the latter methodology is not appropriate to measure individuals’
preferences toward risk, as such measure is not able to predict risky behaviors while other risk attitudes in finance
are (see Case 4).26 Nevertheless, if one starts from the premise that lottery questions are the gold standard, such
results may rather invalidate other elicitation methods and reflect a risk compensation effect across domains (see
Case 3). In other words, individuals who already take risk with their health by smoking or drinking may be less
26I acknowledge that the irrelevance of the lottery measure might come from the absence of incentives provided to respondents. Nonetheless,
the budget constraints usually faced by large scale survey designers and the purpose of this study to derive achievable recommendations justify
the choice we made to only include hypothetical lotteries in the questionnaire.
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willing to play with their money. In any case, the observation made, when looking at descriptive statistics, on
the inconsistency between the information provided by the lotteries and the one given by the other risk attitude
variables is confirmed.
Additionally, it is interesting to see if one particular risk aversion measure has actually a better predictive power
than others. This kind of analysis will allow me to conclude on the existence of domain specificity of risk prefer-
ences (see Case 2). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Pseudo R2 and Log-
likelihood are reported in Table 3.7. All these statistics provide information regarding the quality of each statistical
model and enable me to compare the predictive power of different risk aversion measures on a same dependent
variable.27 More precisely, the lowest AIC, BIC and Log likelihood values and the highest Pseudo R2 indicate the
best model. When considering labor choices, self assessed risk aversion in finance is the variable which seems to
be the most relevant. Job income choice measure, SRRA on the road and the average of the five SRRA variables are
the measures with the highest power of explanation of risky health behaviors. Similarly to Ding et al. (2010), I find
that the SRRA in health and in sport perform quite well for cigarette and alcohol consumption respectively. Nev-
ertheless, unlike them I don’t find that SRRA in general is the best predictor. The average score of self reported risk
aversion in general and in the four specific domains introduced in the survey is actually among the two SRRA mea-
sures with the lowest AIC, BIC and Log likelihood scores and the highest Pseudo R2 for all risky health behaviors.
Finally, lotteries seem also to be quite a good predictor of smoking behaviors even if the relation found contradicts
the results obtained with other measures of risk aversion in finance and rather reflect some risk compensation
effect.
To summarize, on the one hand, in echo to results found in Germany (Dohmen et al.; 2011) but also in China
or Thailand (Ding et al.; 2010; Hardeweg et al.; 2012), self reported risk aversion in different domains, and in par-
ticular the average score, appear to provide appropriate information on individual risk aversion as they really well
predict risky conducts. On the other hand, in our specific context, hypothetical lottery questions may not capture
a parameter correlated with the risky behaviors adopted by individuals. Several reasons might explain this finding,
going from understanding issues to cultural norms (20% of the respondents said they prefer the zero amount to
the lottery28). However, we acknowledge that an alternative explanation may be put forward. Indeed, such results
would be also found if individuals decide to compensate the risk they take in a certain domain by adopting a safer
conduct in another area or if they are more willing to take risk in finance in case they have a secured financial
situation. In these cases, we would conclude that lotteries actually well capture the risk preferences of individuals
and some context specificity and risk compensation effects would be detected with our data. Finally, while SRRA
in finance is more strongly related to labor decisions, results found with health risky behaviors do not really allow
us to conclude on the existence of context specificity (see Case 2) as SRRA on the road and in sport explain better
smoking and drinking habits than SRRA in health.
27This comparison can be done if the sample of respondents does not vary and with a fixed set of controls.
28Nonetheless, similar findings are reported by De Palma et al. (2011).
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Table 3.7: Influence of risk aversion on risky behaviors
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Probability of working in the private sector†, observations = 665
Coefficient -0.008 -0.060?? -0.070??? -0.023 -0.095??? -0.102?? 0.020? -0.073
Robust SE (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.011) (0.045)
Log-likelihood -309.31 -307.28 -305.64 -308.95 -302.84 -305.72 -307.82 -308.05
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.152 0.156 0.147 0.164 0.156 0.150 0.150
AIC 634.62 630.55 627.29 633.91 621.67 627.43 631.65 632.10
BIC 670.62 666.55 663.29 669.90 657.67 663.43 667.65 668.10
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 665
Coefficient -0.005 0.036 0.034 -0.053? 0.041 0.017 -0.011 -0.035
Robust SE (0.041) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.013) (0.052)
Log-likelihood -197.58 -197.13 -196.99 -196.06 -196.81 -197.52 -197.29 -197.38
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.159 0.159 0.163 0.160 0.157 0.158 0.158
AIC 411.16 410.27 409.99 408.12 409.63 411.04 410.58 410.76
BIC 447.16 446.27 445.99 444.12 445.62 447.04 446.58 446.76
Probability of being self employed†, observations = 665
Coefficient 0.047 0.041 0.023 0.037 0.048 0.072? -0.012 -0.036
Robust SE (0.037) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.041) (0.012) (0.049)
Log-likelihood -266.59 -266.63 -267.14 -266.67 -266.00 -265.94 -266.97 -267.19
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.192 0.190 0.192 0.194 0.194 0.191 0.190
AIC 549.17 549.27 550.27 549.35 547.99 547.89 549.94 550.38
BIC 585.17 585.26 586.27 585.35 583.99 583.89 585.93 586.38
Probability of smoking†, observations = 663
Coefficient -0.126??? -0.218??? -0.096??? -0.092??? -0.100??? -0.236??? 0.088??? -0.164???
Robust SE (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.049) (0.014) (0.054)
Log-likelihood -224.25 -208.48 -224.90 -225.13 -224.63 -215.53 -211.70 -225.31
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.191 0.127 0.126 0.128 0.164 0.179 0.126
AIC 464.51 432.96 465.81 466.27 465.25 447.06 439.40 466.62
BIC 500.48 468.93 501.78 502.24 501.23 483.03 475.38 502.59
Probability of drinking†, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.116??? -0.134??? -0.098??? -0.064?? -0.103??? -0.194??? 0.034??? -0.266???
Robust SE (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.045) (0.013) (0.059)
Log-likelihood -205.53 -202.48 -205.13 -208.09 -204.77 -201.17 -207.08 -198.69
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.138 0.127 0.114 0.129 0.144 0.119 0.154
AIC 427.07 420.96 426.26 432.19 425.54 418.33 430.15 413.38
BIC 462.73 456.62 461.93 467.85 461.20 454.00 465.82 449.04
Probability of smoking or/ and drinking†, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.122??? -0.170??? -0.107??? -0.091??? -0.104??? -0.222??? 0.057??? -0.202???
Robust SE (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.044) (0.013) (0.052)
Log-likelihood -250.12 -241.78 -248.97 -251.11 -249.54 -242.01 -246.21 -247.96
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.162 0.137 0.130 0.135 0.161 0.148 0.141
AIC 516.25 499.55 513.95 518.21 515.07 500.02 508.43 511.92
BIC 551.92 535.22 549.61 553.88 550.74 535.68 544.09 547.59
Number of risky activities in which the individual is engaged‡, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.185??? -0.262??? -0.152??? -0.136??? -0.157??? -0.333??? 0.094??? -0.332???
Robust SE (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.044) (0.064) (0.019) (0.079)
Log-pseudolikelihood -361.78 -351.80 -361.55 -362.96 -361.54 -353.87 -357.13 -358.52
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.117 0.093 0.089 0.093 0.112 0.104 0.101
AIC 741.56 721.60 741.11 743.93 741.08 725.73 732.27 735.05
BIC 781.69 761.72 781.23 784.05 781.20 765.86 772.39 775.17
Notes: Gender, age, education level (3 category variable) and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions.
†Probit estimations. ‡Negative binomial estimation. Dependent variable can take values 0, 1 or 2. ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures.
???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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3.4.4 Do cultural specificities bias the influence of risk aversion?
Religion definitively punctuates the daily life of Indians. For instance, in my sample, 87% of the respondents be-
lieve their life is in god’s hands. They are 73% to pray daily. These religious beliefs and practices are, to some
extent, likely to prevent individuals from engaging in prevention activities. However, these individual character-
istics would bias my previous estimates if and only if they are correlated with risk aversion. In order to check the
existence of a potential omitted variable bias, I look at the pairwise correlation coefficients between the religious
variables and the risk aversion parameters. No significant correlations are found. Furthermore, I include religious
beliefs and practices in the set of explanatory variables of individuals’ preference toward risk. Believing that one’s
life is in the hands of god reduces only the self reported risk aversion parameters, while praying every day is sig-
nificantly negatively correlated only with the self reported risk aversion in the health domain and with the income
choice prospect measures. Moreover, when including religious beliefs and practices in the regressions, similar re-
sults are found regarding the relations between the various risk attitudes and the different risky decisions, with the
exception of the income choice variable which now is negatively and significantly correlated with working in the
private sector. As for fate and praying activity, they are positively correlated with risky health behaviors. In other
words, individuals who believe that their life is in the hands of god or who pray on a daily basis are more likely
to smoke and drink. When looking at labor choices, individuals who pray daily are more (less) likely to work in
the private (public) sector. Respondents who believe in fate are more likely to evolve in a private firm. Despite
differences in religious practices between India and developed countries, the influence of individual risk aversion
on risky conducts doesn’t seem to be altered (Tables not shown).
3.4.5 Do interviewers influence the individuals’ risk aversion?
Till now I did not account for a potential interviewer bias. Nonetheless, both risky behaviors and attitudes might
be influenced by observable and unobservable characteristics of the interviewers. In this subsection, I thus turn to
the question of the impact of interviewers on sensitive or hard to measure variables. I first estimate the influence
of interviewers on risk aversion responses provided by respondents. More precisely, I study whether enumera-
tors explain a significant share of the variance in the elicited risk preferences across individuals. I then investigate
whether certain characteristics impact in a specific direction the data collected. Moreover, I explore the interac-
tion between respondent and interviewer characteristics. Finally, I go back to the analysis made previously and
investigate whether my results regarding the influence of individual risk aversion on risky behaviors still hold after
controlling for interviewer effects.
Information on interviewer’s gender, age, education and experience in survey work have been collected. Un-
observable characteristics of the individual, such as survey ability or own risk aversion, are also likely to influence
the collected information on risk attitudes. The former is captured through two performance indicators: the miss-
ing and refusal rates. As for the latter, it could have been interesting to administered a risk aversion questionnaire
3.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 123
to all enumerators. Unfortunately, this has not been done. Nonetheless, econometric methods can help me in
accounting for the influence of unobservables. First, clustering standard errors at the interviewer level allows to
correct for autocorrelation of residuals. In other words, this adjusts for the fact that one same interviewer measures
risk preferences of different interviewees. Second, including interviewer dummies control for variables specific to
each interviewer that could affect both the independent and dependent variables.
Figure 3.1 presents the refusal and missing rates of each of the 17 enumerators who worked on the data col-
lection. The former corresponds to the share of selected motorcyclists who did not agree to answer the survey
while the latter corresponds to the share of my risk aversion measures (SRRA, lotteries and income choices) that
are missing among the individuals interviewed by each enumerator. We note that these performance indicators
vary substantially from one interviewer to the other but also that an enumerator who is good at convincing in-
dividuals to answer the survey may not be so effective when fulfilling the questionnaire.29 Younger interviewers
faced a higher refusal rate which possibly reflects the difficulties they had in convincing respondents to answer to
the survey. An unexpected experience effect is found as the missing rate is positively and highly correlated with
the number of questionnaires completed. Nonetheless this is likely to be driven by one unique interviewer who
has completed almost 20% of the questionnaires. The other socio demographic characteristics don’t seem to play
a significant role in the performance of interviewers (cf. Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Pairwise correlation between performance and characteristics of interviewers
Interviewer characteristics refusal rate missing rate
Male (=1) -0.056 0.058
Age (in years) -0.491 ?? 0.337
Education (3 groups) -0.311 -0.390
Survey experience (in years) -0.331 -0.028
Training
session 1 -0.069 0.179
session 2 -0.136 -0.105
session 3 0.191 -0.052
Number of questionnaires 0.002 0.490 ??
Notes: ?? stands for 5% significance.
Remark: Interviewer socio-demographics (gender, age,
education and experience) are not correlated with one another.
Subsequently, I consider interviewers’ socio demographic attributes as well as the two performance indicators
in order to study the potential interviewer effects on the elicited preferences toward risk. As already mentioned,
the performance indicators allow me to partly capture the ability of each enumerator to do survey work.
29Pairwise correlation coefficient between refusal and missing rates is indeed not significant and rather small (0.049).
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Figure 3.1: Performance of interviewers
Notes: the refusal rate corresponds to the share of eligible individual who refused to answer to the survey,
the missing rate corresponds to the average share of risk aversion questions (SRRA, lotteries and income choices)
which were not fulfilled.
Influence of interviewer’s observable characteristics on risk aversion
Table 3.9 shows some evidence that interviewers’ characteristics explain partly the observed variance in the risk
attitudes revealed by interviewees. The likelihood ratio tests are statistically significant meaning that including the
interviewer’s socio demographic characteristics and his/ her performance indicators add to the explanatory power
of the model. This, for all my measures of risk aversion. Table 3.10 reports the coefficients of interviewer’s charac-
teristics and performance when adding these variables to the specifications made in Table 3.5. Following Dijkstra
(1983) and Davis et al. (2010), I clustered standard errors at the interviewer level. It appears that the attributes of
the interviewers have different impacts depending on the risk aversion measure considered. In particular, a more
educated interviewer collects significantly higher risk attitudes with lotteries. Experience in survey work also in-
crease the level of risk aversion elicited with SRRA on the road, in health and with income prospect choices. This
may reveal a capacity to explain better to respondents the possible alternatives.30 As mentioned previously, refusal
and missing rates may not catch the same skills. The former tend to capture the interviewer’s unability to convince
people to answer to the survey (due to shyness, lack of confidence, but also, in the Indian context, differences in
30Nonetheless, I acknowledge that this interpretation is somewhat speculative. The only certain conclusion one can make on the basis of
such result is that interviewers do influence in some way the answers provided by respondents. Whether certain characteristics of the survey
staff induce better quality information is beyond this empirical analysis.
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social status or caste). As for the latter, it is more likely to reflect the interviewer’s degree of seriousness or his
(her) understanding of these more complex questions. While the missing rate is postively correlated with self as-
sessed risk aversion in sport, in health, in finance and with income prospect choices; the refusal rate is positively
correlated with SRRA on the road, in sport, in health, with lotteries and with income prospect choices.
Table 3.9: Variance of risk aversion explained by interviewer
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
ordered ordered ordered ordered ordered negative ordered
Specification logit logit logit logit ologit ols binomial logit
Socio-demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer characteristics† yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer performance‡ yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -1132.36 -1144.49 -1242.93 -1100.22 -1209.75 - -2061.71 -780.14
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.027 0.043 0.036 0.041 0.033 0.173 0.031 0.063
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
Comparing models with and without interviewers’ controls
LR chi2(6) 28.48 77.88 52.88 68.03 48.70 76.97 117.27 70.99
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Comparing models with and without interviewers’ performance indicators
LR chi2(2) 9.40 45.96 14.58 37.20 26.25 42.25 9.36 33.14
p-value 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: † Interviewer characteristics: gender, age, education level and survey work experience. Ordered logit coefficients are reported.
∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures. OLS estimation is run for this dependent variable.
‡ Interviewer performance: refusal and missing rates. ∗ LR stands for Likelihood ratio.
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Table 3.10: Interviewer effect on risk aversion measures
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
ordered ordered ordered ordered ordered negative ordered
Specification logit logit logit logit ologit ols binomial logit
Respondent socio-demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SE clustered at the interviewer level yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer characteristics
Male (=1) 0.677 0.661 -0.174 0.824 0.194 0.601 -0.042 -0.225
(0.606) (0.477) (0.466) (0.548) (0.523) (0.451) (0.074) (0.527)
Age (in years) -0.023 -0.058 -0.026 -0.115 -0.075 -0.059 -0.015 -0.089?
(0.062) (0.048) (0.038) (0.071) (0.049) (0.044) (0.010) (0.050)
Education (3 categories) -0.271 0.027 -0.339 0.462 -0.085 -0.027 0.259??? 0.452
(0.258) (0.243) (0.258) (0.346) (0.258) (0.273) (0.032) (0.305)
Survey experience (in years) 0.157 0.330??? 0.092 0.374?? 0.149 0.230? -0.001 0.315?
(0.118) (0.105) (0.149) (0.151) (0.148) (0.119) (0.013) (0.170)
Interviewer performance
Missing rate 0.850 4.492 5.284?? 9.666?? 8.577?? 6.876?? 0.673 7.319??
(4.082) (3.175) (2.677) (4.892) (3.700) (2.941) (0.688) (3.696)
Refusal rate 2.518 5.644??? 2.477? 4.354? 2.821 3.448?? 0.495? 4.438??
(2.118) (2.077) (1.471) (2.464) (1.975) (1.589) (0.289) (2.110)
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.028 0.043 0.036 0.040 0.033 0.173 0.031 0.063
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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Matching interviewer and respondent characteristics
I further investigate the influence of interviewers on the level of risk aversion declared by respondents by looking
at how shared characteristics impact elicited parameters. I consider two different individual characteristics: being
a male or a female and being younger or older than 30 years old. I perform ordinary least square regressions to ease
the interpretation of the results and introduce variables indicating whether the gender and the age of enumerators
and respondents match. Table 3.11 presents the results obtained. Similar results are found when using the same
specifications as in Tables 3.5 and 3.10. The net effect of (i) being interviewed by a man for a female and for a
male, (ii) being interviewed by a young person for an old and a young respondent are also reported. We note
that self reported risk aversion variables are not significantly influenced by the gender matching (except for SRRA
in general for which male respondents interviewed by a man appear as more risk averse). On the contrary, for
lottery questions and the income choices, female respondents declare significantly lower levels of risk aversion if
interviewed by a man. More precisely, the lottery elicited risk aversion decrease then by 2.8 (i.e. half one standard
deviation). As for the impact of age, a young person interviewed by one of his peers declares a significantly lower
level of risk aversion with the self reported risk aversion questions in general, on the road and in sport. The impact
of interviewer’s age is even stronger for lotteries. In that case a young interviewer elicit significantly higher levels of
risk aversion when questionning old respondents and significantly lower levels of risk aversion when interviewing
young ones. As an example, old respondents interviewed by a young interviewer end up with 4.1 more safe choices
while young respondents in the same situation end up with 1 safe choice less (i.e. 77% and 18% of one standard
deviation respectively). Yet, it is difficult to give any advice regarding the optimal matching, i.e. which interviewer
should interview which interviewee. Indeed, a young respondent may want to appear reckless in front of one of
his peers but he may also prefer to pretend to be more careful in front of an older interviewer.
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3.4.6 Do interviewers alter the relation found between risk attitudes and risky behaviors?
When investigating the influence of risk preferences on risky behaviors without taking into account a potential
interviewer bias, I might obtain either biased results or incorrectly conclude that a significant (or not significant)
relation exists between risky behaviors and some risk attitudes. Indeed, the interviewer’s socio demographic char-
acteristics but also his or her way of asking questions may both influence the preference toward risk revealed by
the respondent and his or her declared behavior. If this is true, I would face an omitted variable bias.
Controlling for interviewers’ observable characteristics
Results presented in the previous subsection actually provide evidence that interviewers’ characteristics indeed
explain some part of the observed variance in risk attitude variables. In order to control for this omitted bias, I first
introduce interviewers’ characteristics and performance indicators in my empirical analysis. Table 3.12 displays
the same regressions as Table 3.7, adding interviewers’ observable characteristics as explanatory variables and
clustering standard errors at the enumerator’s level.
The significance of the relation between smoking and SRRA in general, in sport, in finance and income prospect
choices vanishes following the introduction of information on interviewer’s characteristics. When looking at drink-
ing habits, coefficients for SRRA in sport, in health, in finance and lotteries are no longer significant. In both cases,
for the variables which remain significant the corresponding coefficient is of smaller magnitude and the level of
confidence is bigger. For example, the marginal effect of self reported risk aversion in health on the probability of
smoking goes from -1.5% to -1.1%. As for the unexpected positive influence of lottery questions on risky health
behaviors, it remains significant for all my measures of risky health behaviors, except the probability of drinking.
The other relations between risky health conducts and risk preferences remain similar. When comparing the re-
spective influence of SRRA in health and in finance, the latter variable is either not significant or significant at a
much lower level than the former one. The introduction of interviewers’ characteristics thus reveals some context
specificity of risk aversion (Case 2). Regarding the choice of the sector of work, self assessed risk aversion on the
road, in sport, in finance and the average of SRRA in all domains are now significantly and positively correlated
with the likelihood of working in the public sector. This is also the case of the influence of lottery questions which
now is correlated in the expected way with public sector choice. The size of the marginal effects of SRRA in finance
and the SRRA score on the probability of working in the private sector both increase by 0.2 percentage points.
Controlling for interviewers’ unobservable characteristics
Despite the introduction of the performance indicators, other enumerators characteristics, which plausibly in-
fluence the information collected on risk aversion, remain uncaptured (such as interviewer’s own risk aversion,
for instance). To deal with this issue, I introduce interviewer dummies instead of the information on observable
characteristics and perform again my empirical analysis.31 Table 3.13 reports the results found with this last spec-
31When estimating probit regressions, fixed effects cannot be introduced in the specifications. Nonetheless, when running the linear proba-
bility models with interviewer fixed effects, as robustness checks, really similar results as the ones presented hereinafter are obtained.
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ification. The only measures which still explain significantly the risky health behaviors adopted by respondents
are the SRRA in general, on the road, the average of SRRA measures and the income prospect choices. The lottery
question appears to be significantly correlated with risky conducts in the same unexpected way as previously. Re-
garding the labor decisions, SRRA in finance remains significantly associated with the likelihood of working in the
private sector. Finally a negative relation between income choices and entrepreneurship is now detected. Infor-
mation regarding the significance of interviewer dummies is provided in the Appendices, Table 3.17. The number
of questionnaires filled in by each interviewer varies quite substantially. When restricting the sample to those
enumerators who interviewed at least 50 persons (7 out of the 17 interviewers), the average of SRRA appears to
be significantly correlated with labor decisions and all the risky health behaviors I consider. Other results remain
overall similar (see Table 3.18 in the Appendices).
I end this analysis by acknowledging that for a certain number of respondents the interviewer effect and the
geographical area specificities cannot be disentangled. On average, when considering my restricted sample, each
interviewer covered six different areas and each location was visited by two enumerators. However, 11 starting
points out of the 50 were covered by only one enumerator and one of them only surveyed one zone.
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Table 3.12: Table 3.7 – controlling for interviewers’ observable characteristics
Self-reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Socio-demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer characteristics† yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer performance‡ yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Probability of working in the private sector†, observations = 665
Coefficient -0.007 -0.057 -0.069??? -0.040 -0.105??? -0.116?? 0.004 -0.078
Robust SE (0.030) (0.041) (0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.051) (0.012) (0.065)
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.191 0.195 0.189 0.205 0.197 0.186 0.190
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 665
Coefficient -0.019 0.089? 0.050? 0.003 0.084?? 0.085? 0.021?? 0.079
Robust SE (0.033) (0.052) (0.026) (0.028) (0.035) (0.046) (0.011) (0.073)
Pseudo R2 0.257 0.265 0.262 0.257 0.268 0.262 0.261 0.260
Probability of being self-employed†, observations = 665
Coefficient 0.068* 0.039 0.029 0.030 0.055 0.083 -0.018 -0.066
Robust SE (0.040) (0.038) (0.034) (0.032) (0.039) (0.055) (0.014) (0.064)
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.212 0.212 0.209 0.209
Probability of smoking†, observations = 663
Coefficient -0.114 -0.183??? -0.029 -0.089??? -0.045 -0.164?? 0.085??? -0.088
Robust SE (0.073) (0.066) (0.038) (0.033) (0.040) (0.080) (0.020) (0.081)
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.337 0.294 0.305 0.296 0.313 0.332 0.297
Probability of drinking†, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.115?? -0.079? -0.055 -0.042 -0.062 -0.130?? 0.022 -0.211???
Robust SE (0.053) (0.044) (0.038) (0.029) (0.044) (0.060) (0.016) (0.063)
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.269 0.265 0.263 0.267 0.273 0.264 0.285
Probability of smoking or/and drinking†, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.118?? -0.128?? -0.061* -0.087??? -0.066? -0.169??? 0.048??? -0.147??
Robust SE (0.059) (0.056) (0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.065) (0.016) (0.067)
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.282 0.265 0.271 0.267 0.281 0.275 0.271
Number of risky activities in which the individual is engaged‡, observations = 638
Coefficient -0.147? -0.187??? -0.065 -0.092??? -0.080? -0.216?? 0.073??? -0.199???
Robust SE (0.076) (0.062) (0.048) (0.033) (0.046) (0.085) (0.024) (0.073)
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.222 0.204 0.207 0.205 0.216 0.216 0.211
Notes: Gender, age, education level (3 category variable) and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions.
† Interviewer characteristics: gender, age, education level and survey work experience. ‡ Interviewer performance: refusal and missing rates.
†Probit estimations. ‡Negative binomial estimation. Dependent variable can take values 0, 1 or 2. ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five
SRRA measures. Standard errors are clusterted at the interviewer level. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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Table 3.13: Table 3.7 – controlling for interviewers’ unobservable characteristics
Self-reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Socio-demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Probability of working in the private sector†, observations = 640
coefficient 0.032 -0.040 -0.042?? -0.016 -0.082?? -0.075 0.009 -0.034
robust SE (0.029) (0.044) (0.019) (0.025) (0.036) (0.053) (0.014) (0.069)
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.210 0.219 0.213 0.210 0.210
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 613
coefficient -0.054 0.065 0.021 -0.018 0.055 0.031 0.005 0.005
robust SE (0.034) (0.058) (0.024) (0.027) (0.037) (0.048) (0.010) (0.078)
Pseudo R2 0.276 0.277 0.274 0.274 0.277 0.274 0.274 0.273
Probability of being self-employed†, observations = 650
coefficient 0.062 0.040 0.023 0.023 0.048 0.079 -0.017 -0.135??
robust SE (0.044) (0.039) (0.037) (0.032) (0.040) (0.060) (0.016) (0.061)
Pseudo R2 0.237 0.235 0.234 0.234 0.236 0.237 0.235 0.241
Probability of smoking†, observations = 619
coefficient -0.095 -0.148?? 0.012 -0.026 -0.009 -0.102 0.123??? -0.043
robust SE (0.072) (0.064) (0.044) (0.024) (0.036) (0.078) (0.015) (0.087)
Pseudo R2 0.407 0.425 0.400 0.400 0.399 0.405 0.462 0.400
Probability of drinking†, observations = 622
coefficient -0.106?? -0.041 -0.036 0.018 -0.044 -0.083 0.034?? -0.217???
robust SE (0.047) (0.041) (0.045) (0.032) (0.050) (0.058) (0.017) (0.080)
Pseudo R2 0.336 0.328 0.328 0.327 0.329 0.330 0.333 0.344
Probability of smoking or/and drinking†, observations = 628
coefficient -0.111?? -0.098? -0.041 -0.039 -0.046 -0.131?? 0.067??? -0.124
robust SE (0.056) (0.055) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031) (0.058) (0.014) (0.076)
Pseudo R2 0.344 0.344 0.335 0.334 0.335 0.342 0.358 0.339
Number of risky activities in which the individual is engaged‡, observations = 638
coefficient -0.196?? -0.130?? -0.017 -0.007 -0.037 -0.127? 0.094??? -0.185??
robust SE (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.073) (0.023) (0.090)
Log-likelihood -262.40 -261.56 -265.14 -265.20 -264.92 -263.66 -256.37 -262.86
Notes: Gender, age, education level (3 category variable) and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions.
† Probit estimations. ‡ Fixed effect negative binomial estimation. Dependent variable can take values 0, 1 or 2. ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the
five SRRA measures. Standard errors are clusterted at the interviewer level. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I am interested in the elicitation of individual risk aversion through surveys in general and in the con-
text of India in particular. More precisely, I wonder if risk aversion parameters as measured in developed countries
are appropriate when investigating risky conducts adopted by a population with a different cultural background.
For this purpose, I take advantage of an original dataset implemented among motorcyclists in Delhi in 2011.
I compare three different survey measures of risk attitudes (self reported risk aversion, hypothetical lotteries and
income prospect choices). I first show that all measures are positively and highly correlated with one another but
that this is rather the case within methodologies and within domains. In a second step, I detect the gender, age
and education effects on the level of risk aversion usually observed in surveys conducted in developed countries.
Subsequently, I investigate the predictive power of these different individual risk aversion measures on the job oc-
cupation and health decisions. Most of my elicited risk preferences appear to well predict risky health behaviors.
This is in particular the case of the average of SRRA variables. Regarding the labor decisions, when restricting to the
sample of income contributors SRRA in finance is the variable with the stronger effect. The unexpected positive
relation observed between self reported risk aversion measures and entrepreneurship may be specific to the In-
dian context where public job opportunities are scarce and occupation may not always reflect the preferred choice
of the individual. As for the lottery questions, the results found are puzzling and may be interpreted either as evi-
dence of risk compensation between domains or as incapacity to capture the desired characteristic. Finally, while
religious practices and beliefs increase the likelihood of engaging in risky health behaviors, they do not modify the
influence of risk preferences on individuals’ conducts. The elicitation of risk aversion measures through surveys
in developing countries appears thus possible.
Besides the choice of the elicitation methodology, the potential influence of enumerators in a face to face in-
terview is a measurement concern applied researchers face when collecting hard to measure parameters such as
individual risk aversion. In this article, I provide evidence that part of the variance in elicited risk aversion comes
from the interviewer himself or herself. Moreover, it seems that each measure is impacted differently by inter-
viewers’ characteristics. However, the relation between risk aversion and risky behaviors hold when including
observable characteristics of interviewers in the regression. When interviewers dummies are introduced most of
the significance of coefficients vanishes. Such results might be partly driven by the limited heterogeneity between
respondents interviewed by the same person and living in the same neighborhood. But the adoption of risky
health behaviors are still correlated positively with lotteries and negatively with self reported risk aversion. This
argues in favor of previous conclusions on the reliability of risk aversion measures still hold despite the more or
less important effect of interviewers.
To sump up, this work supports the capacity of self assessed risk aversion to pick up the individual risk aversion
in countries like India. Besides, I emphasize the influence of interviewers in the elicitation of risk attitudes through
face to face interviews. In addition to enumerators’ instructions during the training sessions, a way to ensure that
such potential bias can be controlled for in the empirical analysis is to carefully allocate enumerators during the
implementation of the survey. In particular, one needs to make sure that several interviewers cover each local
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area and that all of them work in different zones in order to be able to disentagle interviewer and locality effects.
Moreover, the allocation of the work load should be spread into a high number of interviewers to avoid that one
enumerator drives the information collected and the analysis subsequently undertaken. Finally, investigating fur-
ther and with a dedicated research design the influence of interviewers’ risk aversion on the elicited preferences
toward risk of interviewees could be of great interest for future research.
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3.6 Appendices
Appendix A. Risk aversion measures
Self reported risk aversion
Based on the methodology used in particular in the German Socio-Economic Panel (G-SOEP), risk aversion in gen-
eral and in four domains (on the road, in sport or leisure, in health and in finance) have been assessed using a 8
level scale.32 The formulation used in the questionnaire was the following: “People behave differently in different
situations. On a risky scale going from 0 (not at all ready to take risk) to 7 (fully ready to take risk), how would you
describe yourself [in each domain]?
To build my risk aversion measures, I inverse the scale so that the lowest value correspond to risk lover and the
highest value to the most risk averse individuals.
The following variables were created:
? srra_[domain]_8: can take 8 different values, increasing with risk aversion.
? srra_score_8: is the average of the level of risk aversion in each domain,
∑5
i=1srra_[domain]_8
5
.
Remark on the formulation used
1. Regarding the introductory sentence: The purpose of the introductory sentence was to limit the social desir-
ability bias by telling respondents that no “correct” answer exists for this series of questions. I acknowledge
that an unintended effect could be that individuals feel then obliged to provide different answers to the dif-
ferent domains proposed. It is unfortunately not possible to disentangle the true variation of risk aversion
across domains and the induced one. However, when looking at the data collected, 28% of the respondents
provided no more than two different answers. They are 14% to give a different answer to each of the SRRA
question. No difference in terms of gender, age, income or caste is observed between individuals who gave
a different answer to each domain and the others, the former are yet on average more educated.
2. Regarding the scale offered: Dohmen et al. (2011), Hardeweg et al. (2012) or Ding et al. (2010) use a scale
going from 0 to 10, where 0 means “unwilling to take risks" and 10 means “not at all prepared to take risk".
One may argue that by using this formulation, respondents may be induced to report their behaviors rather
than their risk attitudes, which in turn can be problematic when testing whether risk aversion measures
predict risky conducts. The word used in the hindi translation of our questionnaire (“paiyaare”) is closer to
“ready”, which is less misleading.
32In the literature (Dohmen et al.; 2011; Ding et al.; 2010, for instance), a scale going from 0 to 10 is most commonly used.
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Lottery questions
I adapted the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure in order to derive the individual’s constant relative risk aversion
parameter. Holt and Laury (2002) captured individual risk preferences through differences in volatility; more pre-
cisely, they offered 10 decisions between two lotteries which differ in the variation of gains. The safe choice being
the lottery with the smallest gap between its two outcomes. The complexity of such task, in particular for individ-
uals with low math skills, have been raised by Dohmen et al. (2010), Hardeweg et al. (2012) or Vieider, Lefebvre,
Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson (2014). More precisely, a set of 20 choices between an
increasing safe amount and a fixed lottery was presented to respondents. if choosing the lottery the individual has
a 50 percent chance of winning 12,000 INR and a 50 percent chance of receiving nothing. The safe amount was
increasing by 500 INR from 0 to 9,500 INR. The point at which subjects switch from the lottery option to the safe
choice can be used to classify individuals from according to their degree of risk aversion. 27 individuals provided
inconsistent answers. More precisely, they switched from safe amount to lottery. I thus exclude these observations
from the analysis.
The following variable was created:
? safe_choice: can take 21 different values, indicates the number of times the person has chosen the safe
amount.
Income prospect choices
This measure is based on the hypothetical income prospect choices developed by Barsky et al. (1997). All respon-
dents answer to a first ‘yes/no’ question. According to their response, a second question is asked by the interviewer.
(qA) “Would you take the opportunity of a 50 percent chance of doubling your income and a 50 percent chance
of reducing your income by one third?”
(qB) if answer to (qA) is ‘yes’: “Would you take the opportunity of a 50 percent chance of doubling your income
and a 50 percent chance of reducing your income by one half?”
(qC) if answer to (qA) is ‘no’: “Would you take the opportunity of a 50 percent chance of doubling your income
and a 50 percent chance of reducing your income by one fifth?”
I create the following variable:
? ra_gamble_4: 4 categories, increasing with risk aversion, takes value 1 if the individual would gamble on
his income despite a risk of reducing his income by one half; 2 if he agrees to take the job opportunity if the risk of
reducing his income is of one third but not of one half; 3 if the risk of reducing his income is of one fifth but not of
one third; 4 if he won’t take the job opportunity even for a risk of one fifth only.
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Appendix B. Comparing individuals from restricted and full samples
Table 3.14: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents - restricted, missing, full samples
Sample All answers Missing p-value Full
Observations 675 227 902
Male (%) 69.73 60.35 0.009 67.37
Age (years) 36.06 37.67 0.118 36.47
Married (%) 71.98 77.53 0.102 73.39
Education
Illiterate (%) 6.31 8.85 0.194 6.95
Tertiary education (%) 46.7 38.94 0.043 44.73
Education (3 groups) 2.26 2.11 0.012 2.22
Low caste (SC/ST, %) 36.43 28.77 0.039 34.54
Household monthly income
below 10,000 INR 31.41 31.72 0.931 31.49
10,000 - 20,000 INR 34.07 28.19 0.102 32.59
above 20,000 INR 17.63 15.42 0.444 17.07
Contribute to income (%) 55.87 52.42 0.367 55.00
When comparing individuals who answered to all three risk aversion measures and those who didn’t, it appears
that the former are more likely to be men, educated but also to belong to a low caste. No significant difference is
detected regarding income.
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Appendix C. Effect of risk aversion on occupational choice decisions
Table 3.15: Influence of risk aversion on risky behaviors - sample of income contributors
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Probability of working in the private sector†, observations = 372
Coefficient -0.063 -0.089?? -0.087??? -0.020 -0.127??? -0.147??? 0.023? -0.044
Robust SE (0.040) (0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.014) (0.053)
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.098 0.101 0.086 0.118 0.106 0.091 0.086
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 372
Coefficient -0.012 0.036 0.059? -0.049 0.063? 0.039 -0.009 0.008
Robust SE (0.046) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.049) (0.015) (0.058)
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.079 0.086 0.083 0.085 0.079 0.078 0.077
Probability of being self-employed†, observations = 372
Coefficient 0.045 0.045 0.035 0.052? 0.067?? 0.093?? -0.013 -0.008
Robust SE (0.041) (0.036) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.013) (0.053)
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.027
Notes: Gender, age, education level (3 category variable) and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions.
†Probit estimations. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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Appendix D. Heterogenous effect of risk aversion on occupational choice decisions
Table 3.16: Influence of risk aversion on occupational choices with heterogenous effects
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 657
Risk aversion coefficient -0.032 -0.088 0.021 0.069 0.173 -0.025 0.079 0.350
(0.148) (0.135) (0.148) (0.145) (0.123) (0.181) (0.056) (0.217)
Education level (3 groups) 0.272 0.223 0.519? 0.664?? 0.688??? 0.490 0.901??? 0.797???
(0.284) (0.271) (0.267) (0.306) (0.235) (0.327) (0.347) (0.250)
RA × Education level 0.010 0.025 -0.027 -0.064 -0.068 -0.026 -0.041? -0.174??
(0.055) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.065) (0.021) (0.080)
Belongs to a low caste (=1) 0.021 -0.957?? -1.059??? -1.072? -0.534 -1.521??? -0.434 -0.346
(0.438) (0.424) (0.397) (0.560) (0.382) (0.509) (0.420) (0.325)
RA × Belongs to a low caste 0.010 0.202??? 0.256??? 0.217?? 0.128? 0.326??? 0.039 0.168
(0.083) (0.077) (0.077) (0.095) (0.071) (0.099) (0.029) (0.112)
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.165 0.187 0.182 0.169 0.175 0.168 0.169
Probability of of being self-employed†, observations = 657
Risk aversion coefficient -0.099 -0.095 -0.096 -0.139 -0.115 -0.202 -0.023 -0.378??
(0.117) (0.112) (0.098) (0.100) (0.07) (0.147) (0.040) (0.167)
Education level (3 groups) -0.630?? -0.556?? -0.483??? -0.655??? -0.589??? -0.814??? -0.395? -0.661???
(0.252) (0.232) (0.184) (0.223) (0.189) (0.276) (0.236) (0.183
RA × Education level 0.067 0.056 0.047 0.071? 0.070? 0.112?? 0.008 0.144??
(0.047) (0.043) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.054) (0.016) (0.064)
Belongs to a low caste (=1) -0.380 -0.456 -0.393 -0.673? -0.489 -0.610 0.038 -0.383
(0.432) (0.403) (0.289) (0.390) (0.323) (0.469) (0.368) (0.288)
RA × Belongs to a low caste 0.015 0.031 0.020 0.062 0.038 0.061 -0.028 0.029
(0.080) (0.074) (0.060) (0.068) (0.063) (0.092) (0.026) (0.105)
Pseudo R2 0.204 0.203 0.201 0.206 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.203
Notes: Gender, age and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions. †Probit estimations. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the five SRRA measures.
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Appendix E. Significance of interviewer dummies
Table 3.17: Significance of interviewer dummies
Self reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Probability of working in the private sector
# of omitted interviewers 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
# of significant interviewers 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
# of non significant interviewers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Probability of working in the public sector
# of omitted interviewers 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
# of significant interviewers 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
# of non significant interviewers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Probability of being self employed
# of omitted interviewers 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
# of significant interviewers 7 7 6 7 5 5 8 8
# of non significant interviewers 6 6 7 6 8 8 5 5
Probability of smoking
# of omitted interviewers 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
# of significant interviewers 9 10 8 9 8 10 11 9
# of non significant interviewers 3 2 4 3 4 2 1 3
Probability of drinking
# of omitted interviewers 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
# of significant interviewers 10 11 11 10 11 11 10 10
# of non significant interviewers 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4
Probability of smoking or/ and drinking
# of omitted interviewers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# of significant interviewers 12 11 11 12 11 11 11 9
# of non significant interviewers 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 6
Remark: 17 interviewers worked on the data collection. One interviewer is used as reference in the regressions. When the number of interviewers
varies from one risk aversion measure to the other, it is not always the same interviewers who have a significant coefficient.
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Table 3.18: Table 3.7 – controlling for interviewers’ unobservable characteristics if at least 50 questionnaires
Self-reported risk aversion Income
Lottery prospect
in general on the road in sport in health in finance average∗ questions choices
Socio-demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interviewer dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Probability of working in the private sector†, observations = 495
Coefficient 0.030 -0.037 -0.057??? -0.023 -0.108?? -0.103? 0.013 -0.016
Robust SE (0.021) (0.051) (0.020) (0.029) (0.042) (0.059) (0.016) (0.092)
Pseudo R2 0.216 0.217 0.220 0.216 0.232 0.221 0.217 0.215
Probability of working in the public sector†, observations = 495
Coefficient -0.049 0.096 0.038 -0.012 0.102??? 0.079 0.005 -0.074
Robust SE (0.033) (0.067) (0.025) (0.028) (0.034) (0.050) (0.013) (0.078)
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.296 0.289 0.287 0.299 0.290 0.287 0.289
Probability of being self employed†, observations = 332
Coefficient 0.067 0.027 0.038 0.053 0.067 0.199? -0.016 -0.132
Robust SE (0.055) (0.050) (0.044) (0.038) (0.045) (0.068) (0.020) (0.082)
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.105 0.107 0.109 0.111 0.113 0.107 0.113
Probability of smoking†, observations = 495
Coefficient -0.134? -0.202??? -0.025 -0.020 -0.023 -0.172??? 0.121??? -0.056
Robust SE (0.077) (0.062) (0.034) (0.019) (0.033) (0.060) (0.014) (0.098)
Pseudo R2 0.462 0.491 0.450 0.449 0.449 0.462 0.509 0.450
Probability of drinking†, observations = 473
Coefficient -0.159??? -0.065 -0.034 -0.009 -0.027 -0.119?? 0.049?? -0.263??
Robust SE (0.053) (0.058) (0.041) (0.027) (0.049) (0.047) (0.020) (0.104)
Pseudo R2 0.416 0.402 0.399 0.398 0.398 0.404 0.410 0.418
Probability of smoking or/ and drinking†, observations = 473
Coefficient -0.141?? -0.130?? -0.031 -0.032 -0.024 -0.151??? 0.080??? -0.156
Robust SE (0.063) (0.065) (0.039) (0.028) (0.026) (0.048) (0.019) (0.098)
Pseudo R2 0.413 0.416 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.408 0.431 0.405
Number of risky activities in which the individual is engaged‡, observations = 473
Coefficient -0.264?? -0.260?? -0.018 -0.028 -0.048 -0.255??? 0.147??? -0.301?
Robust SE (0.120) (0.113) (0.079) (0.045) (0.040) (0.071) (0.032) (0.167)
Pseudo R2 0.371 0.374 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.364 0.384 0.364
Notes: Gender, age, education level (3 category variable) and household monthly income (dummies) are controlled for in all regressions.
† Probit estimations. ‡ Ordered logit estimation. Dependent variable can take values 0, 1 or 2. ∗ ‘average’ is the average of the
five SRRA measures. Standard errors are clustered at the interviewer level. ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
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Chapter 4
Why do some motorbike riders wear a
helmet and others don’t?
Evidence from Delhi, India
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144 HELMET AND RISK AVERSION
This Chapter was written with Michael Grimm (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Passau University and IZA).
It has been submitted to Health Economics.
Abstract
Injuries to the head and the neck are a major cause of road traffic accident fatalities in most developing countries.
We focus on helmet use behavior among motorbike users in Delhi. We use a detailed data set collected for the
purpose of the study. To guide our empirical analysis, we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on self-
protection and self-insurance. The empirical findings suggest that risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a hel-
met, there is no systematic effect on speed. Helmet use also increases with education. Drivers who show a higher
awareness of road risks are both more likely to wear a helmet and to speed less. Controlling for risk awareness,
we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use. The results can provide a basis for
awareness-raising policies. Improvements to the road infrastructure bear the risk of leading to risk-compensating
behavior.
JEL Classification: D10, I10, K42, R41.
Key words: Road safety, helmet use, risky health behavior, self-protection, self-insurance, India.
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In some states of India, women are exempted from safety rules that mandate motorcycle passengers wear helmets – an exemption that kills or
injures thousands each year. Women’s rights advocates have argued the exemption springs from a culture-wide devaluation of women’s lives.
Supporters of the ban say they’re just trying to preserve women’s carefully styled hair and make-up – which isn’t exactly a feminist response.
(Washington Post, October 27, 2013)
4.1 Introduction
Nearly 3,400 people die on the world’s roads every day. 90% of these fatalities occur in developing countries (WHO;
2013). In 2020, road traffic injuries are expected to be ranked third in the global burden of disease (Lopez et al.;
2006). Despite these numbers and the related tremendous costs, road mortality is still a neglected public health is-
sue in many low and middle income countries. India accounts for about 10% of road accident fatalities worldwide.
The implied costs are estimated at around 3% of GDP (Mohan; 2002). In many developing countries, the share of
two-wheeled vehicles largely dominates the vehicle fleet. In India this share is around 70%. Not surprisingly mo-
torbike users constitute a large share of all road traffic accident injuries and fatalities; in Delhi for instance more
than 30%. Injuries to the head and the neck are the main cause of death. Indeed 60% of All India Institute of Medi-
cal Sciences’ (AIIMS) admissions — one of the biggest trauma centers in Delhi — are road related head injuries (see
also Kumar et al.; 2008). Medical science stresses the efficiency of helmets in reducing the road related mortality
and morbidity. Mandatory helmet use is thus one important policy that governments are recommended to imple-
ment in order to reduce road-related fatalities (WHO; 2004, 2006). The effectiveness of such laws, if enforced, has
been shown in various contexts (see, e.g., Dee; 2009; French et al.; 2009). Despite the formal introduction of such
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laws in most countries of the world (WHO; 2013), enforcement is however often very weak. Moreover motorbike
users are often not aware of the protection that a helmet can provide.
India has had a helmet law since 1988. This national law should be implemented at the State level, yet it is
hardly enforced. A major complication comes from the fact that the Sikh community successfully lobbied against
this law as their religion requires a turban or at least no other headpiece. Since the exception also applies to Sikh
women, and hence it is difficult to distinguish Sikh from other women, the exception was later extended to all
women.1 In Delhi less than 25% of all women wear a helmet when sitting on a motorbike — typically in the poised
perched side-saddle position.2 For men the share of helmet wearers is significantly higher, but is still far from full
coverage. Understanding this heterogeneity, i.e. why some drivers and passengers wear a helmet and others not,
is key to design effective interventions to increase helmet use.
Helmet use might be linked to risk aversion, the awareness of road-related risks, income, and as seen above,
culture and traditions. Moreover, motorbike riders have various options to protect themselves or to seek insur-
ance. Speed is obviously a second important decision parameter. To understand the behavior of helmet use, we
first model this problem theoretically. Relying on the literature of self-insurance and self-protection, we adapt a
simple model to the road safety context and use it for comparative static analysis. Based on this analysis we de-
rive hypotheses which we test empirically using a unique data set covering more than 850 motorbike riders and
passengers in Delhi.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the related literature, high-
light the existing knowledge gaps and elaborate on the paper’s contribution. Section 3 presents the theoretical
framework and derives from it testable predictions regarding helmet use and speed. Section 4 introduces the data
set and shows how we operationalize the empirical tests. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
In what follows we briefly review the theoretical literature that considers the role of risk aversion on individual
investment in different accident prevention activities. We emphasize in particular the role of risk compensating
effects. After that we discuss the related empirical evidence.
Both Peltzman (1975) and Blomquist (1986) modeled the driver’s behavior and derived insightful predictions
for risk neutral agents. They focused in particular on risk compensation effects, i.e. behavioral responses to exoge-
nous variations in risk. Others enriched such models with explicit consideration of the risk preferences of agents
in their behavioral response. Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Bryis and Schlesinger (1990), for example, exam-
ined theoretically the impact of increased risk aversion on the optimal levels of self-insurance and self-protection.
1This softness in the helmet mandatory law implementation came to an end since Septembre 2014. Indeed, traffic police began to prosecute
women riding two-wheelers without a helmet. Sick women are still exempted, but only if they are able to prove their identity (source: The Times
of India, September 11, 2014).
2Figures derived from a household survey implemented by the authors in Delhi. See below.
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Self-insurance refers to activities that reduce the severity of a loss. Self-protection decreases the probability that
the loss occurs (Ehrlich and Becker; 1972). In their models the level of self-insurance monotonically increases with
risk aversion, while the effect of risk aversion is ambiguous regarding self-protection. In other words, a more risk
averse individual will always invest more in self-insurance but it is possible that the individual chooses a lower
level of self-protection. Indeed, self-protection reduces the occurrence of a loss but does not reduce the loss in
case the bad state occurs. Rather to the contrary, in addition to the loss, wealth is reduced by the increased cost
of self-protection, thus leading to an even worse outcome if the bad state occurs. Hence, a higher level of self-
protection might be considered as more, not less risky and may explain why a more risk averse individual might
decide to invest less in such an activity. Finally, when combining both activities and investigating the influence
of risk aversion on a self-insurance-cum-protection activity, a more risk averse individual will invest more in the
prevention activity, if the marginal loss reduction in the bad state out-weights the marginal increase in the cost of
the combined activity. This has been shown by Lee (1998).
Peltzman (1975) and Wilde (1982) introduced the idea that individuals may respond to an exogenous increase
in safety in a way that it lowers or even annihilates (risk homostasis) the reduced risk. Such reactions are called
‘risk compensation effects’ and may arise if individuals target a fixed level of risk and therefore prefer taking more
risks when their risk environment improves. Some studies empirically tested whether such effects indeed exist.
However, these studies typically rely on highly aggregated data and hence potentially suffer from omitted variable
bias. Chirinko and Harper Jr. (1993), for example, investigated the effect of improved car safety (measured through
an index of safety regulations in relation to improved car safety for occupants since 1966) and of the introduc-
tion of the speed limit of 55 mph in the US. Their econometric estimates revealed that the offsetting behavior is
quantitatively important and attenuates the effects of safety regulations on occupant fatalities. Using a modified
expected utility model, the authors showed that the impact of regulatory policies depends on a mix of protection
(direct effect of the regulation), substitution (offsetting behavior) and cognition elements. Based on Virginia State
Police accident reports of 1993, Peterson et al. (1995) also showed that air-bag-equipped cars tend to be driven
more aggressively, thus offsetting the effect of the air-bag for drivers and increasing the risk of death for others.
However, other studies did not find any evidence of such risk-compensating effects (Lund and Zador; 1984; Lund
and O’Neill; 1986).
To circumvent problems inherent in the use of aggregate data, Sobel and Nesbit (2007) used micro-level data
from NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing) races. Their setting allowed them to control for
problems of enforcement, weather conditions and variation in automobile safety devices. According to their re-
sults, NASCAR drivers drive more recklessly in response to an increase in car safety. However, total injuries still fall
since the side effect is not large enough to completely offset the direct impact of increased vehicle safety. Obviously,
the external validity of this study might be low, as NASCAR drivers might not be very representative of drivers in
general. Stetzer and Hofmann (1996) in turn conducted two laboratory experiments to investigate the individual’s
behavioral response and the perceived risk associated with various driving situations. They found a negative cor-
relation indicating some risk compensation following an increase in environmental safety but this was not large
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enough to return to the initial level of risk. Messiah et al. (2012) ran a randomized controlled trial in Bordeaux
to analyze motorcyclists’ chosen speed conditional on helmet adoption. Risk compensation was observed exclu-
sively among men and was of moderate size. Therefore the feedback effect did not offset the benefits of helmet
use.
McCarthy and Talley (1999) also provided evidence on risk compensating behaviors. They relied on data from
recreational boating. They empirically tested whether an operator’s past experience and formal training induces or
reduces safety related behaviors. Moreover they investigated the influence of the operator’s characteristics and the
environmental factors on the attitude adopted by the boat passengers. The authors highlighted that an individual
can adjust to risk changes using various strategies. In their study, they focused on two of them: the use of personal
flotation devices and alcohol consumption. Passengers seemed to adapt their behavior to their perception of the
operator’s safety level. Indeed, an operator’s boating experience was negatively correlated with flotation device
utilization and positively correlated with alcohol consumption by passengers. The authors stressed the implication
for motor vehicle travel. In particular, they pointed out that, since the opening of the debate by Peltzman (1975),
little work has been done to identify alternative margins that individuals use to adjust their safety behavior.
We contribute to the above literature with respect to two dimensions: (i) the influence of risk aversion on
prevention activities and (ii) the existence of risk compensating effects. Regarding the first aspect, we adapt the
existing theoretical framework to the road safety context and derive theoretical predictions regarding the role of
risk aversion on a set of different types of prevention efforts. Moreover, thanks to an original dataset of motorbike
riders and passengers in Delhi, we are able to test these assumptions empirically. In particular, we focus on the
drivers’ simultaneous decision-making with respect to self-protection and self-insurance and how risk preferences
affect this trade-off. With respect to the second dimension, we look at the existence of risk compensating effects.
An interesting feature of our data is that we also observe passengers. For passengers speed can be seen as exoge-
nously determined if the assumption is made that the driver decides on speed. We are thus able to investigate the
relation between a passenger’s safety effort and the environment such as the quality of roads and motorbike and
driver characteristics. As for the driver, we can examine the relationship between alternative dimensions of safety
behaviors and provide evidence with respect to their complementability or substituability.
4.3 Theoretical framework
Based on Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Bryis and Schlesinger (1990), we investigate the individual decision to
invest in self-insurance and self-protection road-related activities using a relatively simple expected utility model.
As in Ehrlich and Becker (1972), self-insurance refers to any activity that reduces the loss if an accident occurs,
while self-protection refers to any activity that reduces the probability of experiencing an accident.
In our theoretical framework we address three questions: (i) How does risk aversion influence the investment in
insurance and protection? (ii) How do motorbike users respond to exogenous changes in safety? (iii) Are protection
and insurance complements or substitutes for one another?
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We consider two road related attitudes: helmet use and speed. Helmet use can be seen as a self-insurance
activity given that a helmet reduces the severity of an injury if an accident occurs.3 For simplicity, lowering speed
is assumed to be a self-protection activity. However, it may be more appropriate to consider the latter as a self-
insurance-cum-protection activity, since speed may impact both the frequency and the severity of road accidents.
Theoretical predictions in this case are presented in the Appendix A (Drivers – Self-insurance-cum-protection ac-
tivity). While we assume that the drivers of a motorbike choose both helmet use and speed, we suppose that
passengers only make a decision on helmet use, and take speed as given.4 We examine these two types of road
users in turn. We start with the case of passengers.
4.3.1 Passengers
Consider a risk averse passenger with wealth W . With a probability p, the passenger is involved in a road accident
and with probability (1−p) the passenger is not. If an accident occurs, the passenger faces a loss I ; however, the
passenger can invest in the self-insurance activity to reduce the size of the potential loss. This decision includes
whether to use a helmet, the type of helmet and whether for instance the strap is closed. However, helmet use
comes at a cost in the form of discomfort. Passengers may also be able to negotiate the speed with the driver, but
we assume that for the passenger full control over speed is highly unlikely, hence this strong assumption. Below,
when we discuss the case of drivers, we endogenize both the use of a helmet and the choice of speed.
Let h denote the level of self-insurance. I (h) represents the effect of a helmet on the severity of an injury, which
is obviously assumed to decrease with the chosen level of self-insurance, I ′(h) < 0. Discomfort, c(h), is assumed
to increase monotonically with h. Preferences, U (·), are assumed to be of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type,
where U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
The individual’s expected utility can be written as:
EU = p ·U [W − c(h)− I (h)]+ (1−p) ·U [W − c(h)]. (4.1)
The first order condition for maximizing (4.1) with respect to h is:
∂EU
∂h
=−p · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)− (1−p) · c ′(h) ·U ′(G)= 0, (4.2)
where G =W − c(h) and B =W − c(h)− I (h).
Note that in order to have an interior solution, we must have [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] < 0, i.e. the magnitude of the
potential marginal benefit, −I ′(h), must be at least as high as the marginal cost following the increase in h, c ′(h).
3Indeed Liu et al. (2008) reviewed 53 studies that investigate the efficiency of helmets. They found that on average the use of a standardized
helmet reduces the risk of death and serious injuries by 40% and 70% respectively. Goldstein (1996) stressed however that there is a ‘head-neck
injury trade-off’, i.e. given the weight of a helmet, the use of a helmet increases the risk of neck injuries.
4The influence of passengers behaviors on drivers travelling conduct as well as bargaining between individuals riding on the same motorbike
will be discussed in the empirical analysis.
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Risk aversion
Let hU denote the optimal level of insurance for the passenger with utility function U defined above. Let us now
consider a second, more risk averse, passenger with a utility function V which exhibits higher risk aversion than U ,
i.e. V (·) is a concave increasing transformation of U (·), hence V (·)= g [U (·)], with g ′ > 0, and g ′′ < 0 (Pratt; 1964).
Assuming the same wealth prospect and choice set as in Equation (4.2) but taking into account the preferences
of the more risk averse individual it can be shown that the level of self-insurance, i.e. helmet use, increases with
the level of risk aversion. For a proof, see Appendix A.
Risk compensating effect
An increase in the probability that an accident occurs from p to q (with q > p) implies an increase in the invest-
ment in self-insurance and hence compensate at least partially for the increased risk. In turn, if safety increases
exogenously, passengers are thought to invest less. In the literature, this effect is called “Peltzman-effect” (Peltz-
man; 1975). See also Wilde (1982) and Blomquist (1986). A proof can be found in Appendix A.
4.3.2 Drivers
Unlike passengers, drivers are assumed to invest simultaneously in self-insurance (helmet use) and in self-protection
(speed). It is assumed that the probability that an accident occurs, p(s), increases with speed, p ′(s)> 0. The time
spent on the road t (s) in turn decreases with speed, i.e. t ′(s) < 0 and thus leaves the driver with a higher level of
wealth. As for passengers, we assume that drivers are risk averse and have an increasing concave utility function
U .
In this case the expected utility is given as:
EU = p(s) ·U [W − t (s)− c(h)− I (h)]+ (1−p(s)) ·U [W − t (s)− c(h)]. (4.3)
The first order conditions for maximizing (4.3) with respect to h and s are:
∂EU
∂h
=−p(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)− (1−p(s)) · c ′(h) ·U ′(G)= 0 and (4.4)
∂EU
∂s
= p ′(s) · [U (B)−U (G)]− t ′(s) · [p(s) ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) ·U ′(G)]= 0. (4.5)
Risk aversion
Again, one can show that a more risk averse individual invests more in self-insurance, however the effect on self-
protection is ambiguous. This is due to the fact that a more risk averse individual invests always more in self-
insurance but not necessarily in self-protection. Indeed, self-protection reduces the occurrence of a loss but does
not reduce the loss in case the accident occurs. Rather to the contrary, in addition to the loss, wealth is reduced
by the increased cost of self-protection, leading to an even worse outcome if the accident occurs. Hence, a higher
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level of self-protection can be considered as more, not less risky and can explain why a more risk averse individual
may not necessarily decide to invest more in such an activity (Dionne and Eeckhoudt; 1985; Bryis and Schlesinger;
1990).
When considering speed as a self-insurance-cum-protection activity, we highlight that a sufficient condition
for a more risk averse individual to invest more in such prevention effort is that the marginal increase in loss if an
accident occurs is greater than the marginal gain in time spent on the road at the optimal level of speed of the less
risk averse individual (cf. Lee; 1998). A proof can be found in Appendix A.
Risk compensating effect
Just as passengers do, drivers invest more in self-insurance following an exogenous rise in the probability that
an accident occurs. It is important to note that any change in speed has also wealth effects, as the travel time
is altered. Therefore, when a driver increases speed, he or she also increases helmet use. In other words, for
risk averse drivers, helmet use and higher speed are complements, and hence self-insurance and self-protection
activities are substitutes. For a proof, see Appendix A.
Awareness
There are different options to model awareness in our framework. One possibility is to assume that increased
awareness implies that the expected probability of an accident at any speed is not underestimated relative to actual
figures. In Appendix A we show that this implies that a driver with a higher (less downward biased) awareness level
invests more in helmet use. However, the effect of increased awareness on speed depends on whether the utility
loss induced by a marginal change in the probability that an accident occurs reinforces or compensates the first
effect. If a more aware driver thinks that a marginal increase in speed modifies less the probability of being involved
in an accident, he invests less in self-protection and travel at a higher speed than a less aware driver. Indeed, in
that case the loss in utility and the expected gain in traveling time reinforce one another.
Another possibility to show the effect of increased awareness is to assume that the expected gain of helmet
use should an accident occur is not underestimated relative to actual figures. By making this assumption one can
again show, that a higher expected loss induces a higher level of helmet use. Regarding the chosen level of speed,
the higher expected level of injuries implies a larger loss in terms of wealth leading to both a greater difference
in utilities between the two states and a higher marginal utility in the bad state. Given the former, a marginal
increase in speed increases the loss. Moreover, the marginal increase in speed also raises the level of gain in terms
of traveling time due to the latter effect. Hence, again, the effect of an increase in the expected level of injuries on
speed is ambiguous.
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4.4 Methods
4.4.1 Data
General presentation
During the months July to September 2011 we conducted a representative two-stage randomly sampled household
survey in Delhi to collect information from motorbike riders and pillion passengers regarding their behavior when
using the motorbike including helmet use and speed, their degree of risk aversion and risk awareness. In addition
the survey collected socio-demographic and economic characteristics, information on insurance coverage as well
as characteristics of the motorbike in use. In total 1,502 households were surveyed. In 545 households at least
one member had used a motorbike in the past four weeks. These households were given a long questionnaire. All
other households only received a short questionnaire (collecting only basic socio-demographic information). 87%
of the households in our ‘long’ sample also own a motorbike. Most motorbikes are rather small (mostly scooters
and mopeds). Only 16% have an engine displacement of more than 150 cubic centimeters. More than 80% of the
respondents report having insurance for their motorbike. In households with at least one motorbike user, up to
three, either drivers or passengers, were selected. On average, there were two eligible members per household.
Given the importance of motorbike status in our analysis, we analyze drivers and passengers separately. See-
ing that we do only have 15 female drivers in our sample, we only consider female passengers. Since, road usage
behavior, helmet use and speed vary a lot with the distance of a trip, the type of roads used and traffic density, for
each user we collected information for up to three different types of trips: trips in residential neighborhoods, short
distance trips (partly outside the neighborhood) and long distance trips (>15 mn). Hence, in the empirical anal-
ysis we exploit the variation across different types of trips using single trips as the unit of analysis and clustering
standard errors at the individual level. Table 4.1 shows some basic descriptive statistics of our sample, separated
by drivers and passengers. In Appendix B we explain how we dealt with missing data.
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Table 4.1: Socio-demographic characteristics of drivers and passengers
Male Passengers All
(%) drivers Male Female respondents
Male - - - 67.41
Age distribution
15-29 years 37.83 32.26 27.70 34.92
30-39 years 25.36 13.98 32.37 26.05
40-49 years 20.25 15.05 25.18 20.84
50-59 years 11.25 17.20 8.99 10.98
60 years and above 5.32 21.51 5.76 7.21
Average (in years) 35.44 42.10 37.00 36.47
Married 69.34 68.82 85.56 73.39
Contributes to HH income 80.78 68.78 5.80 55.00
Share of the contribution
less than 40% 32.09 44.09 96.01 54.59
between 40% and 60% 19.67 22.58 3.62 14.77
more than 60% 48.24 33.33 0.36 30.65
Education level
illiterate 2.49 7.53 14.75 6.95
primary school 3.53 11.83 4.73 4.93
secondary school 48.55 65.59 49.09 50.34
tertiary education 45.44 15.05 30.94 37.78
Religion
Hindu 83.44 86.02 86.69 84.37
Muslim 12.07 10.75 9.35 11.09
Sikh 1.23 2.15 3.24 3.44
other 3.27 1.08 0.72 1.11
Prays daily 65.30 74.19 80.73 71.24
Believes fate is in god’s hands 87.50 90.22 87.27 88.18
Has health insurance 15.11 11.83 12.64 13.77
Observations 489 93 278 902
Notes: The group “all respondents” includes 27 individuals that declared to be
sometimes driver and sometimes passenger as well as 15 female drivers. Both
groups are not included in any of the sub-samples.
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Helmet use and speed
Respondents were asked whether they own a helmet and whether they use their helmet for different types of trips.
The corresponding descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.2.
Among drivers, 86% of all helmets in use are full face helmets. Inspections by our enumerators revealed that in
general helmets are in a rather good condition. Only a few helmets were broken and sometimes manually fixed.
Almost all helmets had a strap. Passengers, and in particular female passengers, often use half-helmets, which
obviously offer less protection.
The speed at which drivers and passengers travel is derived from the information on time spent on the road
and distance traveled. This is more reliable than asking respondents directly. First, drivers might be reluctant to
tell the truth if they notoriously exceed the official speed limit, even if it is only weakly enforced. Second, drivers
may tend to report maximum rather than average speed.5
5We acknowledge that this average speed might to some extent reflect the traffic density. Nonetheless, the small size of engine often allows
drivers to sneak between cars. Moreover, we control for circumstances to some extent.
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Table 4.2: Helmet use and other safety behaviors by type of user and gender
Male Passengers All
drivers Male Female respondents
HELMET CHARACTERISTICS (%)
Helmet ownership
yes 93.24 51.61 56.20 76.92
Observations 488 93 274 897
Type of helmet
full face helmet 86.49 82.98 65.77 80.68
open face helmet 6.08 2.13 6.04 6.09
half helmet 6.98 14.89 27.52 12.78
building site helmet 0.45 0 0.67 0.45
Condition of the helmet
good condition 72.93 74.47 79.33 74.59
some scratches 25.95 25.53 20.00 24.22
broken but manually fixed 1.12 0 0.67 1.18
Helmet with strap
yes 97.75 93.75 93.42 96.49
Observations 447 47 152 684
HELMET USE (%)
In neighbourhoods
yes 73.80 48.91 20.15 54.41
For short trips on main roads
yes 79.84 48.39 30.97 60.97
For long trips on main roads
yes 96.88 83.87 52.08 81.14
Observations 481 93 268 884
OTHER SAFETY BEHAVIORS
Speed (kph)a
average 36.67 30.64 29.58 33.83
variance 21.56 17.47 17.28 20.53
Observations 410 73 170 686
Notes: The group “all respondents” includes 27 individuals that declared to be sometimes
driver and sometimes passenger as well as 15 female drivers. Both groups are not included
in any of the sub-samples. a) observations with a declared speed of more than 150 kph are
excluded.
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Measure of risk aversion
We measure risk aversion using the respondent’s answer to the question whether he or she is taking risks in general
and in the four specific domains: on the road, in finance, in sports and in health. We think this choice makes sense
in our case, since road accidents typically have financial and health implications. Moreover, driving has, at least
for some, features of a sport and hence it is reasonable to take into account this dimension as well. Hence we cal-
culate the arithmetic mean of the self rated degree of risk taking (reported from 0 (risk seeking) to 7 (extremely risk
averse)) in general and in these four domains. This variable is thus a continuous variable taking values between 0
and 7 which we call the “Risk aversion score”. Our preferred choice is also in line with recent studies in this field.
Ding et al. (2010), Dohmen et al. (2011) and Hardeweg et al. (2012) for instance use Chinese, German and Thai data
respectively and all find experimental evidence that at least in larger surveys self assessed risk aversion measures
perform much better than risk aversion measures derived from lottery or hypothetical investment questions. In-
deed while lottery choices are useful for predicting behavior regarding risky financial decisions, they appear to be
uninformative for behaviors in other domains (see Wölbert and Riedl; 2013). Moreover, context specificity of risk
aversion has also been shown by Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012). These two studies found that
many individuals reveal different degrees of risk aversion in different life domains (such as health, disability and
car insurance).
A further validation of our choice is shown in Table 4.3, where we report the correlation between the risk aver-
sion score and three health-related risky behaviors: smoking, drinking and heavy drinking. Throughout we find a
significant negative correlation, i.e. risk aversion is negatively correlated with smoking and drinking, suggesting
that our preferred measure is a reasonable measure of risky behaviors with health implications. Comparisons with
other risk aversion measures show that the average of self reported risk aversion in different domains is one of the
best predictors of health risky behaviors (see Chapter 3).
However, given the choices made in the theoretical modelling and since any measure of risk preferences can be
subject to debate, we will check the robustness of our results with respect to alternative measures (such as lottery
questions, specific risk awareness questions related to finance and health), although we do not expect all measures
to give similar results as some of these measures are clearly less adapted to our context than others and may not
capture exactly the same information (see Chapter 3).
Finally, because the literature suggests that answers to questions about risk aversion, health related behavior
and safety perceptions may be subject to framing effects, i.e. answers may depend on how and by whom the
questions have been asked (see Lutz and Lipps; 2010), we also include in all estimations below interviewer-effects.
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Table 4.3: Probability of engaging in risky health behaviors, linear probability model
Smoking Drinking Drinking heavilya
Risk aversion score -0.020?? -0.017?? -0.011??
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Interviewer fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.276 0.195 0.244
Observations 832 807 806
Notes: ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01. Sample of all respondents.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
a) had three alcoholic beverages in a row at least once in the past
two weeks.
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Other road use behaviors, safety perceptions and motorbike characteristics
To get a good sense of the frequency of road usage, respondents were asked to provide the reason for the use of the
motorbike (see Table 4.4). Drivers were also asked to assess their own driving skills and whether they had any type
of formal training, either by getting a driving license, taking at least some lessons or some type of exam.
Lastly, we collected information about risk perceptions and own road accident experiences.6 For instance, re-
spondents were asked to provide an estimate on the number of road deaths, road injuries and the share of motor-
cyclists among total road accident fatalities they thought had taken place during the previous year in Delhi. Their
answers were then compared to the official figures provided by the National Crime Record Bureau for the year
2010. Hence, for each respondent we could establish whether the respondent underestimated, roughly accurately
estimated or overestimated road risks. In what follows, we define underestimation as a lack of awareness. I.e. if
someone overestimated the figure, we still consider this person as more aware than someone who underestimates
it. So what counts is that someone is aware of how many fatalities occur at least.
6Dionne et al. (2007) have shown that risk perceptions influence driving behavior.
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Table 4.4: Driving behaviors and risk awareness
Male Passengers All
drivers Male Female respondents
DRIVING BEHAVIORS (%)
Road exposure
Uses motorbike to commute (=1) 83.37 67.74 29.96 64.40
Observations 487 93 277 899
Never uses ring roads (=1) 12.92 16.09 24.23 16.53
Observations 480 87 227 835
# of persons on motorbike 1.42 2.46 2.72 1.95
Observations 478 87 267 869
Driving skills
Confident in own driving ability (=1) 55.67
Reports driving more carefully than others (=1) 73.74
Observations 476
Formal training
Has a driving licence (=1) 92.83
Took driving lessons (=1) 43.04
Took a driving exam (=1) 66.46
Observations 474
Says own driver should pay more attention (=1) 56.06 67.00
Observations 66 200
SAFETY PERCEPTIONS (%)
Experienced road traffic accident (=1) 9.67 8.79 2.17 7.15
Observations 486 91 277 895
Awareness
Underest. Annual road injuries (=1) 50.57 60.81 54.63 53.46
Underest. Annual road deaths (=1) 42.60 47.30 40.28 42.88
Observations 439 74 216 765
MOTORBIKE CHARACTERISTICS (%)
HH owns a motorbike (=1) 92.62 48.39 90.65 87.35
Observations 488 93 278 901
Size of the motorbike
Less than 100cc 28.07 30.00 32.58 29.45
Between 100cc and 150cc 54.52 57.50 53.39 54.52
Above 150cc 17.40 12.50 14.03 16.03
Observations 431 40 221 730
Has motorbike insurance (=1) 80.96 85.71 82.25 81.61
Observations 436 42 231 745
Notes: The group “all respondents” includes 27 individuals that declared to be sometimes
driver and sometimes passenger as well as 15 female drivers. Both groups are not included
in any of the sub-samples. Other differences in the number of observations are due to missing data.
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4.4.2 Empirical specifications
The theoretical considerations made above imply an empirical focus on three aspects: (i) How does risk aversion
affect helmet use and speed? (ii) If both can be chosen simultaneously, how are these choices correlated? (iii) How
do other socio-demographic and economic characteristics as well as behaviors and perceptions influence both
helmet use and speed? We consider two functions one for helmet use, hi and one for speed, si . We estimate them
simultaneously to account for the possible correlation of the residuals. Helmet adoption is used in a binary form,
i.e. the driver wears a helmet (h = 1) or not (h = 0). Hence we use a simple probit model for estimation. Speed is
measured continuously (in kph) and we thus use a linear regression model.
Probit(hi = 1|xi )= θ(x ′iβh +²hi ), (4.6)
si =βs0+x ′iβs1+²si . (4.7)
We jointly estimate Equations (4.6) and (4.7) with full maximum likelihood, assuming that the errors, ²si and
²hi , follow a bivariate normal distribution, and then test the covariance of the error terms. In the absence of con-
vincing instruments we exclude speed from the helmet equation and helmet use from the speed equation. Hence,
we cannot directly test how speed affects helmet use and vice versa, but examining the correlation of the residuals
allows concluding how unobservable factors affect both.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Drivers
Table 4.5 shows the results from the simultaneous equation system. We augment the model step-by-step as this
allows us to see whether the estimated effects are sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of particular variables.
As mentioned above, we also include here and in all estimations that follow interviewer-effects. The computed
marginal effects implied by the probit model are shown in Appendix C. (Table 4.8).
It can be seen that risk aversion is positively associated with helmet use. At the sample mean, a one standard
deviation increase in the risk aversion measure (i.e. by 1.60 points or 33%) increases the probability of helmet use
by roughly 2 percentage points (see columns 3 to 5 in Table 4.8). However, risk aversion does not have a significant
impact on speed. This is coherent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Risk averse individuals engage
in self-insurance, but the effect on self-protection is ambiguous. These results also largely hold if we estimate
separately by the type of trip. They are also confirmed if we take risk taking behavior in finance alone (see Table
4.10, Appendix D). If we take the other risk-measures in our data set we find insignificant results except for one
of the lottery-based measures and the measure that tries to elicit how people are prepared to gamble with their
health). Again, we trust our self-reported risk measures more. We also obtain absolutely coherent results if, instead
of the binary helmet variable, we use the combined helmet and strap use (5 categories, see Table 4.2).
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Regarding the other observable explanatory variables, we find that helmet use is lower among the illiterate pop-
ulation, between 10 to 12 percentage points depending on the specification. Tertiary education seems to further
increase the probability of helmet use, but this effect loses significance if religiousness and social status is added
to the list of regressors. Sikhs are less likely to wear a helmet (17 to 20 percentage points less likely), but they also
drive on average slower (8 to 12 kph less (5 to 7 mph)). For that group, not wearing a helmet is not necessarily the
preferred choice, but rather a (religious) constraint and hence risk compensation can be a rational response. The
more children a driver has the lower the chosen speed level (roughly 3 kph (1.9 mph) less per child), however, more
children is not associated with a higher probability of helmet use. Income also does not correlate with helmet use
conditional on all other included variables, however it plays a role for speed. The results suggest that speed first
increases and then decreases with income. Drivers with a monthly household income of more than 25,000 INR
drive on average 15 to 25 kph (9 to 16 mph) slower than drivers with a monthly household income of 10,000 to
15,000 INR, controlling, among others, for the size of the motorbike.
Among the variables measuring driving behavior and safety perceptions, a few effects stand out. Drivers who
use their motorbike regularly to commute to work are more likely to wear a helmet (+6 percentage points). There
is no effect on speed. Risk awareness seems to matter: drivers who took driving lessons are more likely to wear
a helmet (+7 percentage points). Interestingly, individuals who have a driving license but did not take driving
lessons are not more likely to use a helmet than those who don’t have a license at all (effect not shown in Table 4.5).
Again, this suggests that it is awareness that matters. Drivers who underestimate the annual number of road traffic
accident injuries, and thus the implied risk more generally, are less likely to wear a helmet. More passengers on the
motorbike is also associated with lower helmet use. Remarkably, drivers with health insurance are more likely to
wear a helmet and to drive slower. Note that this result holds even if we control for income, education and a whole
range of other characteristics.
Finally, since we estimate helmet use and the choice of speed with a simultaneous equation system, it is in-
teresting to examine the correlation between the error terms of both equations. The error terms capture those
determinants that are not included in the list of regressors and of course measurement error. If we control only
for risk aversion (col. (1)), the error terms are significantly negatively correlated, implying that the net effect of the
unobserved or not included factors tends to increase helmet use and to lower speed, or, in turn to decrease helmet
use and to increase speed. As more and more explanatory variables are included (col. (2) and col. (3)), we see that
the correlation remains significantly negative and even increases in absolute size. If we include those variables
that account for driving behavior and safety perceptions (col. (4)), we see that the correlation coefficient loses its
significance. This is not due to the reduced sample size, as col. (5) shows, where we re-estimate the regression on
the same sample without controlling for driving behavior and safety perceptions. As discussed above, among the
variables measuring driving behavior and safety perceptions, of particular significance in both equations are those
that can be related to risk awareness, such as taking driving lessons, underestimating the number of annual fatali-
ties and having an insurance. Put differently, given that we control (even if imperfectly) for risk aversion and a large
set of socio-demographic and economic characteristics including religiousness, we believe that risk awareness is a
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major determinant that can explain why some individuals wear a helmet and drive slowly and others do not wear
a helmet and drive fast. Hence, whereas risk aversion motivates drivers to compensate for higher speed through a
higher propensity to use a helmet, a lack of awareness comes with both, high speed and no helmet, i.e. both deci-
sions seem to complement each other. In our sample, about 55% of the respondents underestimate the incidence
of road traffic accident injuries. For fatalities the share is closer to 45%. On average, 7% of the respondents had
already experienced a road traffic accident most of these involving injuries and some fatalities.
All our results are qualitatively not different if we limit the sample to those drivers that own a helmet; about
93% (not shown in Table). This is not surprising, as a standard helmet is easy to find and relatively cheap. They are
offered in shops nearby the road for typically less than USD 20; not much compared to the price of the motorbike
or the gasoline and maintenance costs. More precisely, households who own a motorbike in our sample paid on
average 45,800 INR (around 1,000 USD) their vehicle and spend each month 1,250 INR (28 USD) in gasoline.7 Put
differently, modelling the choice of buying a helmet or the choice of using the helmet does not make a significant
difference.
In our analysis, we assumed that the safety behavior adopted by the passenger doesn’t influence the speed at
which the driver travels. Yet, it is likely that the rider chooses his velocity conditional on carrying or not a passenger
and whether the latter is wearing a head protection or not. We know from the data whether each driver has at least
an household member who is a pillion rider. Furthermore, if interviewed, we know if he or she wears a helmet or
not. We introduce this information in our analysis (cf. Table 4.10, Appendix E).8 Drivers who carry passengers who
don’t wear a helmet don’t seem to adapt their traveling speed. Nevertheless this absence of results may also be due
to the fact that we only have the information on average speed and that it is difficult to know what is the share of
trips the rider makes with and without the pillion riders considered. When restricting the analysis to drivers who
have a household member who is a passenger and who has also been interviewed (cf. Table 4.11, Appendix E),
we note as in Table 4.10 that drivers and passengers from the same household are more likely to adopt the same
behavior with regard to helmet use. While this result may indicate some peer effects, the fact that individuals from
a same family may have experienced the same shocks or have the same information, an alternative interpretation
could be that individuals from the same household may influence one another when answering the survey. This
can also occur for motorcyclists who have family members present during the interview. Yet, we can introduce
household fixed effects in order to control for the fact that two drivers belong to the same household. It is the case
of 34% of drivers. All the results previously reported remain similar when controlling for this type of effect (Table
not shown).
7However, individuals may balance the purchase of a helmet with other consumption goods not related with the expenditures made in the
transportation area.
8Assuming that the driver and the passenger who belong to the same household indeed travel with each other. If several passengers were
interviewed in one household, one of them was taken randomly and his or her behavior was considered.
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Table 4.5: Helmet use and speed level chosen by drivers
Simultaneous equation system, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HELMET USE (Probit)
Risk aversion score 0.076 0.070 0.094+ 0.103+ 0.148??
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) (0.061)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age (in years) -0.004 0.001 0.007 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Married (=1) 0.135 0.167 0.179 0.160
(0.237) (0.251) (0.290) (0.266)
Number of children 0.082 0.033 0.006 0.075
(0.079) (0.076) (0.086) (0.083)
Household head (=1) 0.167 0.150 0.051 -0.000
(0.243) (0.256) (0.273) (0.287)
Household size -0.083?? -0.077?? -0.111??? -0.094???
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036)
Education, ref: Primary-secondary education
Illiterate -0.754??? -0.649?? -0.672? -0.678??
(0.249) (0.284) (0.362) (0.300)
Tertiary education 0.304?? 0.233+ 0.153 0.224+
(0.142) (0.145) (0.158) (0.147)
Household monthly income, ref: less than 5,000 INR
between 5,000 and 10,000 INR -0.268 -0.180 -0.283 -0.179
(0.277) (0.269) (0.297) (0.302)
between 10,000 and 15,000 INR -0.402+ -0.266 -0.302 -0.212
(0.257) (0.253) (0.266) (0.279)
between 15,000 and 20,000 INR 0.063 0.099 0.038 0.165
(0.306) (0.304) (0.327) (0.338)
between 20,000 and 25,000 INR 0.131 0.166 0.460 0.572+
(0.331) (0.347) (0.348) (0.356)
above 25,000 INR 0.372 0.342 0.288 0.394
(0.399) (0.414) (0.540) (0.452)
Contribution to hh income (share) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.011
(0.059) (0.060) (0.065) (0.064)
Religion, ref: Hindu
Muslim -0.004 -0.144 -0.212
(0.222) (0.245) (0.230)
Sikh -1.193??? -1.094??? -1.040???
(0.406) (0.399) (0.403)
Believes fate in god’s hands (=1) -0.090 -0.240 -0.043
(0.215) (0.284) (0.246)
Caste (=1) -0.239+ -0.032 -0.164
(0.146) (0.156) (0.154)
Driving behaviors and safety perceptions
Uses motorbike to commute (=1) 0.402?
(0.229)
Never uses ring roads (=1) 0.049
(0.236)
# of persons on motorbike -0.300??
(0.120)
Confident in own driving ability (=1) -0.143
(0.178)
Took driving lessons (=1) 0.437??
(0.188)
Underest. ann. road inj. (=1) -0.431??
(0.188)
Experienced road traffic accident (=1) -0.048
(0.258)
Owns motorbike (=1) -0.059
(0.366)
Size of motorbike in cc, ref: 100cc or less
between 100cc and 150cc 0.050
(0.193)
above 150cc 0.348
(0.257)
Has motorbike insurance (=1) -0.028
(0.233)
Has health insurance (=1) 0.020??
(0.008)
Type of trips, ref: Short distance trip
Long distance trip 1.191??? 1.276??? 1.338??? 1.646??? 1.525???
(0.147) (0.149) (0.156) (0.182) (0.187)
Neighbourhood trip -0.194??? -0.237??? -0.255??? -0.320??? -0.283???
(0.072) (0.078) (0.081) (0.093) (0.088)
(continues next page)
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Table 4.5 (... continued)
Simultaneous equation system, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SPEED (kph) (Linear model)
Risk aversion score 0.778 1.018 1.000 0.181 0.303
(0.740) (0.745) (0.757) (0.770) (0.722)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age (in years) -0.172 -0.109 -0.067 -0.087
(0.125) (0.125) (0.121) (0.120)
Married (=1) 7.227? 6.853? 5.002 5.411
(3.725) (3.685) (3.607) (3.780)
Number of children -2.650?? -2.936?? -3.443??? -3.323???
(1.281) (1.290) (1.163) (1.250)
Household head (=1) 3.129 3.184 3.497 3.399
(2.946) (2.817) (2.729) (2.847)
Household size -0.096 -0.114 0.244 0.162
(0.600) (0.583) (0.546) (0.531)
Education, ref: Primary-secondary education
Illiterate 3.470 4.920 3.667 6.413
(7.601) (7.407) (7.167) (7.014)
Tertiary education -0.674 -0.327 1.363 0.786
(2.037) (2.024) (2.110) (2.084)
Household monthly income, ref: less than 5,000 INR
between 5,000 and 10,000 INR 1.508 2.002 0.579 2.070
(3.304) (3.369) (3.471) (3.382)
between 10,000 and 15,000 INR 7.446?? 8.177?? 3.971 6.175?
(3.559) (3.690) (3.727) (3.660)
between 15,000 and 20,000 INR 2.849 3.460 0.104 2.178
(3.510) (3.637) (3.783) (3.620)
between 20,000 and 25,000 INR 5.356+ 6.886? 3.140 5.441
(3.694) (3.735) (3.927) (3.819)
above 25,000 INR -8.466? -8.285? -15.083??? -10.907??
(4.482) (4.599) (4.338) (4.600)
Contribution to hh income (share) 0.602 0.626 0.604 0.694
(0.704) (0.690) (0.643) (0.651)
Religion, ref: Hindu
Muslim 0.075 0.136 -1.024
(2.473) (2.527) (2.487)
Sikh -11.653?? -9.624?? -8.334??
(4.719) (4.226) (4.249)
Believes fate in god’s hands (=1) -5.837+ 0.064 -3.548
(3.806) (3.473) (3.205)
Caste (=1) 2.001 0.711 0.519
(2.260) (2.135) (2.306)
Driving behaviors and safety perceptions
Uses motorbike to commute (=1) 0.914
(2.599)
Never uses ring roads (=1) -6.880???
(2.444)
# of persons on motorbike 1.970
(2.207)
Confident in own driving ability (=1) -0.720
(2.100)
Took driving lessons (=1) 1.256
(1.953)
Underest. ann. road inj. (=1) 3.179
(2.440)
Experienced road traffic accident (=1) -0.233
(3.332)
Owns motorbike (=1) 6.026+
(3.817)
Size of motorbike in cc, ref: 100cc or less
between 100cc and 150cc 2.019
(2.286)
above 150cc 3.450
(3.263)
Has motorbike insurance (=1) 0.945
(2.371)
Has health insurance (=1) -0.139??
(0.061)
Type of trips, ref: Short distance trip
Long distance trip 0.012 0.014 0.029 0.022 0.024
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.028)
Neighbourhood trip 0.003 0.011 0.006 -0.004 -0.002
(0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.025)
Interviewer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Correlation residuals -0.096? -0.108? -0.153?? -0.119+ -0.125?
Observations 1367 1328 1295 1160 1160
# of respondents 456 443 432 387 387
# of observations per respondent (mean) 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01.
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4.5.2 Passengers
Again, for passengers we assume that they only make a choice regarding helmet use and consider speed to be
determined by the driver, although there might be possibilities for the passenger to influence the driver to some
extent. This is discussed in more detail below. Table 4.6 shows the results of a simple probit model. We only present
marginal effects.
Interestingly, for passengers we do not find any significant effect for risk aversion. One of the most important de-
terminants of helmet use among passengers is gender. Men are between 25 to 40 percentage points more likely to
wear a helmet than women, controlling for all other socio-demographic and economic characteristics and differ-
ences in travel habits and safety perceptions. Again, women are exempted from the helmet law. Moreover, women
may refuse to wear a helmet because of their hair-dress.
Religiousness and whether a passenger believes that life is in the hands of a superior force does not explain hel-
met use. Although the coefficient associated with the latter variable is negative throughout, it is never statistically
significant. Education and income also seem to play no role. The same is true for marital status, having children
and household size. However, being of a lower caste decreases helmet use by 8 to 15 percentage points.
Based on the predictions derived from our theoretical model, we expect a negative correlation between helmet
use and exogenous improvements in the safety level (the “Peltzman-effect”). In Table 4.6 we do indeed see that the
passenger’s choice to wear a helmet is influenced by the driver’s choice of speed. Helmet use increase with speed, at
least if a speed below 20 kph is compared to a speed between 20 and 40 kph (12 and 25 mph). If passengers could
negotiate the speed or if drivers simply slowed down when the passenger is not wearing a helmet, the positive
correlation would still be consistent with risk compensation, but speed would obviously be endogenous.
As with drivers, we again find that people who underestimate the risk of a road traffic accident wear a helmet
less often (10 to 15 percentage points less likely). Surprisingly, for passengers, in contrast to drivers, we find that
passengers with health insurance wear a helmet less often (12 percentage points less likely). It could be that for
passengers there is some moral hazard, in a sense that passengers think better health care reduces the cost of an
injury, but this hypothesis would need further empirical testing. Finally, we see that passengers who think their
driver is speeding too much and where we may speculate that they urge their driver to pay more attention, wear a
helmet less often (9 to 12 percentage points less likely). Again, such a finding could still be considered as evidence
for a ‘Peltzman effect’ as it reflects a trade-off between the passenger’s and driver’s safety efforts.
Finally, we explore the interaction between drivers and passengers. For this, we introduce the driver’s attitude
regarding helmet adoption when a driver belonging to the household of the passenger has also been interviewed.
We note that driver’s and passenger’s conducts are positively and significantly correlated (cf. Table 4.12, Appendix
F). As with drivers, we run again the analysis introducing household fixed effects (30% of our passengers have a
household member who is a pillion rider who have also been interviewed). The significance of the results remains
similar (Table not shown).
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Table 4.6: Determinants of helmet use for passengers
probit specification, marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk aversion score -0.033 -0.030 -0.036 -0.012 -0.029 -0.010 -0.009 -0.031
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010) (0.025)
Speed, ref: between 20 and 40 kph
below 20 kph -0.115? -0.093?
(0.064) (0.054)
above 40 kph -0.061 -0.041
(0.062) (0.050)
Owns a helmet (=1) 0.314???
(0.120)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age (in years) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003? -0.003? -0.002 -0.004?
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Male (=1) 0.411??? 0.425??? 0.401??? 0.405??? 0.245?? 0.430???
(0.076) (0.075) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.082)
Married (=1) 0.046 0.049 0.049 0.045 0.023 0.071
(0.066) (0.069) (0.053) (0.052) (0.033) (0.080)
Number of children -0.009 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.027)
Household head (=1) -0.089 -0.074 -0.034 -0.051 -0.032 -0.084
(0.085) (0.087) (0.069) (0.065) (0.040) (0.092)
Household size 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.012)
Education, ref: Primary-secondary education
Illiterate -0.103 -0.084 -0.069 -0.057 -0.021 -0.079
(0.081) (0.083) (0.058) (0.059) (0.036) (0.089)
Tertiary education -0.070 -0.093 -0.071 -0.069 -0.020 -0.112
(0.060) (0.062) (0.052) (0.052) (0.030) (0.069)
Household monthly income, ref: less than 10,000 INR
between 10,000 and 20,000 INR -0.062 -0.057 -0.013 -0.010 -0.023 -0.023
(0.062) (0.063) (0.051) (0.049) (0.029) (0.069)
above 20,000 INR 0.059 0.027 0.002 0.019 -0.037 -0.006
(0.090) (0.091) (0.069) (0.071) (0.038) (0.103)
Religion, ref: Hindu
Muslim 0.033 0.034 0.017 0.025 0.062
(0.093) (0.077) (0.073) (0.051) (0.102)
Sikh -0.030 -0.046 -0.027 -0.056 -0.015
(0.127) (0.067) (0.068) (0.037) (0.127)
Believes fate in god’s hands (=1) -0.046 -0.039 -0.018 -0.023 -0.057
(0.090) (0.084) (0.076) (0.052) (0.106)
Caste (=1) -0.110?? -0.091? -0.088? -0.042 -0.146??
(0.056) (0.048) (0.047) (0.034) (0.060)
Driving behaviors and safety perceptions
Uses motorbike to commute(=1) -0.010 -0.010 -0.018
(0.050) (0.048) (0.027)
Never uses ring roads (=1) 0.034 0.059 0.028
(0.067) (0.071) (0.044)
Size of motorbike in cc, ref: 100cc or less
between 100cc and 150cc 0.075 0.075 0.024
(0.053) (0.053) (0.035)
above 150cc 0.219 0.191 0.063
(0.137) (0.133) (0.082)
Experienced road traffic accident (=1) -0.081 -0.079 -0.032
(0.056) (0.056) (0.031)
Underest. ann. road inj. (=1) -0.141?? -0.135?? -0.092?
(0.065) (0.063) (0.053)
Has health insurance (=1) -0.122??? -0.125??? -0.117???
(0.035) (0.031) (0.020)
Says own driver should pay more attention (=1) -0.124?? -0.120? -0.092?
(0.065) (0.068) (0.052)
Type of trips, ref: Short distance trip
Long distance trip 0.262??? 0.298??? 0.296??? 0.275??? 0.264??? 0.273??? 0.231??? 0.336???
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.066) (0.026) (0.065) (0.089) (0.034)
Neighbourhood trip -0.063?? -0.078?? -0.078?? -0.056? -0.065?? -0.055? -0.038 -0.081??
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.036)
Interviewer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.247 0.256 0.310 0.159 0.316 0.440 0.267
Observations 963 954 936 759 963 759 756 756
# of respondents 324 321 315 255 324 255 254 254
# of observations per respondent (mean) 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.99 2.98 2.99 2.99 2.99
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01.
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4.6 Conclusion
Risky health behavior is in many domains still only poorly understood. The analysis is often plagued by incomplete
data and a general lack of information. In this study, we try to understand the behavior of helmet use among
motorcycle riders and passengers in Delhi, a context in which road safety is low and helmet use is far from being
the norm. We use a very detailed data set collected exactly for the purpose of that study. To guide our empirical
analysis, we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on their speed and helmet use. While a helmet provides
insurance if an accident happens, speed affects the probability that an accident will occur. However, a lower speed
implies time costs and helmet use comes with a level of discomfort that has to be borne by the user. Key variables
in our analysis are risk aversion as well as aspects related to risk awareness.
The empirical findings suggest that risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet. A one standard devia-
tion increase in our risk aversion score (i.e. by 29%) increases the probability of using a helmet on a given trip by 3
percentage points. This is certainly not a very strong effect, but cumulated over many trips it means a substantial
reduction in the risk of being seriously injured in the event of an accident. We do not find any systematic effect
of risk aversion on speed. Both results are coherent with our theoretical model. Interestingly, helmet use also in-
creases with education: illiterate drivers are by about 10% less likely to wear a helmet than literate drivers. Tertiary
education further increases helmet use. Speed decreases with the number of children at home suggesting that
family responsibilities stimulate drivers to take fewer risks. Speed first increases and then decreases with income,
i.e. the middle class drives the fastest.
Drivers who show a higher awareness of road risks, because, for instance, they are more conscious about the
health risks faced when traveling on Delhi’s roads or have taken driving lessons, are both more likely to wear a
helmet and to speed less. In turn, those drivers who show a high level of unawareness take the highest risks.
Controlling for risk awareness, we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use: the
Sikh who cannot wear a helmet because of the turban, drive, on average, slower.
For passengers, we find a similar pattern. Their probability of helmet use increases with the driver’s chosen
level of speed. The fact that generally passengers less often wear a helmet than drivers, and women less often than
men, even controlling for helmet ownership, suggests that norms and habits also play an important role. Breaking
these is one of the major challenges that needs to be overcome.
The most obvious solution to India’s road safety problem and the related high social costs that result from it, is
to enforce the helmet law and speed limits and hence to ignore the associated private costs such as time costs and
discomfort. An alternative strategy, and probably more feasible in the current context, is to design interventions
which raise awareness of road risks. In terms of our model, this means bringing the expected probability of an
accident at a given speed and the expected gain of helmet use closer to its actual levels. Improvements to the road
infrastructure such as separate lanes for cars and motorbikes are also a possible solution, but, as our analysis and
a few other examples in the literature show, these measures bear the risk that drivers will react by increasing speed
or lowering helmet use.
We end our analysis with a word of caution. In this study we work with purely observational data and hence
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we cannot really claim to tease out causal relationships. However, given the detail of the information we have, we
think there are good reasons to believe that biases due to omitted variables are relatively limited. Further research
should try to validate some of the findings we generated through an adequate experimental design. Nevertheless,
we believe that our analysis is a first important step in understanding helmet use in a low-income but highly-
motorized context.
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4.7 Appendices
Appendix A. Theoretical framework
Passengers — Risk aversion
Let hU denote the optimal level of insurance for the passenger with utility function U defined above. Let us now
consider a second, more risk averse, passenger with a utility function V which exhibits higher risk aversion than U ,
i.e. V (·) is a concave increasing transformation of U (·), hence V (·)= g [U (·)], with g ′ > 0, and g ′′ < 0 (Pratt; 1964).
Assuming the same wealth prospect and choice set as (4.2) but taking into account the preferences of the more
risk averse individual, we obtain:
∂EV
∂h
=−p · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] · g ′(U (B)) ·U ′(B)− (1−p) · c ′(h) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G). (4.8)
To see whether a more risk averse individual invests more in self-insurance, we need to evaluate
∂EV
∂h
at h = hU .
Since, g ′′ < 0, we have g ′(U (B)) > g ′(U (G)). Therefore, when computing ∂EV
∂h
at the optimal point hU (for which
we have
∂EU
∂h
= 0) we obtain ∂EV
∂h
|h=hU > 0. In other words, a more risk averse passenger invests more in self-
insurance, i.e. helmet use.
Passengers — Risk compensation
We consider again the passenger with utility function U and explore an increase in the probability that an accident
occurs from p to q , where q > p. Substituting q in Equation (4.2), we obtain:
∂EU (q)
∂h
=−q · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)− (1−q) · c ′(h) ·U ′(G). (4.9)
To see whether the passenger invests more in self-insurance following an exogenous increase in the probability
that an accident occurs, we need to evaluate
∂EU (q)
∂h
at h = hU . Since q > p and −[c ′(h)+ I ′(h)]> 0 (the condition
for an interior solution), we have−q ·[c ′(h)+ I ′(h)]>−p ·[c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] and (1−q)·c ′(h)< (1−p)·c ′(h). Thus, when
computing
∂EU (q)
∂h
at the optimal point hU , we obtain
∂EU (q)
∂h
|h=hU > 0, i.e. if the probability that an accident
occurs increases, the passenger invests more in self-insurance and hence compensate at least partially for the
increased risk. In turn, if safety increases exogenously, passengers are thought to invest less.
Drivers — Risk aversion
Again we consider the case of two individuals with different degrees of risk-aversion, U and V :
∂EV
∂h
=−p(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] · g ′(U (B)) ·U ′(B)− (1−p(s)) · c ′(h) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G) (4.10)
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and
∂EV
∂s
= p ′(s) · [g (U (B))− g (U (G))]− t ′(s) · [p(s) · g ′(U (B)) ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G)]. (4.11)
To see whether the more risk averse driver invests more in self-insurance and self-protection, we need to com-
pute the sign of Equations (4.10) and (4.11) at h = hU and s = sU respectively. The results show that a more risk
averse individual invests more in self-insurance, while the effect on self-protection is ambiguous.
Drivers — Self-insurance-cum-protection activity
Let’s relax the assumption made and consider that low speed reduces both the probability of the road crash real-
ization and the size of the loss in case of accident.
In that case the expected utility is given as:
EU = p(s) ·U [W − t (s)− c(h)− I (h, s)]+ (1−p(s)) ·U [W − t (s)− c(h)] (4.12)
Remark: we assume that I ′h does not depend on s and I
′
s does not depend in h.
We focus on the SICP activity. The first order condition for maximizing (1) with respect to s is:
∂EU
∂s
= p ′(s) · [U (B)−U (G)]−p(s) · [t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] ·U ′(B)− (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) ·U ′(G)= 0 (4.13)
As before, we compare the level of SICP chosen by two individuals, U and V, V being more risk averse than U:
∂EV
∂s
|s=sU = p ′(s) ·[g (U (B))−g (U (G))]−p(s) ·[t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] ·g ′(U B)) ·U ′(B)−(1−p(s)) · t ′(s) ·g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G) (4.14)
If
∂EV
∂s
|s=sU is negative, a more risk averse individual invest more in the SICP activity.
From Equation (4.13) we have: p ′(s)= p(s) · [t
′(s)+ I ′(s)] ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) ·U ′(G)
U (B)−U (G)
Due to the concavity of g (U )), we can write that:
⇒ p ′(s)< g
′(U (G))
g (U (B))− g (U (G)) · [p(s) · [t
′(s)+ I ′(s)] ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) ·U ′(G)]
⇒ p ′(s) · [g (U (B))− g (U (G))]> p(s) · [t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G)
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⇒ ∂EV
∂s
|s=sU > p(s) · [t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G)
−p(s) · [t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] · g ′(U (B)) ·U ′(B)− (1−p(s)) · t ′(s) · g ′(U (G)) ·U ′(G)∂EV
∂s
|s=sU
> [g ′(U (G))− g ′(U (B))] ·p(s) · [t ′(s)+ I ′(s)] ·U ′(B) (4.15)
Since g ′(U (G))− g ′(U (B))< 0, Equation (4.15) will be negative if t ′(s)+ I ′(s)≥ 0 at sU .
Similar as in Lee (1998), a sufficient condition for a more risk averse individual to invest more in the SICP
activity, in our framework, is that t ′(s)+ I ′(s) ≥ 0 at sU . In other words, a more risk averse individual will invest
more in such prevention effort if the marginal increase in loss if an accident occurs is greater than the marginal
gain in time spent on the road at the optimal speed level of the “reference” individual.
Drivers — Risk compensation
We investigate the influence of a change in the probability that an accident takes place on helmet use by drivers.
Such variation may be exogenous (as in the case with passengers) or endogenous. The marginal change in helmet
use following a marginal change in speed is given by the following cross-derivative:
∂2EU
∂h∂s
= p ′(s) · (−[c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)+ c ′(h) ·U ′(G))+
t ′(s) · (p(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′′(B)+ (1−p(s)) · c ′(h) ·U ′′(G)). (4.16)
Using Equation (4.4), we obtain the following two equalities:

−[c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)= (1−p(s)
p(s)
· c ′(h) ·U ′(G) and
p(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)]=−(1−p(s)) · c ′(h) ·U
′(G)
U ′(B)
.
Replacing these two equalities in Equation (4.16) allows us to derive the sign of the cross derivative at the
optimal point hU :
∂2EU
∂h∂s
|h=hU =
p ′(s)
p(s)
· c ′(h) ·U ′(G)+ t ′(s) · (1−p(s)) · c ′(h) · [U ′′(G)−U
′(G)
U ′(B)
·U ′′(B)]. (4.17)
Assuming a constant relative risk aversion rate (−U
′′(G)
U ′(G)
= −U
′′(B)
U ′(B)
= r ), we find that ∂
2EU
∂h∂s
|h=hU > 0. There-
fore, a driver increases speed, he or she also increases helmet use.
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Drivers — Awareness
Case #1: Raising the expected probability that an accident occurs at any speed level
We denote the initial probability p and the probability after awareness has risen qA , i.e. qA > p. Hence, we substi-
tute in Equations (4.4) and (4.5) p by qA and obtain:
∂EU1
∂h
=−qA(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B)− (1−qA(s)) · c ′(h) ·U ′(G) and (4.18)
∂EU1
∂s
= q ′A(s) · [U (B)−U (G)]− t ′(s) · [qA(s) ·U ′(B)+ (1−qA(s)) ·U ′(G)]. (4.19)
In this case, the weight that is associated with the net marginal gain of using a helmet and being involved in an
accident increases (qA > p) while the one associated with the marginal cost of wearing a helmet in the good state
decreases ((1−qA)< (1−p)). Hence, a driver with a higher (less downward biased) awareness level invests more in
helmet use.
Regarding the chosen speed level, as was the case with the decision on helmet usage, the weight associated with
the marginal utility derived in the bad state increases while the one associated with the marginal utility derived in
the good state decreases. Thus, raising awareness leads in this case to a decrease in the expected marginal gain of
higher speed in terms of traveling time. Therefore the effect of increased awareness on speed depends on whether
the utility loss induced by a marginal change in the probability that an accident occurs reinforces or compensates
the first effect.
Case #2: Raising the expected loss if an accident occurs for any level of helmet use
Now we denote the initial expected loss I (h) and the expected loss after awareness has increased I A(h), i.e. ,
I A(h)> I (h) and hence B A <B , U (B A)<U (B), U ′(B A)>U ′(B). We substitute again in Equations (4.4) and (4.5) and
obtain:
∂EU2
∂h
=−p(s) · [c ′(h)+ I ′(h)] ·U ′(B A)− (1−p(s)) · c ′(h) ·U ′(G) and (4.20)
∂EU2
∂s
= p ′(s) · [U (B A)−U (G)]− t ′(s) · [p(s) ·U ′(B A)+ (1−p(s)) ·U ′(G)]. (4.21)
In this case, the level of wealth in the bad state is reduced (B A <B) because of the increased severity of injuries.
Therefore, given the concavity of the utility function, a marginal increase of consumption at B A is higher than at
point B . If Equation (4.20) is evaluated at the optimal point h = hU , we obtain ∂EU2
∂h
|h = hU > 0, i.e. a higher
expected loss induces a higher level of helmet use.
Regarding the chosen level of speed, the higher expected level of injuries implies a larger loss in terms of wealth
leading to both a greater difference in utilities between the two states of the world (U (G)−U (B A) >U (G)−U (B))
and a higher marginal utility in the bad state (U ′(B A) >U ′(B)). Given the former, a marginal increase in speed
increases the loss. Moreover, the marginal increase in speed also raises the level of gain in terms of travelling
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time due to the latter effect. Hence, again, the effect of an increase in the expected level of injuries on speed is
ambiguous. Note that in this case the utility of helmet use remains the same, i.e. I ′(h) is constant.
Appendix B. Determinants of non-reporting
In total 212 sampled individuals refused to answer to the questionnaire, leading to a final sample of 902 individuals
which corresponds to a response rate of 81%. Yet, among those who have answered to our survey, there are respon-
dents who could not or did not want to answer to some of the questions. We decided to use in our analysis always
the largest possible sample. However we show that our results across different specifications are robust to the exact
sample chosen. We also show below the results from a probit model in which we regress for drivers and passengers
a dummy variable “having at least one missing variable" on a set of basic socio-demographic and socio-economic
variables. It can be seen that for male drivers, none of these variables is significant, suggesting that non-reporting
is rather random. For passengers we see that women, higher income and caste categories are more likely to have
some missing information. In all our regressions we control for these characteristics. Not surprisingly, income is
the variable where most of the missings occur. In our regressions we introduce (but do not show) next to the vari-
ous income categories a category “income not reported”. This dummy was in none of the regressions significant,
also suggesting that there is no systematic non-reporting in the data. We also have 27 individuals in the sample
that reported to be sometimes a driver and sometimes a passenger. They are also excluded from the driver and
passenger samples.
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Table 4.7: Socio-demographic and economic correlates of missing information
probit specifications, coefficients Male drivers All passengers
Male (=1) -0.753??? -0.649??
(0.194) (0.282)
Age (in years) -0.005 -0.006 0.010? 0.010
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Education level (3 categories) 0.006 0.054 0.012 -0.060
(0.117) (0.130) (0.109) (0.133)
HH monthly income, ref: Less than 10,000 INR
Between 10,000 and 20,000 INR 0.079 -0.009 0.044 -0.017
(0.186) (0.204) (0.177) (0.191)
More than 20,000 INR 0.012 -0.174 -0.268 -0.529??
(0.220) (0.255) (0.240) (0.262)
Married (=1) 0.131 -0.214
(0.282) (0.254)
Number of children -0.044 -0.051
(0.089) (0.083)
Head of household (=1) -0.122 0.264
(0.243) (0.364)
Household size 0.025 0.039
(0.042) (0.031)
Contributes to HH income (share) 0.057 -0.220??
(0.067) (0.111)
Religion, ref: Hindu
Muslim -0.235 -0.309
(0.253) (0.300)
Sikh -0.395 -1.013?
(0.455) (0.569)
Believes fate is in god’s hands -0.344 -0.250
(0.221) (0.235)
Belongs to low caste (=1) -0.189 -0.563???
(0.172) (0.182)
Constant -0.936??? -0.967? -0.853?? -0.174
(0.345) (0.510) (0.343) (0.484)
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.023 0.052 0.122
Observations 482 456 368 354
Total observations in survey 489 489 371 371
Share of observations in sample (%) 98.50 93.25 99.00 95.40
Notes: ???, ?? and ? stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Appendix C. Marginal effects
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Table 4.8: Helmet use and speed level chosen by drivers – marginal effects
Simultaneous equation system, marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HELMET USE
Risk aversion score 0.015 0.013 0.016+ 0.016+ 0.025??
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age (in years) -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Married (=1) 0.024 0.029 0.028 0.027
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
Number of children 0.015 (0.006) 0.001 0.013
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Household head (=1) 0.030 0.026 0.008 -0.000
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048)
Household size -0.015?? -0.013?? -0.017??? -0.016???
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Education, ref: Primary-secondary education
Illiterate -0.135*** -0.111?? -0.105??? -0.114??
(0.045) (0.049) (0.056) (0.051)
Tertiary education 0.055?? 0.040+ 0.024? 0.038
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Household monthly income, ref: less than 5,000 INR
between 5,000 and 10,000 INR n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
between 10,000 and 15,000 INR n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
between 15,000 and 20,000 INR n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
between 20,000 and 25,000 INR n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
above 25,000 INR n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
Contribution to hh income (share) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Religion, ref: Hindu
Muslim -0.001 -0.022 -0.036
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Sikh -0.204??? -0.171??? -0.175???
(0.069) (0.061) (0.067)
Believes fate in god’s hands (=1) -0.015 -0.037 -0.007
(0.037) (0.045) (0.042)
Caste (=1) -0.041 -0.005 -0.028
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
Driving behaviors and safety perceptions
Uses motorbike to commute (=1) 0.063?
(0.038)
Never uses ring roads (=1) 0.008
(0.037)
# of persons on motorbike -0.047??
(0.019)
Confident in own driving ability (=1) -0.022
(0.028)
Took driving lessons 0.068??
(0.030)
Underest. ann. road inj. (=1) n.e.
Experienced road traffic accident (=1) -0.007
(0.040)
Owns motorbike (=1) -0.009
(0.057)
Size of motorbike in cc, ref: 100cc or less
between 100 and 150cc n.e.
above 150cc n.e.
Has motorbike insurance (=1) n.e.
Has health insurance (=1) 0.003???
(0.001)
Type of trips, ref: Short distance trip
Long distance trip 0.232??? 0.229??? 0.229??? 0.257??? 0.257???
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Neighbourhood trip -0.038??? -0.042??? -0.044??? -0.050??? -0.048???
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Interviewer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1367 1328 1295 1160 1160
Notes: n.e. stands for not estimable. + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01.
4.7. APPENDICES 177
Appendix D. Using self reported risk aversion in finance
Table 4.9: Helmet use and speed level chosen by drivers
Simultaneous equation system, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HELMET USE (Probit)
SRRA in finance (8 point scale) 0.073?? 0.057+ 0.072? 0.093?? 0.097??
(0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040)
SPEED (kph) (Linear model)
SRRA in finance (8 point scale) -0.344 -0.073 -0.019 -0.648 -0.601
(0.517 (0.537) (0.543) (0.549) (0.517)
Correlation residuals -0.052 -0.062 -0.099+ -0.071 -0.061
Observations 1373 1334 1301 1166 1166
# of respondents 460 448 433 388 388
Notes: + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01.
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Appendix E. Controlling for passengers’ behaviors
Table 4.10: Helmet use and speed level chosen by drivers – full sample
Simultaneous equation system, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HELMET USE (Probit)
Risk aversion score 0.074 0.075 0.099? 0.110? 0.156??
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.061)
ref: drivers who have a HH passenger who doesn’t wear a helmet
drivers who have a HH passenger who wears a helmet 0.891??? 1.008??? 0.920??? 0.714??? 0.863???
(0.229) (0.221) (0.223) (0.246) (0.254)
drivers who have a HH passenger but helmet use unknown 0.318 0.325+ 0.272 0.015 0.115
(0.221) (0.225) (0.235) (0.245) (0.238)
drivers who don’t have a HH passenger 0.224 0.281+ 0.212 -0.026 0.188
(0.157) (0.171) (0.180) (0.186) (0.184)
SPEED (kph) (Linear model)
Risk aversion score 0.711 0.943 0.942 0.170 0.326
(0.719) (0.728) (0.732) (0.760) (0.703)
ref: drivers who have a HH passenger who doesn’t wear a helmet
drivers who have a HH passenger who wears a helmet 4.656+ 4.016 2.866 0.488 1.499
(2.835) (2.824) (2.800) (2.571) (2.773)
drivers who have a HH passenger but helmet use unknown 5.635 5.738 5.646 4.242 4.739
(4.827) (4.774) (4.874) (5.108) (5.324)
drivers who don’t have a HH passenger -2.526 -2.301 -2.517 -3.662+ -3.814+
(2.454) (2.455) (2.501) (2.494) (2.643)
Correlation residuals -0.107? -0.120? -0.151?? -0.117+ -0.119?
Observations 1367 1328 1295 1160 1160
Notes: + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01. HH stands for household.
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Table 4.11: Helmet use and speed level chosen by drivers – restricted sample
Simultaneous equation system, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HELMET USE (Probit)
Risk aversion score 0.067 0.038 0.055 -0.103 0.180?
(0.089) (0.096) (0.098) (0.127) (0.108)
HH passenger wears a helmet 0.809??? 1.173??? 1.032??? 1.022??? 1.045???
(0.253) (0.250) (0.249) (0.274) (0.276)
SPEED (kph) (Linear model)
Risk aversion score -0.098 0.588 0.879 1.403 0.022
(1.393) (1.460) (1.399) (1.610) (1.311)
HH passenger wears a helmet 3.593 3.170 2.458 -0.270 0.057
(3.267) (3.254) (3.022) (2.345) (2.676)
Correlation residuals -0.202?? -0.181? -0.218?? -0.222?? -0.212?
Observations 561 535 517 463 463
# of respondents 187 178 172 154 154
Notes: + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01. HH stands for household.
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Appendix F. Controlling for drivers’ behaviors
Table 4.12: Determinants of helmet use for passengers
Probit specification, coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk aversion score -0.145? -0.125 -0.131 -0.140 -0.139+ -0.151+ -0.143 -0.140
(0.088) (0.099) (0.099) (0.104) (0.086) (0.101) (0.113) (0.106)
HH driver wears a helmet 0.721?? 0.834??? 0.798??? 1.019??? 0.772??? 1.081??? 1.654??? 0.636??
(0.292) (0.288) (0.291) (0.266) (0.294) (0.279) (0.327) (0.289)
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.264 0.267 0.390 0.194 0.401 0.528 0.294
Observations 457 451 446 393 457 393 390 390
# of respondents 152 150 148 131 152 131 130 130
Notes: + p<0.15, ? p<0.10, ?? p<0.05, ??? p<0.01. HH stands for household.
Chapter 5
“Your money or your life!”
The influence of injury and fine
expectations on helmet use among
motorcyclists in Delhi
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Abstract
In this paper, I study the individual decision of wearing a helmet using original data collected among motorcy-
clists in New Delhi in 2011. The data measures the motorcyclists’ subjective expectations of medical expenditures
and fines. In my empirical analysis, I first study whether previous personal experiences influence individuals’ be-
liefs. I show that knowing some one who experienced a road crash or having been sanctioned by the traffic police
modify motorcyclists’ subjective expectations. Nonetheless, differences across individuals may be partly due to
actual differences in health hazards and police enforcement intensity. In a second step, I investigate to what extent
injury and fine expectations impact helmet adoption, this depending on the characteristics of the trip. I find that
subjective expectations of injuries are correlated with helmet use for long distance journeys while expected fines
are rather linked with helmet adoption for short distance trips either on main roads or within residential neigh-
borhoods. I use geographical fixed effects to control for area related specificities which could bias my estimates,
such as differences in health infrastructures or neighbors’ attitudes. Finally, in view of designing policies, I assess
the impact of different safety measures which raise either expected medical expenditures or expected fines. The
increase of police threat, through enforcement, information and fine levels are likely to increase helmet adoption
among motorcyclists. Information campaigns stressing the utility of helmet to avoid severe injuries even for mo-
torbike trips nearby one’s home should have a similar effect.
JEL Classification: C81, D84, I15, K42, 012, R41
Key words: Subjective expectations, road safety, risky behaviors, India
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5.1 Introduction
Every five minutes in India someone dies from a road traffic accident (NCRB; 2011). This phenomenon is expected
to escalate to one death every three minutes by 2020. Many of these fatalities are nevertheless preventable. While
Hsiao et al. (2013) found that 62% of Indian road casualties suffered from a cerebral trauma;1 Liu et al. (2008)
highlighted that standardized quality helmets efficiently reduce risk of mortality and injuries by 40% and 70% re-
spectively. Besides road infrastructures or the quality of motorized vehicles, behaviors adopted by road users are
actually a crucial lever to reduce the frequency and severity of road traffic accidents. Indeed, individual character-
istics and attitudes toward risk may play a role in road habits, risk exposure and conduct while traveling. Grimm
and Treibich (2014) (cf. Chapter 4) studied the influence of individual risk aversion on helmet use and choice of
speed among motorcyclists. Their results suggest that risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet. Never-
theless, safety behaviors adopted on the road correspond to “economic decisions involving uncertainty” that are,
according to Delavande et al. (2011b), “shaped not only by preferences but also by subjective expectations of future
1Their study is based on a nationally representative survey of 1.1 million homes.
184 EXPECTATIONS OF INJURY AND FINE
outcomes”. Given the important share of motorcyclists in the traffic mix and among road fatalities in developing
countries, a better understanding of the individual decision process of this particular group would definitively help
design appropriate and efficient policies. In order to fill this gap, this paper considers individuals’ heterogeneity
regarding expected consequences of not using a helmet. More precisely, it provides empirical evidence on the re-
lation between helmet adoption and subjective expectations of injuries and fines among motorbike users in New
Delhi, as well as insights into the way these beliefs are shaped.
In recent years, a growing literature of applied development economics has started to investigate the impact of
subjective expectations on probabilities and outcomes in the individual decision making process in areas like in-
vestment, education, health and entrepreneurship (see for instance Attanasio; 2009; Delavande and Kohler; 2009;
Dominitz and Manski; 1997a; McKenzie et al.; 2007). As all other uncertain decisions, road safety conducts are
likely to be the result of a combination of factors among which perceptions and beliefs play a key role. These in-
clude the subjective probability to be caught by the police for infringing road rules, or, in case of an accident, be
injured and suffer financial, physical and psychological losses.
Awareness programs on road dangers have extensively used shocking ads in order to raise citizens’ expecta-
tions of negative outcomes in case they should choose not to use a seat belt or a helmet. Nevertheless, given the
low probability of accident occurrence on a given trip, individuals still face difficulties in internalizing this risk
and adapting their behaviors. Many countries have therefore chosen to bind attitudes by law. In low and middle
income countries, where two wheelers represent up to 70% of all motorized vehicles, an increasing number of gov-
ernments have implemented compulsory helmet legislations. This, to urge motorcyclists to protect themselves. In
India, for instance, a legislation was enacted in 1988 (Motor Vehicle Act). However, it is the responsability of each
and every Indian state to implement and enforce the law. The effect of such a punitive measure on road safety
attitudes may thus vary substantially across the country depending on the actual and perceived strength of its en-
forcement.2 This can be captured by the subjective probability of being caught by the police if infringing the law
and the subsequent expected fines.
In this study, elicited subjective expectations of injury and fine if one does not use a helmet were obtained
through a unique dataset collected among motorcyclists in New Delhi in 2011. The methodology, which will be
presented in detail below, comes from studies on investment in education (Attanasio; 2009), migration decisions
(McKenzie et al.; 2007) or health prevention exams (Delavande; 2008). This questionnaire allows me to estimate
the impact of injury and fine expectations on road safety behaviors, in particular helmet adoption. Moreover, in-
formation gathered on previous experiences of road crash and traffic police stop enables me to investigate how
individuals form their beliefs on the consequences of not using a helmet. Finally, based on my findings, the im-
pact of various road safety measures on helmet use are simulated. This will provide evidence as for the possible
ways to improve road safety in large metropolitan cities in developing countries.
2In the last Global Status Report on Road Safety WHO (2013), the Indian rate of enforcement of helmet law appears to be very low (2 on a
scale going from 0 to 10). Nonetheless, this figure does not reflect the potential variation across Indian states.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the road safety literature, with a focus
on the work done at the microeconomic level. In particular, I stress why information on subjective probabilities
and outcomes could help to understand the behavior of road users. Then, the methodological literature on the
measurement of subjective expectations of probabilities and outcomes is introduced. Section 3 presents the data
and the survey methods used to draw expectations out. Some descriptive statistics are also reported. In section
4, I discuss the channels through which personal experiences may impact the formation and updating of beliefs
as well as the role of the latter in the decision process regarding helmet adoption by motorcyclists. Section 5
reports the empirical strategy and findings. In this analysis, I first explore the influence of previous experiences
of road crash or police stop on subjective expectations. In a second step, I look at the extent to which subjective
expectations of medical expenditures and fines influence helmet use conditional on trips’ characteristics. The
impacts of different policy measures raising either expected medical costs or expected fines are reported in section
6. Section 7 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 Studies on motorcycle safety
Studies implemented in developed countries have examined the effectiveness of compulsory helmet legislations.
For instance, using U.S. longitudinal data, Dee (2009) found that a universal helmet law reduces motorcyclist fa-
talities by 27 percent. As for French et al. (2009), they compared the capacity of different safety policies to reduce
both fatal and non fatal road injuries and showed that legislations making helmet use mandatory outperform alco-
hol policies as well as speed limit measures or education programs targeted to riders. It is worth highlighting that
motorbike users from the U.S.A or Europe differ – in terms of demographics, uses and engine sizes – from those of
developing countries such as India. In low income countries for instance, most drivers ride scooters or mopeds,
and this on rather short distances. Given the specificities of motorcyclists and the traffic environment in which
they evolve, contextualized evaluations are required. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, and despite the implemen-
tation of compulsory helmet legislations in many developing countries, studies estimating the efficiency of such
regulation have not yet been undertaken in these regions.
In addition, very few studies have investigated the determinants of road safety habits. One exception is Rit-
ter and Vance (2011) who looked at the socio economic characteristics influencing voluntary helmet use among
German cyclists. The scarcity of behavioral analysis can be explained by the absence of data on road habit is-
sues. Indeed, micro level data on road safety behavior are all but inexistent, partly because this issue has been
less prioritized by the authorities. This considerably limits research on the topic. We started filling the gap in 2011
by collecting information on road habits among motorcyclists in New Delhi. Information on socio demographic
characteristics, preferences toward risk and beliefs were also gathered. In a previous paper (Grimm and Treibich;
2014, cf. Chapter 4), we focused on the influence of risk aversion on helmet use and choice of speed and on the
existence of risk compensation behaviors. We found that among drivers, individuals who are more risk averse are
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significantly more likely to use a helmet. As to passengers, their use of a helmet depends on the environment they
face (driver’s characteristics or traveling speed for instance).
While Grimm and Treibich (2014) (cf. Chapter 4) assumed that expected probabilities of accident and subse-
quent injuries are identical for all motorcyclists, this paper takes into account the possible heterogeneity in expec-
tations individuals may have regarding the consequences of not using a helmet. Indeed, besides their risk aversion,
the discomfort of wearing a helmet, the protection it offers in case of a crash (in terms of probability and severity
of the injury) or the capacity of avoiding police sanctions are various dimensions that may enter the individual
decision process regarding helmet adoption and which plausibly differ from one person to the other. Introduc-
ing subjective expectation data in the analysis allows to disentangle explanations based on preferences and those
based on beliefs. More adequate behavioral interventions might then be suggested.
Both the concern about negative health outcomes and the threat of financial sanctions may influence motorcy-
clists’ behavior toward helmet use. Elicited subjective probability of injury and subsequent medical expenditures
on the one hand, and subjective probability of police halt and financial penalties on the other hand have been
gathered using similar methodologies to the ones already extensively used in the literature (see Delavande et al.;
2011b; Manski; 2004, for reviews). In other words, the “frequency” and the “severity” dimensions have been elicited
through our survey. This paper discusses the possible mechanisms at play in the formation of beliefs and their the-
oretical impact on helmet use. Based on a unique dataset, I then empirically test these relations.
To summarize, behavioral studies on road safety conducts investigating the influence of educational and re-
pressive policies, in particular in developing countries, have not yet been undertaken. Individuals’ beliefs regard-
ing the gains and costs of not using a helmet are certainly an important dimension to explore in the safety decision
process. Moreover, the formation or updating of road related subjective expectations as well as the influence of
the latter on helmet adoption are questions which remain overlooked. To fill these gaps, I first explore the role of
personal experiences on the observed heterogeneity in beliefs across individuals. Second, I study to what extent
subjective expectations of medical expenditures and fines impact helmet adoption in different trip circumstances
and third I estimate the impact on helmet use of various safety measures modifying expectations. I report in the
following subsection the various methods used in the literature to elicit this specific type of information.
5.2.2 Measurement of subjective expectations
Despite the development of elicitation methodologies, in particular in psychology, economic empirical studies of
individual choices have often only focused on preferences, while individuals’ beliefs were assumed homogenous.
However, Tversky and Kahneman (1974)’s results suggested that individuals tend to use heuristic rules to pro-
cess data. These findings brought concerns regarding the assumption of rational and homogenous expectations
across agents. Furthermore, as pointed by Manski (2004), expectations may vary from one person to the other
and different combinations of subjective expectations and preferences may lead to the same observed behavior.
By collecting data on individuals’ expectations regarding the occurrence of specific events and their subsequent
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outcomes, researchers aim at relaxing the homogeneity assumptions made on expectations.
Attanasio (2009) highlighted that a careful design of questionnaires should enable to elicit information on sub-
jective probabilities and distribution of future variables. He added that such procedure is important for economic
welfare and relevant to determine economic choice. Because of lower cost and higher willingness of individuals
to spend time on answering surveys in developing countries, such data collection has particularly increased in
these regions. Detractors have called into question the quality of these datasets putting forward the limited formal
education of some respondents and their unfamiliarity with the formal concept of probability. Delavande et al.
(2011b) refuted these arguments based on a survey of recent contributions to the literature on the measurement
of subjective expectations in developing countries. They showed that elicitation of probability is feasible in low
income countries despite the average low level of education of respondents. These authors also provided advice
regarding the methods to be used in the questionnaire to limit numeracy difficulties. For instance, visual aids
(balls, beans, sticks) could be used in low income countries where probability concepts might be too abstract for
respondents. When such tools were used only few people gave degenerated forecasts, supporting the idea that
individuals understand the questions asked (cf. Luseno et al.; 2003; Lybbert et al.; 2007). Initial formulation of
questions eliciting continuous variables, such as future earnings or retirement benefits, enabled to obtain only
one value of the outcome of interest, leaving unclear whether the respondent gave the minimum, the maximum,
the median or the average of what he expects. Different methods have been used since then to draw out the dis-
tribution of the outcome of interest. Dominitz and Manski (1997b), for instance, asked the following questions to
respondents: “what do you think is the percent chance that your total household income, before taxes, will be less
than Y over the next 12 months?”. Four income thresholds in increasing order were presented to the individual. The
thresholds about which a given respondent was queried were determined by the respondents’ answer to a pair of
preliminary questions asking for the lowest and highest possible income that the household might experience in
the next year. Such methodology generates flexible thresholds, a way of avoiding the anchoring problem which ap-
pears when using pre-determined intervals among population differing regarding their wealth. Finally, Delavande
et al. (2011a) conducted an experiment in India to test the sensivity of elicited expectations to variation in three di-
mensions of the elicitation methodology: (i) the number of beans,3 (ii) the design of the support (pre-determined
vs. self-anchored) and (iii) the ordering of questions. While more accuracy was obtained by using more beans and
a larger number of intervals with a pre-determined support, the results remained very robust to variations in the
elicitation design.
I now proceed with the presentation of the dataset.
3Beans are used as visual aids by respondents.
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5.3 Data
5.3.1 Road safety survey
With the help of a local survey firm, we implemented an household survey in Delhi in 2011 targeting motorcy-
clists. Besides socio demographic characteristics, data on risk aversion, perception of road rule enforcement and
of road risks were gathered along with helmet use, previous involvement in road traffic crashes or traffic police
stops. Finally, we attempted to elicit the subjective expectations of medical expenditures and fines, based on the
methodologies developed in the literature and describe in more detail below in section 5.3.2.
The following sampling design was adopted: (i) New Delhi was divided into five zones, (ii) in each zone, ten
polling booths were randomly drawn, (iii) the location of each of these polling booths represented the starting
point from which every fifth household was selected for the interview. Around each polling booth, 30 households
were interviewed, leading to a total of 1,502 households. In 545 of them at least one member had traveled by
motorbike in the previous four weeks. Up to three drivers or passengers per household could answered the survey.
In the end, 902 motorbike users agreed to reply to our questions.
Our respondents are 36 years old on average, two thirds of them are men and 70% pray daily. 97% of the drivers
are men while they only represent 25% of the passengers. Regarding road safety efforts, while men use full face
helmets, women more often opt for a half helmet. Motorcyclists were asked about their helmet use in three differ-
ent circumstances. On average, motorbike users are more likely to declare wearing a helmet for long trips4 (81%)
than for short trips on main roads (61%) or trips in residential neighborhoods5 (54%). Nonetheless, significant
differences in helmet use are observed between men and women, drivers and passengers and motorcyclists who
frequently or occasionally use this mode of transportation. Drivers without passengers travel at a higher speed on
average. More than 60% of the passengers declare being three or more people when they use the motorbike. 46% of
the respondents declare to frequently circulate on a motorbike, 64% use it mainly to commute to work. Finally, 7%
of the interviewed motorcyclists have already been involved in a road crash, they are about the same percentage
to have been sanctioned by the traffic police.
5.3.2 Eliciting subjective expectations of medical expenditures and fines
Subjective probability to be hurt in a road accident and subsequent medical expenditures
Starting with the potential injuries, two situations were presented to the interviewees. First, they were asked to
consider the way they usually travel on their motorbike (“in general”). Second, they were put in the situation
where they would not use the helmet (“if no helmet”). 6
4Long trips are defined as journeys lasting more than 15 minutes.
5Residential neighborhoods correspond to residential areas with small food and clothes markets.
6We think that asking individuals about their subjective probabilities of being injured with and without helmet would have exacerbated the
social desirability bias. Controlling by the type of injuries individuals have in mind and the answer to the “in general” question should allow
me to capture the perceived utility of helmet. As a matter of fact, helmet use questions came before the elicitation of subjective probabilities
and outcomes. Furthermore, in the case of respondents who report usually not wearing a helmet, the subjective probabilities of being involved
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In each case, respondents were asked to establish the likelihood they would be involved in an accident and
injured using an 11 point response scale going from 0 “this event will never happen” to 10 “this event will surely
happen”. Answers were divided by ten in order to obtain values between 0 and 1 which can be related to proba-
bilities. In order to control for the understanding of the scale, five general questions were asked before eliciting
subjective probabilities regarding road risks (further detail regarding these “check questions” are included in the
Appendices).7
I acknowledge that no explicit time horizon was included in the formulation of the question. Despite a com-
prehensive training of interviewers, the possibility that some of the respondents might refer to the next trip while
others might think about their entire lifetime can’t be completely rule out. Literature on protective behaviors (Kun-
reuther and Slovic; 1978) highlighted that time horizon matters when asking about probability of accident. How-
ever, if individuals who refer to a really short time horizon are not systematically different from those who consider
their whole life, the absence of time horizon is not such a concern. Later on, I discuss possible reasons implying
a correlation between individuals’ characteristics and elicited subjective expectations and attempt to control for
this potential bias in the empirical analysis.
Table 5.1 provides the distribution of subjective probabilities of injury in the two situations of interest. Notably,
the “no helmet” variable is on average higher and has fatter tails than the “in general” probability. The graph on
the left of Figure 5.1a draws the distribution of subjective probability of being hurt if not wearing a helmet. The
distribution is broken down by different socio demographic characteristics and preferences toward risk in Figure
5.2a. This subjective probability seems to vary substantially among respondents, even for individuals of similar
gender, education, religion or presenting the same level of risk aversion.
in an accident if the respondent travels (i) as s/he usually does and (ii) not wearing a helmet should be similar.
7We use similar questions as Delavande and Kohler (2009). When performing robustness checks, I exclude from the sample individuals who
did not answer correctly to the check questions (see results in Appendix F, Table 5.19).
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Table 5.1: Distribution of subjective probabilities of injuries and police sanctions
percentile
25th 50th 75th mean std. dev. observations
Probability to be hurt
in general 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.37 0.25 841
if no helmet 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.58 0.31 836
Probability to be stopped by the police
in general 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.39 0.29 840
if no helmet 0.4 0.7 1 0.65 0.34 878
for no reason 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.36 0.30 845
FORMULATION OF QUESTIONS
Probability to be hurt
in general - “Think about the way you generally travel on the motorcycle. Given this, how likely do you think that you have an
accident in which you get injured?”
if no helmet - “In case you are not wearing a helmet, how likely do you think that you have an accident in which you get injured?”
Probability to be stopped by the police
in general - “Think about the way you generally travel on the motorcycle, what is the likelihood that you will be stopped by the
police in the next month?”
if no helmet - “If you do not use the helmet at all during the next month, what is the probability the police stops you at least once
over the period?”
for no reason - “According to you, what is the likelihood you will be stopped by the police for no reason in the next month?”
Answer scale
Respondents answered using a 11 point scale going from 0 “this event will never happen” up to 10 “this event will surely happen”.
I then divided their answer by 10 to obtain probabilities, between 0 and 1.
5.3. DATA 191
Figure 5.1: Heterogeneity in beliefs
a. Subjective probabilities if non use of helmet
b. Subsequent expected outcomes
Box plot legend:
◦
upper adjacent value
75th percentile
median
25th percentile
lower adjacent value
◦ outside values◦
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Figure 5.2: Heterogeneity in beliefs breakdown by socio-demographics
a. Subjective probability of being hurt if not using a helmet
b. Subsequent expected medical expenditures
c. Subjective probability to be stopped by the police if not using a helmet
d. Subsequent expected fines
Notes: Answers to the self-assessed risk aversion in general question have been used to build the above graphs.
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Following the question regarding the likelihood of being injured, respondents were asked which type of injury
would most likely happen in each of the two cases (“in general” and “if no helmet”). Trauma to inferior and su-
perior limbs8 are the most commonly cited injuries. However, based on data from one of the biggest hospitals in
Delhi, Kumar et al. (2008) highlighted that more than 60% of road related fatalities sustained head injuries. Cere-
bral trauma is mentioned by only 7% of my sample when considering the “in general” case.9 This share goes up
to 48% of respondents in case the individual is not using a helmet. Nevertheless, this figure is likely to cumulate
actual beliefs and the fact that respondents answer what they think they should say.
If the individual answered that the probability of being hurt while not using a helmet was strictly higher than
zero, the interviewer proceeded with questions regarding the subsequent medical expenditures. More precisely,
respondents were asked the percent chance the medical expenditures would be less than a series of fixed amounts
going from 500 INR up to 200,000 INR.10 The enumerator kept proposing higher amounts till the respondent an-
swered 100%. The main drawback of using one unique and fixed scale to elicit the distribution of a continuous
variable, in particular among a heterogenous population, is the possibility that the range offered doesn’t corre-
spond to the intervals the individual has in mind. By asking each respondent about the range of values which is
relevant for him, we would instead create a self-anchored support. In our case, expected medical expenditures
may vary quite substantially according to the motorcyclist’s wealth but also to his access to medical care, in par-
ticular whether he has health insurance or not. Taking into account this potential anchoring issue, in the initial
version of the questionnaire the respondent was first asked about the minimum and the maximum amounts of
medical expenditures. The interviewer then computed three thresholds and asked what was the percent chance
the individual would have to pay less than each of these thresholds (the three computed thresholds and the maxi-
mum) following the elicitation methodology used by Dominitz and Manski (1997b). Nevertheless, the pilot phase
revealed the interviewer’s difficulties in computing the intervals, which also increased the duration of the inter-
view and exacerbated interviewee’s fatigue. This led us to opt for pre-determined scales to derive the distribution
of medical expenditures each motorcyclist expect to pay. Yet, no significant differences in subjective medical costs
are actually found between income groups. I acknowledge that not all relevant costs are drawn out here, in par-
ticular job revenues due to a temporary or a permanent incapacity to work were not asked to the respondents.
Similarly, a possible fatal accident, which would correspond to the worst case scenario in terms of health but
which doesn’t imply any medical costs, is not explicitly elicited.
Based on the elicited cumulative distribution function, I built the expected cost for each respondent using
the following methodology. Let’s denote pi k the percent chance that the cost will be less than the amount Ck for
individual i . The motorcyclist’s expected cost Ei (C ) is then equal to :
8This covers broken arm, broken leg or possibly the loss of one of these members.
9No significant differences are detected when comparing motorcyclists who declare using or not the helmet and this no matter the trip
circumstance considered.
10The exact formulation used was the following: “Thinking about the medical expenditure you would have to pay if you were injured in a road
crash right now without wearing a helmet, what do you think is the percent chance that this amount will be less than X INR?”
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Ei (C )=
n∑
k=1
(pi k −pi k−1) ·
(
Ck +Ck−1
2
)
with
Ck +Ck−1
2
the central value of each interval and pi k−pi k−1 the percent chance associated to each interval.
Initial values C0 and pi 0 are equal to zero.11
Let’s take the example of a respondent who answered that there was a 20% chance the health expenses would
be less than 500 INR, 50% chance that they would be less than 1,000 INR and 100% chance that they wouldn’t ex-
ceed 1,500 INR. Following the above formula, this person’s expected medical expenditures amounted to 900 INR
(0.2 × 250 + 0.3 × 750 + 0.5 × 1,250).
The average expected medical cost is 5,189 INR.12 We observe a lot of heterogeneity across motorcyclists, the
standard deviation being equal to 9,012 INR (cf. Table 5.2). Based on provided answers, the 25th and the 75th
percentiles were derived through linear extrapolation. When a respondent gave for the first proposed amount a
higher percentage than 25% or 75%, the lowest amount of medical expenditures (500 INR) was imputed to the
related percentile.13 Interquartile range (75th percentile - 25th percentile) captures the variation in the poten-
tial financial costs individuals have in mind. The extent of potential medical expenditures appears to vary a lot
across respondents. Some individuals may consider both minor and extremely severe injuries when answering
the outcome question while others may have a clear opinion of what type of injuries they would face. We note that
expectation and variance parameters of medical expenditures are significantly correlated with the type of injuries
a person thinks he would suffer from if he wasn’t wearing a helmet at the time of the crash. More precisely, they
are positively related to head trauma and negatively correlated with injuries to superior or inferior limbs.
11When using different computations of the first central value (either by applying an exponential function or a power function instead of a
linear one or fixing a strictly positive minimum amount of medical costs), the expected cost is almost not modified – between 0.27% and 1.36%
of change.
12I unfortunately can’t compare this figure with actual medical expenses faced by road victims due to unavailability of hospital data.
13The minimum of 500 INR has been imputed to the 25th percentile for 236 individuals and to the 75th percentile for 97 of them.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of expected medical expenditures and fines
observations mean std. dev. median minimum maximum
Expected costs (in INR)
medical expenditures 772 5,189 9,012 1,688 250 64,003
fines 760 129 103 105 25 783
Interquartile range (in INR)
medical expenditures 772 6,718 15,039 1,500 0 94,000
fines 760 112 109 88 0 500
FORMULATION OF QUESTIONS
Medical expenditures
“Thinking about the medical expenditure you would have to pay if you were injured in the road crash right now without wearing
a helmet, what do you think is the percent chance that this amount will be less than X INR ?”
A serie of fixed amounts going from 500 INR up to 200,000 INR were proposed, the enumerator kept on proposing higher
amounts till the respondent answered 100%.
Fines
“Thinking about the fine you would have to pay if you were stopped by the police right now without wearing a helmet, what do
you think is the percent chance that this amount will be less than X INR ?”
A serie of fixed amounts going from 50 INR up to 1,000 INR were offered.
Variables built
1. Based on provided answers, the expected cost Ei (C ) was computed: Ei (C )=
∑n
k=1(pi k −pi k−1) ·
(
Ck +Ck−1
2
)
, with pi k the
percent chance that the cost will be less than the amount Yk for individual i ,
Ck +Ck−1
2
the central value of each interval and
pi k −pi k−1 the percent chance associated to each interval. Initial values C0 and pi 0 being equal to zero.
2. The interquartile range, which corresponds to the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles, has also been computed.
Based on provided answers, the 25th and the 75th percentiles were derived through linear extrapolation. When a respondent
gave for the first proposed amount a higher percentage than 25 or 75, the lowest amount of medical expenditures (500 INR) was
imputed to the percentile.
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Subjective probability to be stopped by the police and subsequent fines
The mandatory helmet law aims at providing incentives toward helmet use through financial penalties. Nonethe-
less, such sanctions are likely to modify motorcyclists’ behavior only if they are credible and sizeable enough. To
capture the actual beliefs of motorcyclists regarding helmet legislation, respondents were asked about their per-
ception of road rules enforcement. More precisely, their subjective probabilities of being stopped by the police in
the next month in three different situations were assessed. In addition to the “in general” and “if no helmet” cases,
individuals were asked the likelihood they would be stopped by the police for no reason (situation hereinafter la-
belled “for no reason”). It seemed important to set this third case given that unfair and random police sanctions
may have an unproductive and potentially adverse effect on safety decisions. From Table 5.1, it appears that the
mean of the perceived probability of being stopped by the police in the “no helmet” situation is much higher than
“in general” or “for no reason” (0.65 vs. 0.36-0.39). The variance is also a bit higher.
As previously, when the respondent said that there was a strictly positive probability of being stopped by the
police when not wearing a helmet, his expectations regarding the fine he would have to pay were elicited by the
interviewer. More precisely, interviewees were asked the percent chance the financial penalties would be less than
a series of fixed amounts going from 50 INR up to 1,000 INR; the official fine for infringing the helmet law being
100 INR. Following the same methodology as the one used to derive the expected medical expenditures, expected
fines have been computed for each individual. The individual’s lack of information regarding the level of financial
penalties has also been derived by computing the interquartile range.14 On average, motorcyclists slightly overes-
timate the financial sanctions, the observed mean of expected fines across respondents in the sample being 129
INR (cf. Table 5.2).15 Nonetheless, the variation in answers is quite important and half of the respondents have
expectations which do not exceed the official fine. The dispersion parameter also indicates that the level of the of-
ficial fine is somewhat unclear for many individuals given that on average interviewees gave an interquartile range
which is higher than the official fine (112 INR).
After this presentation of the collected data, and before turning to the empirical analysis, I discuss in the next
section the potential mechanisms at play in the formation of the subjective expectations of injury and fine as well
as the expected role of such beliefs in the decision to wear a helmet or not.
14In this case, the minimum of 50 INR has been imputed to the 25th percentile for 330 individuals and to the 75th percentile for 78 of them.
15One may argue that the proposed pre-determined scale may have biased answers upward given that it starts at 50 INR. Nevertheless,
respondents were not told the maximum offered amount (1,000 INR) and 75% of interviewees said the maximum possible fine was below 300
INR (90% below 500 INR). I acknowledge however that it could have been preferable to have a scale starting at 25 INR and increasing by a smaller
amount. This would have allowed me to obtain more accurate information. Moreover, I cannot rule out the possibility that respondents also
include in the financial consequences of being caught by the police for helmet non use additional fines related to other road regulations they
would have simultaneously violated.
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5.4 Mechanisms at play
Hereinafter, I approach the problem from the theoretical side. This discussion serves to guide the subsequent em-
pirical analysis. First, I consider the formation and updating of individuals’ beliefs regarding the medical expen-
ditures and fines they expect to pay if they don’t use a helmet. In particular, I look whether personal experiences
of road crash or traffic police stop influence motorcyclists’ subjective expectations. In a second step, I discuss the
theoretical role of subjective expectations on the decision of helmet use along with additional variables which may
directly impact the adoption of a head protection device.
5.4.1 Influence of previous experiences on subjective expectations
From every motorbike trip, individuals obtain new information with respect to the health and financial risks they
face from not using a helmet. This new information can, as defined by Haselhuhn et al. (2012), come from a traffic
accident they witness (information via observation) or from being involved in a road crash themselves (informa-
tion via personal experience). Motorcyclists are also likely to modify their beliefs after hearing the story of someone
who suffered from road injuries (information via description).
Being involved in an accident and injured or being caught by the police while not wearing a helmet certainly
increase the subjective probabilities that such events occur. Nonetheless, the effect of personal experiences on
expected medical costs and expected fines are more ambiguous. More precisely, whether personal experience
increases or decreases expected outcomes depends on (i) the individual’s prior belief and (ii) the severity of the
loss the person faces. In other words, if a person, who expected to face tremendous medical expenditures in case
of a road crash, is involved in a minor accident, he will certainly correct his expectations downward. If instead, the
motorcyclist thought that he would not be injured at all, he will rather modify his beliefs upward. Furthermore, a
person is likely to decrease or increase the expected fine to be paid in case of police halt if he was respectively able
to corrupt or not the police officer. Finally, a same road experience may have different lasting effects depending
on the frequency at which the victim uses the motorbike after the event.
One may think of many other variables which may play a role in the formation of individuals’ expectations.
Older people have had more time to experience road accident or police stop. As for women, given their low par-
ticipation in the labor market, they are much less exposed to motorbike risks. Despite the influence of socio de-
mographic characteristics, I mainly focus, in my empirical analysis, on previous experiences. Due to the cross
section data at hand, I acknowledge that I am neither able to properly study the updating process nor to estimate
accurately the impact of a road crash or a police stop on one’s subjective expectations.16 Nevertheless, I can look
whether individuals who experienced a traffic accident or who have been sanctioned by the traffic police report
significantly different beliefs regarding injuries and fines.
16Panel data could permit to estimate the influence of such events by comparing before and after level of expectations.
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5.4.2 Potential influence of subjective expectations on helmet adoption
Unconditional expected costs
When investigating the impact of expectations on helmet adoption, it seems relevant to consider the product of the
subjective probabilities and subsequent expected outcomes rather than the two dimensions separately. Indeed,
on the one hand, two motorcyclists who think they will certainly be caught by the police if they don’t wear a helmet
but who have different expectations in terms of fines to be paid may not adopt the same conduct. On the other
hand, a motorcyclist who thinks that he has a low probability of being injured but that he will suffer from severe
injuries, should this occur, and a person who believes he has a high probability of accident but the subsequent
medical expenditures will be rather small may opt for the same attitude toward helmet use. Therefore, it seems key
to look at the combination of the two dimensions. This product of variables is called unconditional expected costs
in the empirical analysis.
Different influence of expectations depending on trip circumstances
Helmet use is a renewed decision, i.e. individuals decide to use a helmet or not before each of their motorbike
trips. The characteristics of each journey (its length, the type of roads taken, etc.) are therefore likely to influence
the use of head protection. Habits and routines may also to some extent be adopted by motorcyclists who will
always use the helmet in some circumstances and never in others. Very short trips in small streets are commonly
assumed to be less dangerous in terms of injuries. While statistics from developed countries showed that a large
share of accidents occur very close to the victims’ home,17 road users often only consider the risk of injuries in long
distance trips on big roads where a lot of vehicles circulate at a high speed. A reason for that may be the willingness
not to take into account all the risks, so as to limit the stress generated by the fear of injuries. Indian motorcyclists
may follow a similar reasoning. Furthermore, the probability of crash remains low for short distance trips when
compared to the number of times a person takes the same path. Given this difficulty in internalizing all the health
risks constantly faced, it would not be surprising that subjective expectations of injuries either do not impact at all
safety behaviors or only influence helmet use in long trips on main roads. On the contrary, traffic police operates
throughout the city, both on main inner city roads and within neighborhoods. Therefore, the threat of financial
penalties is more likely to impact helmet use on short distance trips.
Additional variables impacting the expected costs and gains of helmet use
Other important determinants of helmet use include preferences toward risk. Indeed, a more risk averse individual
will prefer to adopt a safe conduct to avoid the potential loss. Results from a previous paper (Grimm and Treibich;
2014, cf. Chapter 4) show that, indeed, more risk averse drivers wear a helmet more often. However, this relation
is not found for passengers. Age is likely as well to affect the individual’s time preference rate through the horizon
over which the person discounts the consequences of a negative event. As for the level of education, it may capture
17This is the case of France where 75 % of road casualties are locals, pedestrians or occupants of vehicles registered in the district. A peak of
mortality is also observed around 6 pm, when people return from work (www.securite-routiere.gouv.fr). Unfortunately, to my knowl-
edge, no such data is available for the city of Delhi or at the Indian national level.
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the person’s ability to collect and deal with information regarding road risks. Income earners, in particular heads of
households, married people and individuals with children, may also opt for a safer conduct because of their fam-
ily responsibilities and the additional financial consequences implied by a temporary or permanent incapacity to
work. Moreover, access to health care may also matter, through the mitigation of negative health consequences.
Finally, people who believe that their life is in the hand of a superior force and that their date of death is already
written may decide not to use a helmet despite high subjective expectations of injuries.
Figure 5.3 summarizes the main channels through which individuals may form their expectations of injury
and fine and then choose whether to wear a helmet or not, in different traveling circumstances. The discussion
above aimed at highlighting the role of previous experiences in the formation and updating of individuals’ beliefs
regarding injury and fine in case one doesn’t use a helmet. It also stressed the potential role of these subjective
expectations on helmet adoption. This guides my empirical analysis. In particular by helping me to decide which
explanatory variables should be introduced in the different regressions of my empirical study.
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Figure 5.3: Formation of subjective expectations and their influence on helmet adoption
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5.5 Empirical analysis
I now empirically test the mechanisms previously brought to light. I first explore the influence of previous expe-
riences on subjective probabilities, expected financial consequences and the variance regarding these costs. In a
second step, I look at the extent to which subjective expectations influence helmet adoption. In particular, whether
the beliefs regarding injury and fine impact the use of a head protection device in different ways depending on the
circumstances of the motorbike trip.
5.5.1 Do individuals’ experiences modify their subjective expectations?
I investigate here whether previous experiences of road crash and police stop influence the individuals’ subjective
expectations regarding the risk they face when not wearing a helmet.
Empirical specification
Road hazards and police enforcement intensity are likely to vary across neighborhoods and influence subjective
expectations. In other words, if in a given area, police officers are more present, individuals living in that neigh-
borhood are likely to report higher subjective probabilities of being stopped by the police. Similarly, in an accident
prone area, individuals are more likely to report higher subjective probabilities of accident. These characteristics
are thus likely to bias my estimates if not taken into account. New Delhi is divided into 47 police zones, called “cir-
cles”. A specific police budget and man power is allocated to each of these areas. As 32 different circles are present
in our survey, I take advantage of the geographical division of the city to capture potential local effects.
I therefore estimate the following specification:
Expectationi tk =β ·Experiencei t +
∑
j
γ j ·Xi j +µc +εi tck
I consider seperately the subjective probabilities, the expected costs and the variance regarding these costs
which is captured by the interquartile range (Expectationi tk , with k = 1, 2 or 3). My variables of interest are previous
experiences (Experiencei t ) and differ depending on the type of subjective expectations t considered (injury or fine)
and the individual i . In all regressions, I introduce a set of additional explanatory variables (Xi j ). More precisely, I
include the frequency and the purpose of motorbike use in order to control, at least partly, for the probability that
the motorcyclist experienced either a road crash or a police stop. In addition, religious practices are also included
in the analysis as they may actually alter individuals’ beliefs. The local effects are captured by µc . Given that for
several of my variables of interest no variation is found within a circle (cf. Table 5.12, Appendix A), I also report the
results found with ordinary least square results and when relevant the results of the random effect specifications.
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Influence of previous road traffic experiences on injury expectations
Both personal and relatives’ experiences of road crash are introduced as dummy variables in the analysis. As men-
tioned previously, the purpose and the frequency of motorbike use control for possible differences in road risks
and therefore for the probability of being involved in an accident.18 Furthermore, the trauma caused by one expe-
rience of crash is likely to have a smaller impact on people who frequently uses this mode of transportation and
who balances this negative event with many safe journeys. I thus introduce an interaction term between frequency
of motorbike use and personal involvement in a road accident. Hausman tests indicate that the estimation with
police zone fixed effects should be preferred to ordinary least square or random effect specifications.
Table 5.3 reports the results found for the different specifications described above. Interestingly, involvement
in an accident decreases the variance related to medical costs. Following an accident, individuals actually seem
to have a clearer idea of the health risks they face. While praying daily decreases one’s subjective probability of
being injured in a road crash when not using a helmet, expected medical expenditures and variation in these costs
are higher among religious individuals who personally experienced a road accident than among those who didn’t.
As for individuals who use the motorbike to commute to work, they report significantly higher probabilities of
being hurt. When looking at the interaction term, frequent use of a motorbike seems to decrease the impact of
personal road crash on the subjective probability of being injured, indicating that the number of trips impact the
repercussions of road crash experiences. Furthermore, it appears that knowing someone who has been involved
in an accident increases by 0.09 the subjective probability of being injured in a road crash if not using a helmet,
while personal experience has no significant impact (cf. column(1), Table 5.3). Different reasons may explain this
finding. First, personal involvement in a traffic accident may cover very different types of events, in particular with
regard to the seriousness of injuries faced by road victims. Second, a sample selection may be at play as individuals
who suffered from severe road injuries may no longer use a motorbike or may not even have survived the crash.19
Third, remembering that a friend or a family member got caught in a traffic accident is more likely if this crash was
quite severe. Differences in road quality and incidence of road crash between neighborhoods may partly explain
the level of expectations as the influence of knowing a person who got caught in an accident vanishes once circle
fixed effects are introduced. In 15 circles out of 32, none of the respondents knew a person who got involved in a
road traffic accident. This may either support the quality of roads argument or imply that individuals are rather
homogenous in this regard within areas.
18In my sample, individuals who frequently use a motorbike are more likely to have personally experienced a road crash.
19While information on the severity of the accident was gathered, very few individuals (2% of the sample) were involved in a severe crash.
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Table 5.3: Determinants of injury expectations
subjective probability subsequent outcomes
of injury if no helmet expected costs interquartile range
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Experienced a road crash (=1) 0.078 0.042 -6.092??? -5.377?? -9.576??? -8.266??
(0.080) (0.052) (1.366) (2.146) (2.553) (3.607)
Has a relative involved in a road crash (=1) 0.093?? 0.030 1.554 2.275 2.070 3.226
(0.041) (0.040) (1.814) (1.500) (2.910) (2.149)
Uses the moto to commute to work (=1) 0.044? 0.068??? -0.124 0.071 0.411 0.758
(0.025) (0.019) (0.770) (0.583) (1.278) (0.851)
Uses the moto frequently (=1) 0.071??? 0.053?? -2.450??? -0.676 -3.804??? -1.254
(0.025) (0.023) (0.723) (1.064) (1.192) (1.769)
Experienced a road crash ×Uses the moto frequently -0.151?? -0.125 4.425?? 2.263 7.670? 4.119
(0.073) (0.080) (2.176) (2.129) (4.330) (4.422)
Prays daily (=1) -0.142??? -0.069??? -1.300? -1.059 -1.714 -1.420
(0.024) (0.023) (0.771) (0.759) (1.285) (1.208)
Experienced a road crash × Prays daily 0.094 0.065 5.128??? 5.668?? 9.639??? 10.401??
(0.087) (0.072) (1.811) (2.210) (3.484) (4.183)
R2/ R2 within 0.077 0.048 0.028 0.017 0.026 0.018
Observations 828 828 765 765 765 765
Hausman test (p-value)
OLS vs. FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
FE vs. RE 0.003 0.088 0.061
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ??? 1%, ?? 5% and ? 10% significance.
Remark: The difference in the number of observations comes from the fact that individuals who gave a zero probability of injury
did not answer to the medical expenditure questions. Moreover some respondents who gave a non zero probability did not reply to
the outcome questions.
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Influence of previous interactions with the traffic police on fine expectations
I now turn to the influence of personal experiences on fine expectations. Besides previous police stops for infring-
ing road rules, individuals’ subjective probability of being stopped by the police for no reason and the possibility
of bribing police officers are my variables of interest. The former may capture the discretionary power of the police
and the latter the bargaining power of the motorcyclist.20 Both can be considered as proxies for previous interac-
tions with traffic forces and might impact individuals’ subjective expectations. As previously, road exposure and
religious practices are introduced in all regressions.
From Table 5.4, it appears that the random effects specifications should be preferred to the fixed effects esti-
mations. Having been already sanctioned by the traffic police increases both the expected fines to be paid and
the uncertainty with respect to the financial penalty. This latter effect may be explained by repeated sanctions of
different amounts. Arbitraireness in the traffic police sanctions increases the subjective probability of being sanc-
tioned if not using a helmet. As for individuals who think they can bribe police officers, they report significantly
lower probabilities of being stopped by the police. This variable may thus actually capture how serious the traffic
police is about enforcing road rules.
As for the effect of road habits and religious practices. Motorcyclists who use the motorbike to go to work report
significantly higher probabilities of being caught by the police if not wearing a helmet. The observed differences
between ordinary least square and fixed effect specifications indicate that differences in expectations may also
come from actual differences in police enforcement intensity in each circle. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that this
result may be simply caused by the small variation within a circle. In 11 circles, none of the respondents reports
having been stopped by the traffic police.
20Expectations and opinion on the work made by the traffic police may actually be both related with a third variable which reflects the
individual’s acceptance of authorities and their power.
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Table 5.4: Determinants of fine expectations
subjective probability subsequent outcomes
of police stop if no helmet expected costs interquartile range
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specification OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Has been sanctionned by the police (=1) 0.086? 0.032 0.045 0.598?? 0.538? 0.548? 0.516?? 0.469? 0.487?
(0.046) (0.035) (0.034) (0.244) (0.297) (0.298) (0.214) (0.273) (0.271)
Discretionnary power of police 0.271??? 0.189??? 0.201??? 0.281?? 0.168 0.198 0.492??? 0.206 0.258
(0.041) (0.061) (0.059) (0.123) (0.198) (0.190) (0.144) (0.243) (0.230)
Police officers can be bribed (=1) -0.045? -0.041 -0.044? -0.085 -0.126 -0.123 -0.093 -0.153 -0.149
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.081) (0.100) (0.097) (0.084) (0.100) (0.100)
Uses the moto to commute to work (=1) 0.011 0.034? 0.033? 0.002 0.045 0.044 0.009 0.038 0.036
(0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.091) (0.083) (0.081)
Uses the moto frequently (=1) 0.029 0.038 0.035 -0.098 -0.051 -0.059 0.010 0.023 0.017
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.083) (0.090) (0.093) (0.087) (0.077) (0.078)
Prays daily (=1) -0.050?? -0.040 -0.042 -0.137 -0.006 -0.020 -0.224?? -0.120 -0.132
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.089) (0.074) (0.074) (0.101) (0.097) (0.099)
R2/ R2 within / R2 overall 0.076 0.050 0.025 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.041 0.028 0.034
Observations 821 821 821 702 702 702 702 702 702
Hausman test (p-value)
OLS vs. FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
FE vs. RE 0.105 0.687 0.751
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ??? 1%, ?? 5% and ? 10% significance.
Remark: The difference in the number of observations comes from the fact that individuals who gave a zero probability of injury did not answer
to the medical expenditure questions. Moreover some respondents who gave a non zero probability did not reply to the outcome questions.
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5.5.2 To what extent do subjective expectations influence helmet adoption?
Empirical specification
I investigate here whether fear of injuries and police threat actually make motorcyclists adopt safer road behaviors,
in particular toward helmet use.
Dependent variables
As already mentioned, in our survey, two traveling dimensions were considered for helmet use: the type of roads
and the length of the motorbike trip. More precisely, three different circumstances were presented to the respon-
dents: trips (i) in residential neighborhoods, (ii) on the main roads for short distances and (iii) on the main roads
for long distances (> 15mn). While the first situation refers to narrow streets in residential or market areas, the
two last cases correspond to travels on large boulevards where the traffic is often heavy. The richness of the data
collected allows me to look at the role of different types of subjective expectations (medical expenditures vs. fines)
on specific trip situations.
Variables of interest
My variables of interest are the products of the subjective probabilities of being hurt or stopped by the police if
not wearing a helmet and the related subsequent expected costs. In addition to the argument presented in the
previous section, this choice is motivated by the fact that no information regarding expected outcomes is available
for people who gave a zero probability for the negative event to occur. I set the unconditional expected costs to
zero for those individuals. For the subsample of individuals who gave a non zero probability of being injured and
stopped by the police if they are not wearing a helmet, I decompose the unconditional expected cost in order to see
if there is one of its dimensions (“frequency” vs. “severity”) which drive the results I found. Furthermore, one may
also argue that the variance in potential financial consequences is important in the motorcyclist’s decision process.
I thus include the interquartile range in the decomposition analysis. Finally, in my robustness checks, I consider
higher values of the expected outcomes (75th percentile and maximum) as the conduct adopted by motorcyclists
might be rather related to the worst case scenario.
Local effects
When studying the relation between beliefs and behaviors, one may argue that local specificities may be correlated
with individual’s subjective expectations and eventually bias the estimates.21 While some variables, such as the
quality of roads, the incidence of road crash or the police presence, may impact helmet use only through their
effect on subjective expectations; others may also have a direct effect on helmet use. For instance, the presence
of private emergency services in the area is likely to be associated with the expected medical costs but may as
well partly influence the consequences of an accident (through the quality of health care), impacting directly the
21This issue is actually not relevant when looking at the influence of risk aversion on road safety efforts (helmet use and choice of speed), as
done in Grimm and Treibich (2014) (cf. Chapter 4). Indeed, in that case, it is rather the interviewers themselves who potentially influence the
declared helmet use and the elicited risk aversion and not the local environment.
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helmet use. As for neighbor’s attitudes (social norms), they are likely to be correlated with one’s behavior regardless
of his subjective expectations but they may also induce a modification regarding the perceived consequences of
helmet use.
Therefore, living, for instance, in a neighborhood where no one uses a helmet, may lower simultaneously hel-
met adoption by motorcyclists in the area and their subjective expectations of being caught by the police. This
would lead to an underestimation of the true relation existing between subjective expectations and helmet adop-
tion. On the contrary, the presence of private health centers may increase the medical expenditures individuals
expect to pay in case of road injury but also decreases the helmet adoption as individuals may expect to receive
particularly high quality care. This in turn would lead to an overestimation of the true coefficient. In other words,
some unobservable characteristics at the geographical level are likely to be correlated with the independent re-
gressors of interest and have a direct effect on the behaviors we attempt to explain. However, the direction of this
bias is ambiguous.
Identification strategy
Similar to what I did to study the formation of subjective expectations, I take advantage of the administrative
organization of Delhi to capture the local effects. Yet, before implementing this kind of empirical strategy, it is im-
portant to make sure that there is enough variation within circles; this, in order to avoid making hasty conclusions.
Based on the analysis of the intra circle heterogeneity, it seems that dependent and independent variables vary
quite substantially, even within one area (cf. Table 5.13 in Appendix A).
I therefore estimate the following specification:
Helmet usei t =βm ·UECmedi +β f ·UEC
f i ne
i +
∑
j
γ j ·Xi j +µc +εi ct
with i referring to the individual and t to the type of trip. Helmet usei t is a binary variable. UECmedi and
UEC f i nei are the unconditional expected medical costs and the unconditional expected fines respectively. Xi j is a
set of individual socio demographic characteristics. Finally, µc corresponds to the respondent’s circle of residence.
I run fixed effect linear probability estimations, I thus obtain the effect of the variations in subjective expec-
tations on helmet use within each police zone. I clustered all standard errors at that level to control for potential
autocorrelation in the error terms. My variables of interest are the unconditional expected costs. I include several
individual characteristics which are likely to be correlated with both subjective expectations and helmet adoption
and which thus may bias my estimates. More precisely, I introduce gender, age, education level, marital status,
number of children, household monthly income, personal contribution to the family revenues, religious beliefs,
preferences toward risk and health insurance. Indeed, as pointed out in the section discussing the underlying
mechanisms, these variables are likely to be correlated with helmet adoption (through the expected costs and
gains of helmet use) and with individuals’ beliefs regarding risk of injury and fine (through the likelihood that the
person has already experienced a road crash or a police stop). Introducing police zone fixed effects in the estima-
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tions allows me to capture the previously mentioned specificities of each area along with the behaviors adopted
by respondents’ neighbors and the socio economic status of each residential locality. However, as Manski (1993)
pointed out, these various effects are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, people with similar tastes and characteristics
may select themselves into the same circles. Therefore, the absence of significant impact of some of the explana-
tory variables might be actually due to their too limited variation within a circle. From Table 5.13 (cf. Appendix
A), we note that for some of the socio demographic characteristics this may be a concern. Furthermore, while
circle effects pick up part of the differences in actual risks faced by individuals in different neighborhoods, it does
not annihilate them completely. This because of, for instance, different traveling hours, different routes taken or
different driving skills of motorcyclists living in the same police zone.
Results
Table 5.5 presents the results found for the three types of trips considered. Police threat and fear of injuries appear
to impact helmet use in different ways depending on the traveling situation considered. Indeed, it seems that
subjective expectations with respect to fines increases helmet use on short distance trips. On the contrary, higher
expected medical expenditures lead to a greater helmet adoption on long distance trips only.22 More precisely a
raise of 1,000 INR in the unconditional expected medical costs increases by 0.5 percentage points the probability
that the person wears a helmet for long trips on main roads. A raise of 100 INR in the unconditional expected
fines increases by respectively 7.7 and 4.9 percentage points the probability of using a helmet for short trips on
main roads and trips in residential neighborhoods. From the Hausman test’s results, it seems that the fixed effect
specification should always be preferred to the ordinary least square estimation. When looking at helmet use on
short distance trips on main roads, the random effect specification appears to provide more efficient estimates.
One issue with linear probability estimations is that predicted value may be out of the probability range. This is
actually the case for only 40 (6%), 13 (2%) and 11(1.7%) observations regarding respectively the helmet use on long
distance trips on main roads, short distance ones and trips in residential areas.
Table 5.14 (cf. Appendix B) reports the results obtained for the additional explanatory variables introduced in
the regressions presented in Table 5.5. Men are significantly more likely to use a helmet than women, while Sikhs
are significantly less likely than motorcyclists belonging to other religious communities to use such protective
device. More precisely, when considering long distance trips, the probability of using a helmet increases by 41
percentage points if the motorcyclist is a man and decreases by 27 percentage points if he or she is a Sikh. These
findings are not surprising given that the Sikhs successfully lobbied against the use of helmet on the ground that it
goes against their religious beliefs.23 They managed to be exempted from this obligation by the Delhi government.
De facto, the helmet law has not been enforced for any women due to the difficulty to distinguish a Sikh from a
Hindu or a Muslim.24 Having a health insurance has a significant and negative impact on helmet use only for long
22The results on the significance of unconditional expected medical costs on helmet use for long distance trips without and with robust
standard errors differ very marginally, but the latter specification makes the coefficient passes above the 10% significance level.
23In addition to religious constraints, men belonging to the Sikh community can’t wear simultaneously their turban and a helmet.
24This softness in the helmet mandatory law implementation came to an end since Septembre 2014. Indeed, traffic police began to prosecute
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distance trips when not controlling for the circle of residence (Table not shown). The absence of effect of access to
health care on helmet use may actually be explained by the inefficiency of ambulatory services. According to Hsiao
et al. (2013), 58% of all road traffic injury deaths in India occur on the scene of the collision, either immediately
or while waiting for the emergency ambulance to come. No effect of income or impact of education are detected.
Finally, preferences toward risk don’t appear to significantly influence motorcyclists behaviors.25
Table 5.5: Influence of expectations on helmet use - using unconditional expected costs (UEC)
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005+ -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.011 0.077??? 0.049??
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
R2 0.296 0.261 0.243
Observations 670 673 665
Hausman test (p-value)
OLS vs. FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
FE vs. RE 0.000 0.161 0.000
Predicted values
1st percentile 0.248 0.047 -0.002
99th percentile 1.071 1.024 0.094
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance.
Fixed effect linear probability estimations with clustered standard errors reported
in parentheses. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, gender, age,
income, education level, contribution to income, Sikh, caste, risk aversion, health insurance
and existence of a superior force.
women riding two-wheelers without a helmet. Sick women are still exempted, but only if they were able to prove their identity (source: The
Times of India, September 11, 2014).
25In a previous paper (Grimm and Treibich; 2014, cf. Chapter 4), the effect of risk aversion on helmet adoption was detected only in the
sample of drivers. Contrary to the analysis made then, I gather in this analysis all types of motorcyclists.
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Differentiated influence of expectations on helmet use
Some socio demographic characteristics of individuals are likely to modify the influence of subjective expectations
on helmet adoption. In particular, women may be more sensitive to health issues and react more strongly to a given
level of expected medical costs. Furthermore, absolute amounts of medical expenditures and fines have been
elicited, yet poorer individuals may be more responsive to a given level of costs as it represents a bigger share of
their income. Finally, more risk averse individuals may adopt safer behaviors than less risk averse motorcyclists to
avoid the same amount of costs. In order to study such differentiated effects, I interact the unconditional expected
costs with gender, level of income and preferences toward risk. Results when introducing or not the interaction
between risk aversion and subjective expectations are really similar. I report the coefficients obtained when not
introducing the latter interactions in Table 5.6 and the corresponding net effects of subjective expectations on
helmet use for the different subgroups in Table 5.7. Interestingly when allowing for heterogenous effects between
income and gender, I find that the probability of wearing a helmet in long distance trips increases by 2 percentage
points if the level of unconditional expected medical costs rises by 1,000 INR for all women. No effect is detected
for men. Similarly, for a same level of subjective medical costs poor women are more likely to use a helmet in
short trips on main roads. An income gradient is found when introducing interaction terms between subjective
expectations and levels of income. More precisely, poor and middle income individuals are less likely to wear a
helmet than individuals belonging to wealthier household. Moreover, among the poorest individuals (31% of the
sample), a raise of 100 INR in the unconditional expected fines increases the probability of wearing a helmet in
short distance trips on main roads by 11 percentage points against an increase by only 7 percentage points among
the wealthiest motorcyclists (17% of the sample). Subjective expectations of fines have a significant impact on
helmet use in trips in the residential neighborhoods only among middle class individuals. Finally, the impact of
unconditional expected fines on helmet use for short trips on main roads decreases with the level of risk aversion
of motorcyclists (Table not shown). While one might expect that risk preferences and beliefs reinforce one another,
this finding may be explained by the fact that preferences toward risk already partly influence the behavior of more
risk averse motorcyclists, or that extremely risk averse individuals with high expected medical costs simply do not
use this mode of transport and are de facto excluded from our survey.
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Table 5.6: Differentiated influence of expectations on helmet use by gender, income and risk aversion
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005+ 0.022? -0.000 0.005 0.001 0.006
(0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.011 -0.022 0.077??? 0.076?? 0.049?? -0.016
(0.018) (0.044) (0.018) (0.035) (0.023) (0.037)
Male (=1) 0.409??? 0.428??? 0.414??? 0.474??? 0.390??? 0.388???
(0.052) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060) (0.070) (0.062)
Male ×UEC medical expenditures -0.019?? -0.020?? -0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Male ×UEC fine 0.025 -0.002 0.030
(0.046) (0.040) (0.033)
Household monthly income, ref: Rich (above 20,000 INR)
Poor (less than 10,000 INR) -0.013 -0.066 -0.095+ -0.185?? -0.092 -0.164?
(0.042) (0.063) (0.064) (0.068) (0.078) (0.092)
Middle (between 10,000 and 20,000 INR) -0.019 -0.044 -0.097?? -0.090+ -0.062 -0.164???
(0.038) (0.046) (0.040) (0.053) (0.049) (0.058)
Poor ×UEC medical expenditures 0.001 0.017?? 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
Middle ×UEC medical expenditures 0.002 0.003 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Poor ×UEC fines 0.045 0.039 0.050
(0.031) (0.032) (0.044)
Middle ×UEC fines 0.016 -0.015 0.082???
(0.031) (0.034) (0.028)
Risk aversion (average, 8 points) -0.009 -0.013 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R2 0.296 0.317 0.261 0.284 0.243 0.254
Observations 670 670 673 673 665 665
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance. Fixed effect linear probability estimations with clustered standard errors reported
in parentheses. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, age, education level, contribution to income, Sikh, caste,
health insurance and existence of a superior force.
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Table 5.7: Influence of subjective expectations on helmet use - net effects for different subgroups
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
UEC medical costs UEC fine UEC medical costs UEC fine UEC medical costs UEC fine
Rich women 0.022?? -0.022 0.005 0.076?? 0.006 -0.016
(0.010) (0.044) (0.008) (0.035) (0.012) (0.037)
Rich men 0.003 0.003 -0.015??? 0.074??? -0.007 0.014
(0.004) (0.029) (0.005) (0.027) (0.009) (0.037)
Middle class women 0.024?? -0.005 0.007 0.061+ 0.015 0.066??
(0.009) (0.044) (0.010) (0.040) (0.014) (0.031)
Middle class men 0.005 0.020 -0.012?? 0.059?? 0.002 0.095???
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.022) (0.008) (0.029)
Poor women 0.023?? 0.023 0.021?? 0.114??? 0.014 0.034
(0.009) (0.037) (0.009) (0.032) (0.015) (0.038)
Poor men 0.004 0.048? 0.002 0.112??? 0.001 0.063
(0.004) (0.024) (0.006) (0.029) (0.008) (0.043)
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance.
Household monthly income categories: Poor = less than 10,000 INR, Rich = above 20,000 INR.
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Decomposing the unconditional expected costs
In the previous analysis, my variables of interest were the products between the subjective probabilities of being
hurt or being stopped by the police when not using a helmet and their related subsequent costs. This choice was
mainly driven by the fact that individuals who think that they will never be hurt in a road accident or stopped by the
police if they don’t use a helmet were not questionned about the possible financial consequences of these events.
However, empirical evidence, consistent with prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman; 1974), highlighted the fact
that individuals tend to be overly responsive to low probabilities of high costs events. The reported probabilities
may therefore already contain some overweighting. In other words, in this case, we should observe that individuals
who declare higher subjective probabilities of injury or fine also report higher levels of costs. When looking at
the pairwise correlation coefficients between subjective probabilities and subsequent costs, we note that this is
true for police sanctions, individuals who think they have a higher probability of being stopped by the police also
expect to pay a higher amount of fine. However, individuals who declare higher subjective probabilities of being
hurt disclose lower medical costs. Furthermore, we are here interested in the impact of subjective expectations on
individual behaviors and not on whether motorcyclists accurately estimate the probabilities injury or police halt
occur.
For the subsample of respondent who provided a strictly positive probability of injury and fine, I am able to
investigate the respective roles of subjective probabilities and subsequent outcomes on helmet adoption. This
corresponds to excluding 104 individuals from the sample. In addition, one may argue that the variance of poten-
tial financial consequences is also a dimension which motivates the conduct adopted by motorcyclists. Therefore, I
also included the interquartile range in the specification to study the influence of variance and lack of information
regarding possible losses on individuals’ risky behaviors.
Table 5.8 presents the results found. When comparing coefficients of unconditional expected costs obtained
with the full sample (Table 5.5) and the restricted one (cf. Table 5.8 – columns 1, 4 and 7), we see that stronger ef-
fects are obtained with the latter sample either in terms of significance of the coefficient (for long distance trips) or
in terms of its magnitude (for short distance trips). When looking at the respective effect of “frequency” (subjective
probabilities) and “severity” (expected costs) dimensions (cf. columns 2, 5 and 8), we note that it is the expected
costs which actually drive the relations previously detected. Finally, when introducing the dispersion dimension
(cf. columns 3, 6 and 9), I find that an increase of 1,000 INR in the expected medical expenditures increases by
1.5 percentage points the probability of wearing a helmet in long distance journeys. On the contrary, a similar in-
crease in the variance regarding such costs decreases by 0.7 percentage points the probability that the motorcyclist
adopt a safe behavior. Comparable relations between subjective medical costs and helmet use are found in short
distance trips on main roads. Regarding expected fines, in both short distance trips on main roads and trips in
residential neighborhoods, the lack of information regarding the amount to pay drives the individual’s behavior.
More precisely, an increase in 100 INR of the dispersion in the fine boosts the probability of using a helmet by
around 6 percentage points. The coefficient of expected financial cost is then no longer significant.
214 EXPECTATIONS OF INJURY AND FINE
Table 5.8: Influence of expectations on helmet use - non zero probability sample
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005? 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.001 0.085??? 0.059???
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Subjective probability of injury 0.077 0.085 -0.164 -0.158 0.064 0.051
(0.062) (0.065) (0.142) (0.141) (0.120) (0.116)
Expected medical costs (th. INR) 0.003? 0.015?? 0.002 0.017?? -0.000 -0.012
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
IQR of medical costs (th. INR) -0.007? -0.008?? 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Subjective probability of police stop -0.001 -0.003 0.163 0.163 -0.004 -0.003
(0.052) (0.050) (0.103) (0.102) (0.071) (0.073)
Expected fine (hund. INR) -0.013 -0.020 0.065??? 0.013 0.075??? 0.028
(0.023) (0.033) (0.014) (0.030) (0.022) (0.034)
IQR of fine (hund. INR) 0.008 0.061?? 0.056??
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
R2 0.262 0.264 0.269 0.244 0.253 0.265 0.223 0.231 0.239
Observations 589 589 589 591 591 591 583 583 583
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5% and ? 10% significance. Fixed effect linear probability estimations with clustered standard errors reported.
Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, gender, age, income, education level, contribution to income caste, risk aversion,
health insurance and existence of a superior force. IQR stands for interquartile range and captures the dispersion in the outcome.
Robustness checks
In order to provide evidence for the reliability of my results, I implement different robustness checks, the results of
which are reported hereinafter.
Considering alternative information of the expected outcomes’ distribution
One may argue that it is the highest possible values with respect to potential financial consequences (i.e. the
costs corresponding to the worst case scenario the individual has in mind), rather than its expected level, which
motivates the conduct adopted by motorcyclists. When replacing expected costs by the 75th percentile or the
maximum value, I find similar results regarding the influence of subjective expectations on helmet use (cf. Table
5.15, Appendix C).
Tackling the reverse causality issue
A main concern regarding the previous results is the possibility that individuals who decide not to wear a helmet
may report lower expectations of negative consequences in order to reduce the stress induced by the behaviors
they choose to adopt. This effect is known as cognitive dissonance and has been first highlighted by Akerlof and
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Dickens (1982). In order to tackle the reverse causality issue previously mentioned, I try to show that helmet use
does not cause subjective expectations regarding injury or fine. I take advantage of a regulation implemented in
Delhi since July 2009 that makes it compulsory to provide a helmet with every new motorbike that is sold. I regress
helmet use on unconditional expected costs instrumenting the former variable by mandatory helmet provision.
More precisely, the instrument takes value one if the respondent is a driver and rides a motorbike purchased first
hand less than two years ago. I assume that this variable is indeed exogenous and unrelated with any omitted
variable. Results presented in Table 5.16 (Appendix D) show that helmet adoption does not explain fine or injury
expectations and that the instrumental variable (helmet provision) is positively and significantly correlated with
the endogenous regressor (helmet use). More precisely the F-statistics takes values from 12 to 18 conditional on
the circumstances of the trip.
Individual omitted characteristics
I acknowledge that some individual’s characteristics (such as optimism, overconfidence regarding one’s driving
skills, preference for present, level of speed or road habits) still remain unobserved and might bias my results.
Optimism, for instance, is likely to reduce the subjective probability of accident and the size of injury. Similarly,
overconfident drivers are likely to think they are able to avoid both police officers and road crashes. These two
characteristics, so far unobserved, are negatively correlated with subjective expectations regarding the usefulness
of a helmet. On the contrary, the velocity at which motorcyclists travel may influence both subjective expecta-
tions of medical expenditures and helmet adoption. Speed certainly increases the probability of accident and the
severity of injuries. If low speed and helmet use are substitutes,26 individuals with high subjective expectations
of injuries may decide to reduce their speed instead of wearing a helmet. The estimates would in that case be an
overestimation of the true relation between beliefs and head protection use. As for the absence, in the formulation
of the question, of a clear time horizon to be considered by the respondent when answering to the likelihood of be-
ing hurt in a road crash, I acknowledge that comparability between individuals might be problematic. As pointed
before, some may refer to the next trip while others think about their entire life time. The absence of time horizon
would jeopardize my results if individuals who refer to a really short time horizon are different than those who
consider their whole life. One may argue that present oriented individuals may be more likely to refer to the next
motorbike trip and then may report lower probabilities of injuries. If preference for the present is negatively corre-
lated with subjective expectations (and not included in the analysis) then the estimate of unconditional expected
medical costs on helmet use will be an underestimation of the true relation.
In Table 5.17 (Appendix E), I add the following variables to the previous specifications: average speed (Panel 1),
road habits (Panel 2), preference for present (Panel 3) and confidence on one’s driving skills (Panel 4, restricted to
the drivers subsample).
A significant relation between subjective expected medical costs and helmet use in long distance trips appears
when average speed is introduced in the specification. In addition, we note that subjective expectations of fines
26In the previous article Grimm and Treibich (2014) (cf. Chapter 4), we provide evidence regarding the relation between these two safety
behaviors.
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also increase helmet use on long distance trips when average speed or confidence are included in the regressions.
Similar results as the ones previously presented are found regarding the influence of subjective expectations of
fines on helmet adoption in the two types of short distance journeys. One issue raised when discussing the relation
between subjective expectations regarding injuries and safety effort was the possible link between individuals’
preferences for present and the time horizon they considered when answering to the probability of being hurt
in a road crash. Nonetheless, when introducing preference for present in the regression as additional control,
results found previously are not modified. Regarding the impact of the previously omitted variables on helmet
adoption, speed appears to be positively correlated with helmet use on long travels. Individuals who frequently
use a motorbike are significantly more likely to wear a helmet when traveling on main roads. Finally, drivers who
believe they drive better than others are less likely to use a helmet for long trips or trips in neighborhoods. In this
latter case, risk aversion is found to be positively correlated with helmet use on main roads. To conclude, adding
these different characteristics leads to a reduction of the sample but findings are consistent with the previous
results providing that my attempts to control for omitted local environmental variables have already given reliable
estimates.
Excluding individuals who did not seem to understand the probability scale
The understanding, by all respondents, of the probability scale used to derive subjective probabilities may be ques-
tioned. Before eliciting subjective expectations of probabilities and outcomes regarding injury and fine, several
questions were asked to interviewees in order to be able to verify whether they properly understood the proba-
bility scale (cf. Appendix F). I compare the results reported in Table 5.5 to the coefficients obtained if excluding
individuals who did not correctly answered to the check questions (see Table 5.19). Similar findings of the in-
fluence of subjective expectations on helmet adoption are found for the different samples considered (excluding
individuals who answered incorrectly to one or several check questions). The magnitude of the effects are quite
constant across samples: a raise of 100 INR in the unconditional expected fines increases by around 7 percent-
age points (from 6.3 to 7.9) the probability of wearing a helmet in short distance trips on main roads and by 5
percentage points (from 4.8 to 5.2) the probability of using a helmet in residential neighborhoods.
On the direct influence of experiences on helmet use
When studying the formation of subjective expectations, I have assumed that previous experiences related to road
risks only influence helmet adoption through expectations, these being updated based on the new information
the individual gets from a road traffic accident or a police stop.
Nonetheless, the event per se is likely to impact the safety conduct adopted by motorcyclists. Haselhuhn et al.
(2012) used data on video rental fines and showed that, controlling for the level of information regarding the finan-
cial sanctions of a delay in returning the video, previous experience with a fine significantly improved the future
compliance rate. Using the same specification as the one presented in Table 5.5, I introduce road crash and police
stop as explanatory variables along with interaction terms between (i) road accident and unconditional expectated
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medical costs and (ii) police stop and unconditional expected fines. From Table 5.9, we note that the effect of in-
jury expectations on helmet use for short trips appears to be lower among individuals who have been involved in
a traffic accident. The effect of fine expectations on helmet use for trips in the residential neighborhoods among
individuals who have been caught by the traffic police doubles compared to its effect among those who have never
been in that situation. This last result shows the importance of combining information and enforcement to make
motorcyclists adopt safe behaviors.
Table 5.9: Differentiated influence of expectations on helmet use by previous experiences
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.010 0.007 0.076??? 0.085??? 0.050?? 0.031
(0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026)
Road crash (=1) -0.049 -0.015 -0.097
(0.059) (0.061) (0.064)
Road crash ×UEC medical expenditures -0.002 -0.010?? 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Police stop (=1) 0.030 0.047 -0.112
(0.050) (0.072) (0.095)
Police stop ×UEC fines 0.009 -0.041 0.080??
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030)
R2 0.287 0.289 0.259 0.262 0.242 0.248
Observations 662 662 665 665 657 657
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5% and ? 10% significance.
Fixed effect linear probability estimations with clustered standard errors reported.
Controls are gender, marital status, # of children, head of household, age, education level, income,
contribution to income, Sikh, caste, risk aversion, health insurance and existence of a superior force.
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5.6 Policy implications
In order to be able to formulate policy recommendations, I now consider different road safety policies which are
likely to influence individuals’ subjective expectations of injuries and fines when not wearing a helmet, and esti-
mate their impact with respect to helmet use.
5.6.1 Raising subjective expectations of fines
I first study policies which impact subjective expectations of fines if infringing the helmet law, either through the
information on the official level of fine, its perceived enforcement or its level per se.
In order to simulate policies and estimate their impact on helmet adoption, I run probit specifications with
circle dummies clustering standard errors at the police zone level. Results obtained, both in terms of significance
and magnitude, are very similar to those obtained with the fixed effect linear probability model. I report them in
the Appendix G, Table 5.20. Based on these probit estimations, Table 5.10 reports the estimated impact on helmet
use if motorcyclists perfectly know the current level of fine (Scenario 1), if the official fine is raised up to 500 INR
(Scenario 2), if individuals perfectly know the current level of fine and expect to always be caught by the police
when not wearing a helmet (Scenario 3), and if perfect enforcement and information is associated with a higher
official fine of 500 INR (Scenario 4). The chosen multiplicator factor of fines (×5) coincides with an amendment
of the Motor Vehicle Act currently under discussion in the Indian Parliament. As expected from the empirical
analysis, larger gains regarding helmet adoption are obtained on short distance trips, in particular on main roads.
The limited increase in helmet use for longer trips can be explained both by a bigger role of expected injuries in
this particular decision and by the smaller room for improvement in this type of trip. A larger impact is found when
raising the official fine substantially. More precisely, scenarios 2 and 4 lead to an increase of 25% to 40% of helmet
use for short distance trips.
When comparing previous police stops experienced by respondents with administrative traffic police data, we
note that the number of offences for not using a helmet in 2011 per police zone is positively correlated with the
share of respondents living in that area who declare they have been stopped by the police for infringing the helmet
law. According to these figures, it seems important not only to publicize the financial penalties individuals may
face when not using a helmet but also to increase the actual enforcement of helmet legislation. Similar findings
are found by Lu et al. (2012). These authors implemented a randomized experiment in China and showed that
telling drivers that they have been catched by the electronic devices deters them from infringing the road rules in
the future while providing them with information on the likelihood of punishment does not. The acceptance and
efficiency of such repressive rules depend also on the way they are implemented. Information prior the change of
traffic sanctions and a period where road users are stopped by the police but not sanctioned are key for individuals
to accept the offence and its amount.
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Table 5.10: Estimated helmet use for changes in expectations of fines
on main roads for trips in
Helmet use for long trips for short trips the neighborhood
observations 610 663 660
Current UEC fines (INR) 90 93 93
Declared helmet use (%) 78.20 59.58 53.03
Declared - predicted helmet use (average) -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
% change in helmet use
Scenario 1 EC = 100 INR + 0.14% - 3.12% - 1.36%
Scenario 2 EC = 500 × info. coeff. + 2.33% + 23.36% + 25.12%
Scenario 3 UEC = 100 INR + 0.41% + 2.55% + 1.53%
Scenario 4 UEC = 500 INR + 2.85% + 49.56% + 32.43%
Notes: Computations based on probit regression with circle dummies (cf. Table 5.20).
Scenario 1: perfect information, individuals expect to pay 100 INR, i.e. the official fine.
Scenario 2: raising the official fine up to 500 INR, but keeping enforcement and information level as it is.
Scenario 3: perfect information and enforcement with current level of fine.
Scenario 4: perfect information and enforcement with an official fine at 500 INR.
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5.6.2 Raising subjective expectations of medical expenditures
I now focus on different scenarios of subjective expectations of medical costs and relate them to policies such as
awareness campaigns regarding the road mortality rate or the usefulness of a helmet.
I unfortunately don’t have access to any official data regarding the actual health expenditures road victims have
to pay. I therefore simply consider different scenarios with increasing unconditional expected medical costs and
estimate the helmet use associated to each of these levels of expenditures for different motorbike trips. Table 5.11
reports the simulated change in percentage of use. While no increase in the share of motorcyclists wearing a helmet
is found on short distance trips, doubling the expectations of injury costs (from 2,400 to 5,000 INR) raises the use of
a head protection device for long distance trips by 0.5 percentage points. A share of 98.2% of motorcyclists using a
helmet in long distance trips, implying an increase of 20 percentage points, is obtained when multiplying by 20 the
individuals’ beliefs. These results suggest that awareness campaigns stressing the high cost of road injuries in case
of an accident and in particular if not using a helmet might be useful to increase helmet use among motorcyclists
in Delhi. Lewis et al. (2007) summarized the literature on road safety media campaigns and concluded that the
impact of shocking advertisement is rather mixed and inconsistent. Fear campaigns must therefore be used with
caution. Using factual information or humor might be alternative options.
Finally, highlighting the risk one faces even in short distance trips could raise the use of helmets among indi-
viduals who use a motorbike only in the vicinity of their homes or who wear a head protection only in long distance
journeys. When imputing the estimated impact of unconditional expected medical costs found for long trips to
helmet use on short distance ones (scenario 8), it appears that if individuals thought that short distance journeys
imply similar health risks as longer trips, an increase of around 6% in the share of individuals who use a helmet
would be observed.
Table 5.11: Estimated helmet use for changes in expectations of medical expenditures
on main roads for trips in
Helmet use for long trips for short trips the neighborhood
observations 610 663 660
Current UEC medical expenditures (INR) 2,408 2,704 2,755
Declared helmet use (%) 78.20 59.58 53.03
Declared - predicted helmet use (average) -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
% change in helmet use
Scenario 5 UEC = 5,000 INR +3.04% +0.82% +1.21%
Scenario 6 UEC = 10,000 INR +7.40% +0.99% +1.79%
Scenario 7 UEC = 50,000 INR +25.63% +2.40% +6.56%
Scenario 8 βˆl ongU ECi n j - +4.63% +6.54%
Notes: Computations based on probit regression with circle dummies (cf. Table 5.20).
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5.7 Conclusion
Road mortality is a growing burden in many developing countries. To counteract this trend, an increasing num-
ber of low and middle income countries have started to implement mandatory helmet regulations. Yet, helmet
use remains low in a majority of African and Asian countries, where motorcyclists represent an important share
of both traffic mix and road casualties. Understanding the mechanisms leading to the adoption of a helmet by
motorcyclists is therefore key to implement efficient safety measures in these regions.
This paper studies motorbike users’ decisions whether to wear a head protection or not, using original data
collected in a low income country metropolitan city, New Delhi.
I first explore the factors which may explain the observed differences in beliefs across individuals and show
that road exposure and previous experiences of road related risks impact the formation of motorcyclists’ beliefs.
Nonetheless, differences across individuals seem also to come from differences in actual health hazards and police
enforcement intensity.
In a second step, I study the impact of subjective expectations of injury and fine on helmet adoption; this, in
various traveling situations differing by the length of the trip and the type of roads taken. Both fear of injuries and
police threat are indeed likely to play a role in the safety conduct adopted by motorcyclists.27 I therefore investigate
whether one type of belief is more likely to be associated with the adoption of a helmet for a specific type of travel.
In the empirical analysis, I find that while expectations regarding medical expenditures increase the adoption of
helmet on long distance trips on main roads, it is rather the threat of police sanctions which explains helmet use
on short distance journeys. Differentiated effects are found for helmet use on short distance trips on main roads
between gender and income groups. In particular, expected medical costs impact the decision of using a helmet
for women but not for men. Moreover, the influence of financial penalties varies across income groups, richer
individuals being less sensitive to fines. This is not surprising as sanctions represent a smaller share of wealthier
individuals’ revenues.
In view of designing policies, various measures impacting expectations of injury or fine have been considered
and their impact on helmet use have been assessed. Based on these predictions, different policy directions can be
suggested. First, the increase of police threat through enforcement, information or fine levels should increase hel-
met use in short distance journeys. As a matter of fact, combining these measures should be even more effective.
Second, information campaigns stressing the usefulness of a helmet to avoid severe injuries (implying important
health expenditures) even for motorbike trips nearby one’s home are also likely to make motorcyclists adopt safer
conducts.
27By using the slogan “Protect yourself from hefty fines and serious injuries. Wear a helmet.” in its 2012 road safety campaign, the Cambodian
government actually intented to impact both dimensions.
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5.8 Appendices
Appendix A. Variation within circles
Table 5.12: Variation within circles - previous experiences and expectations
# of circles
Observations Mean Standard deviation without
N n T-bar overall overall between within variation†
EXPECTATIONS
Probability of injury¦ 836 32 26.13 0.58 0.31 0.20 0.26 0
Expected medical costs (in INR) 772 32 24.13 5,189 9,012 4,217 8,013 0
IQR of medical costs (in INR) 772 32 24.13 6,718 15,039 6,162 13,763 0
Probability of police stop¦ 878 32 27.44 0.65 0.34 0.20 0.29 1
Expected fines (in INR) 760 32 23.75 129 103 60 85 0
IQR of fines (in INR) 760 32 23.75 112 109 67 92 0
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES
Experienced a road crash (%) 836 32 26.13 7.04 26.22 7.46 25.44 11
Has a relative involved in a road crash (%) 836 32 26.13 6.70 25.01 12.39 23.39 15
Has been sanctionned by the police (%) 867 32 27.09 7.04 25.59 9.81 24.85 11
Discretionnary power of police¦ 841 32 26.28 0.36 0.30 0.19 0.25 1
Police officers can be bribed (%) 869 32 27.16 36.48 48.16 21.86 44.59 1
ROAD HABITS
Uses the moto to commute to work (%) 833 32 26.03 65.07 47.70 14.35 46.09 0
Uses the moto frequently (%) 835 32 26.09 44.55 49.73 20.27 46.70 0
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
Prays daily (%) 832 32 26 71.80 44.93 16.80 42.21 1
Notes: T-bar is the average number of respondents per circle (N/n). † Total number of circles is 32.
¦ This variable takes values from 0 to 1.
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Table 5.13: Variation within circles - expectations and helmet use
# of circles
Observations Mean Standard deviation without
N n T-bar overall overall between within variation†
HELMET USE
Long trips on main roads (%) 670 32 20.94 80.15 39.92 12.62 38.03 4
Short trips on main roads (%) 673 32 21.03 59.44 49.14 24.05 44.86 2
Trips in neighborhoods (%) 664 32 20.75 53.46 49.92 21.36 46.56 2
EXPECTATIONS
UEC medical costs (INR) 673 32 21.03 2,729 5,087 2,357 4,636 0
UEC fines (INR) 673 32 21.03 93 102 58 86 0
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS
Male (%) 673 32 21.03 69.54 46.06 14.78 44.18 2
Age (in years) 673 32 21.03 36.01 12.86 4.42 12.48 0
Level of education (3 groups) 673 32 21.03 2.26 0.65 0.40 0.60 2
Household monthly income 3
less than 10,000 INR (%) 673 32 21.03 32.84 47.00 28.96 41.66
10,000 to 20,000 INR (%) 673 32 21.03 34.47 47.56 20.85 43.99
above 20,000 INR (%) 673 32 21.03 16.94 37.54 18.80 33.78
Share of one’s contribution to income¦ 673 32 21.03 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.37 0
Head of HH (%) 673 32 21.03 38.48 48.69 14.90 47.73 1
Married (%) 673 32 21.03 72.96 44.45 11.70 43.21 0
Number of children 673 32 21.03 1.47 1,32 0.47 1.27 0
Sikh (%) 673 32 21.03 4.31 20.32 11.04 18.68 22
Belongs to a low caste (%) 673 32 21.03 37.30 48.40 26.85 43.91 5
Believes his life is in god’s hands (%) 673 32 21,03 89.90 30.16 9.93 28.77 15
Risk aversion score¦¦ 673 32 21.03 2.72 0.78 0.43 0.70 0
Has a health insurance (%) 673 32 21.03 12.93 33.58 14.71 31.76 7
Notes: T-bar is the average number of respondents per circle (N/n). This table shows the statistics for the
sample used in my analysis. ¦ this variable takes values from 0 to 0.9. ¦¦ the risk aversion score takes values
from 1 to 4. † Total number of circles is 32.
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Appendix B. Additional explanatory variables
Table 5.14: Influence of expectations on helmet use - complete set of independent variables
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005+ -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.011 0.077??? 0.049??
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Risk aversion (average, 8 points) -0.009 0.002 0.001
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Male (=1) 0.409??? 0.414??? 0.390???
(0.052) (0.061) (0.070)
Married (=1) -0.002 0.044 0.014
(0.045) (0.057) (0.072)
# of children 0.003 -0.007 -0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Head of the household (=1) 0.004 0.043 0.059
(0.042) (0.048) (0.050)
Age (in years) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Level of education (3 groups) -0.009 0.047+ 0.053+
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032)
Household monthly income, ref: less than 10,000 INR
between 10,000 and 20,000 INR -0.006 -0.002 0.030
(0.041) (0.046) (0.053)
more than 20,000 INR 0.013 0.095+ 0.092
(0.042) (0.064) (0.078)
Share of one’s contribution to income 0.045 0.004 0.055
(0.072) (0.086) (0.079)
Sikh (=1) -0.272? -0.221+ -0.217+
(0.141) (0.142) (0.133)
Belongs to a low caste (=1) -0.034 -0.080? -0.063
(0.042) (0.045) (0.054)
Has health insurance (=1) -0.010 -0.018 -0.048
(0.025) (0.046) (0.053)
Believes fate is in god’s hands (=1) 0.006 -0.061 -0.126
(0.030) (0.077) (0.085)
R2 0.296 0.261 0.243
Observations 670 673 665
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance. Clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
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Appendix C. Highest values of expected costs
Table 5.15: Influence of expectations on helmet use - using alternative distribution’s information
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
UP75 medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UP75 fines (hund. INR) 0.106 0.591??? 0.377?
(0.134) (0.148) (0.157)
Risk aversion (average, 8 points) -0.010 0.001 0.000
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
R2 0.295 0.265 0.246
Observations 670 673 665
Hausman test (p-value)
OLS vs. FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
FE vs. RE 0.000 0.224 0.000
UMAX medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.001+ 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
UMAX fines (hund. INR) 0.072 0.478??? 0.287???
(0.107) (0.127) (0.123)
Risk aversion (average, 8 points) -0.010 0.000 -0.000
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
R2 0.298 0.268 0.244
Observations 670 673 665
Hausman test (p-value)
OLS vs. FE 0.000 0.000 0.000
FE vs. RE 0.000 0.015 0.000
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance. Clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, gender, age,
income, education level, contribution to income, Sikh, caste, risk aversion, health insurance
and existence of a superior force.
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Appendix D. Tackling reverse causality
Table 5.16: Reverse causality tests
UEC inj. UEC fine UEC inj. UEC fine UEC inj. UEC fine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Helmet use
Long trips on main roads 1.860 1.188
(9.388) (1.796)
Short trips on main roads 0.7309 0.404
(3.213) (0.595)
Trips in the neighbourhood 2.335 0.905
(6.993) (1.298)
observations 670 670 673 673 665 665
on main roads for trips in
for long trips for short trips neighborhoods
First stage
Helmet provision (=1) † 0.062??? 0.182??? 0.092?
(0.021) (0.044) (0.054)
Weak identification test ‡ 8.901 16.900 2.861
F statistic 12.08??? 15.985??? 17.95???
R2 0.281 0.236 0.252
observations 670 673 665
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5% and ? 10% significance. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of hh, gender,
age, income, education level, contribution to income caste, risk aversion, health insurance and existence
of a superior force. † helmet provision is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the respondent is a driver and
rides a moto purchased in first hand less than 2 years ago and 0 otherwise. ‡ Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.
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Appendix E. Individual omitted variables
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Table 5.17: Influence of expectations on helmet use - using alternative distribution’s information
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 - adding average speed
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.007?? -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.038??? 0.085??? 0.058??
(0.013) (0.016) (0.028)
Average speed 0.002??? -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.317 0.267 0.237
Observations 525 527 522
Panel 2 - adding road habits
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005+ -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.010 0.075??? 0.048??
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Uses the moto frequently (=1) 0.064? 0.092? 0.050
(0.032) (0.047) (0.045)
Uses the moto to commute to work (=1) 0.028 0.018 0.022
(0.031) (0.048) (0.037)
R2 0.299 0.267 0.244
Observations 668 671 663
Panel 3 - adding preference for present
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.005 0.072??? 0.045??
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Present oriented (=1) -0.023 0.080? 0.015
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
R2 0.328 0.274 0.243
Observations 626 629 621
Panel 4 - adding confidence on one’s skills (sample of drivers)
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.012+ 0.069??? 0.064??
(0.008) (0.022) (0.027)
Risk aversion (8 point scale) 0.023? 0.022+ 0.024
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Thinks he has a better driving skills than -0.043?? -0.027 -0.073?
other drivers (=1) (0.020) (0.040) (0.041)
R2 0.244 0.148 0.148
Observations 393 393 389
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance. Clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, gender, age,
income, education level, contribution to income, Sikh, caste, risk aversion, health insurance
and existence of a superior force.
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Appendix F. Excluding individuals who did not undestand the probability scale
Five general questions were asked to respondents in order to control for their understanding of the scale.
First, we check the understanding of the probability concept:
1. “Imagine I have 5 balls, one of which is red and four of which are blue. If you pick one of these balls without
looking, how likely it is that you will pick the red ball?” - variable named “red ball” below.
Two nested questions were also asked:
2. “How likely are you to go to the market sometime in the next two days?” - variable named “2 days” below.
3. “How likely are you to go to the market sometime in the next two weeks?” - variable named “2 weeks” below.
The variable called “nested” takes value 1 if the individual gave consistent answers to above two questions.
Finally, we aimed at check whether the entire scale was used by the respondent and therefore asked about events
for which everybody should reply the extreme values of the scale:
4. “How likely do you think it is that you will go out of the house for any reason in the next month?” - variable
named “outside” below. This question turned out to be misleading, while we meant outside the house, some
respondents understood out of the city. This confusion explain the unexpected results presented in Table
5.19.
5. “How likely is it that Christmas will fall in the month of June?” - variable named “christmas” below.
Only 4 respondents have no correct answer. 52% of interviewees provided only one or no inconsistent answer.
36% gave two consistent replies out of four.
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Table 5.18: Check questions
probability concept nested questions extreme values
red ball 2 days 2 weeks outside christmas
event will not happen (%) 3.05 2.83 1.36 6.59 96.06
1 8.77 3.28 1.36 6.14 0.48
2 24.24 4.87 1.25 4.89 0.48
3 9.99 3.74 3.28 2.05 0
4 15.35 3.96 2.60 1.14 0.48
5 26.55 12.46 6.46 7.61 1.08
6 5.97 4.53 4.19 3.07 0
7 2.68 7.47 8.61 6.02 0
8 1.34 8.04 9.29 8.07 0.36
9 0.37 4.87 6.91 6.59 0.12
event will happen 1.71 43.94 54.7 47.84 0.96
Share of correct answers 24.24 84.60 47.84 96.06
observations 821 883 883 880 837
Notes: In bold are indicating the share of individuals who provide the expected answer to each question.
Remark: 84.60% of respondents said that the probability that they will go to the market in the next two
weeks was higher or equal as the probability they will go within two days.
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Table 5.19: Keeping individuals who understood the probability scale
christmas christmas
Sample all christmas nested outside OR nested AND nested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Helmet use for long trips on main roads
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.005+ 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.005+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.032) (0.018) (0.018)
R2 0.296 0.280 0.287 0.441 0.290 0.279
Observations 670 629 552 306 647 521
Panel B: Helmet use for short trips on main roads
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.077??? 0.073??? 0.067??? 0.079??? 0.072??? 0.063???
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.038) (0.018) (0.014)
R2 0.261 0.267 0.288 0.352 0.266 0.298
Observations 673 632 555 308 650 524
Panel C: Helmet use for trips in residential neighbordhoods
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
UEC fines (hund. INR) 0.049?? 0.049?? 0.052?? 0.050?? 0.048?? 0.052??
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
R2 0.243 0.252 0.253 0.359 0.248 0.267
Observations 665 625 548 304 642 518
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance. Controls are marital status, # of children, head of hh, gender,
age, income, education level, contribution to income caste, risk aversion, health insurance, helmet ownership and
existence of a superior force. Estimations in column (1) corresponds to regressions presented in Table 5.5.
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Appendix G. Probit estimations
Table 5.20: Influence of expectations on helmet use - using unconditional expected costs (UEC)
Helmet use on main roads trips in the
long trips short trips neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficients
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.042 0.001 0.002
(0.031) (0.016) (0.015)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.027 0.359??? 0.154?
(0.117) (0.123) (0.084)
Pseudo R2 0.374 0.342 0.279
Observations 610 660 663
Marginal effects
UEC medical expenditures (th. INR) 0.008 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
UEC fines (hund.INR) 0.005 0.090??? 0.044??
(0.021) (0.030) (0.023)
Notes: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10% and + 15% significance.
Probit estimations with circle dummies and clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.
Controls are marital status, # of children, head of household, gender, age, income, education level,
contribution to income, Sikh, caste, risk aversion, health insurance and existence of a superior force.
Remark: The difference in the number of observations between probit and linear probability
estimations is due to the use of dummies in the former specification: observations being dropped in case
of an absence of variation in the variable of interest among respondents belonging to the same area.
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